11 ideas
14082 | No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Many decent candidates could the referent of this 'cup', differing over whether outlying particles are parts. No further sortal I could invoke will be selective enough to rule out all but one referent for it. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1 n8) | |
A reaction: I never had much faith in sortals for establishing individual identity, so this point comes as no surprise. The implication is strongly realist - that the cup has an identity which is permanently beyond our capacity to specify it. |
14081 | Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: There can be determinately true identity claims despite indeterminate reference of the terms flanking the identity sign; these will be identity claims true under all admissible interpretations of the flanking terms. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1) | |
A reaction: In informal contexts there might be problems with the notion of what is 'admissible'. Is 'my least favourite physical object' admissible? |
13766 | 'If' is the same as 'given that', so the degrees of belief should conform to probability theory [Ramsey, by Ramsey] |
Full Idea: Ramsey suggested that 'if', 'given that' and 'on the supposition that' come to the same thing, and that the degrees of belief in the antecedent should then conform to probability theory. | |
From: report of Frank P. Ramsey (Truth and Probability [1926]) by Frank P. Ramsey - Law and Causality B | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
19419 | Not all of perception is accompanied by consciousness [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I do not think that the Cartesians have ever proved or can prove that every perception is accompanied by consciousness. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.195) | |
A reaction: This idea is very important in Leibniz, because non-conscious or barely conscious thoughts and perceptions explain a huge amount about behaviour, reality and morality. |
19143 | Ramsey gave axioms for an uncertain agent to decide their preferences [Ramsey, by Davidson] |
Full Idea: Ramsey gave an axiomatic treatment of preference in the face of uncertainty, when applied to a particular agent. | |
From: report of Frank P. Ramsey (Truth and Probability [1926]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 2 | |
A reaction: This is evidently the beginnings of Bayesian decision theory. |
19421 | Souls act as if there were no bodies, and bodies act as if there were no souls [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Everything takes place in souls as if there were no body, and everything takes place in bodies as if there were no souls. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.198) | |
A reaction: I don't think I have ever encountered a modern thinker who accepts this view. Leibniz rejected Occasionalism, but his account depends entirely on the role of God, to set up the pre-established harmony. Why would God do that? |
19420 | Death and generation are just transformations of an animal, augmented or diminished [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Death, like generation, is only the transformation of the same animal, which is sometimes augmented and sometimes diminished. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.195) | |
A reaction: Leibniz has a very unusual view of death, since neither minds nor their bodies can ever be wholly destroyed. Death is a kind of shrinking. I suspect that he was wrong about that. |
19416 | Not all of matter is animated, any more than a pond full of living fish is animated [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It must not be said that each portion of matter is animated, just as we do not say that a pond full of fishes is an animated body, although a fish is. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.190) | |
A reaction: This is a particularly clear picture of the role of monads in matter. Monads are attached to bodies, which are entirely inanimate, but monads suffuse matter and give it its properties, like particularly bubbly champagne. Cf Idea 19422. |
19422 | Every particle of matter contains organic bodies [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There is no particle of matter which does not contain organic bodies. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.198) | |
A reaction: Cf Idea 19416. There seems to be an interaction problem here (solved, presumably, by pre-established harmony). The organic bodies are there to explain the active behaviour of matter, but the related matter seems intrinsically inert. |
19418 | Mechanics shows that all motion originates in other motion, so there is a Prime Mover [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The maxim that there is no motion which has not its origin in another motion, according to the laws of mechanics, leads us again to the Prime Mover. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.194) | |
A reaction: This is Leibniz's endorsement (uncredited) to Aquinas's First Way. It is hard to see how the laws of mechanics could have anything to say about the origin of movement. And doesn't the law say that the motions of God need a mover? |
19417 | All substances are in harmony, even though separate, so they must have one divine cause [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: My system of Pre-established Harmony furnishes a new proof of God's existence, since it is manifest that the agreement of so many substances, of which the one has no influence upon the other, could only come from a general cause on which they all depend. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.192) | |
A reaction: Adjacent harmony seems self-explanatory, but remote harmony is interesting evidence for God. Hence modern quantum non-locality should make us all wonder whether there is a deeper explanation. |