37 ideas
18290 | But what is the reasoning of the body, that it requires the wisdom you seek? [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: There is more reason in your body than in your best wisdom. For who knows for what purpose your body requires precisely your best wisdom? | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.05) | |
A reaction: Lovely question. For years I've paid lip-service to wisdom as the rough aim of all philosophy. Not quite knowing what wisdom is doesn't bother me, but knowing why I want wisdom certainly does, especially after this idea. |
18303 | Reject wisdom that lacks laughter [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Let that wisdom be false to us that brought no laughter with it! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 3.12.23) |
13734 | Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: On the now dominant Quinean view, metaphysics is about what there is (such as properties, meanings and numbers). I will argue for the revival of a more traditional Aristotelian view, on which metaphysics is about what grounds what. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], Intro) | |
A reaction: I find that an enormously helpful distinction, and support the Aristotelian view. Schaffer's general line is that what exists is fairly uncontroversial and dull, but the interesting truths about the world emerge when we grasp its structure. |
13751 | If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Traditional metaphysics is so tightly woven into the fabric of philosophy that it cannot be torn out without the whole tapestry unravelling. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.3) | |
A reaction: I often wonder why the opponents of metaphysics still continue to do philosophy. I don't see how you address questions of ethics, or philosophy of mathematics (etc) without coming up against highly general and abstract over-questions. |
19433 | The universe is infinitely varied, so the Buridan's Ass dilemma could never happen [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The Buridan's Ass case of perfect equilibrium is chimerical. ...The universe has no centre and its parts are infinitely varied; thus it will never happen that all will be perfectly equal and will strike equally from one side or the other. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Coste [1707], 1707) | |
A reaction: Can the great Leibniz have missed the point? Surely all that matters is that the ass cannot distinguish the two options - not that they actually are identical in every detail? If the ass is short-sighted, that should be easy to set up. |
13743 | We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Occam's Razor should only be understood to concern substances: do not multiply basic entities without necessity. There is no problem with the multiplication of derivative entities - they are an 'ontological free lunch'. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.1) | |
A reaction: The phrase 'ontological free lunch' comes from Armstrong. This is probably what Occam meant. A few extra specks of dust, or even a few more numbers (thank you, Cantor!) don't seem to challenge the principle. |
18305 | To love truth, you must know how to lie [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Inability to lie is far from being love of truth. ....He who cannot lie does not know what truth is. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 4.13.9) |
13741 | If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: We can automatically infer 'there are roses' from 'there are red roses' (with no shift in the meaning of 'roses'). Likewise one can automatically infer 'there are numbers' from 'there are prime numbers'. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.1) | |
A reaction: He similarly observes that the atheist's 'God is a fictional character' implies 'there are fictional characters'. Schaffer is not committing to a strong platonism with his claim - merely that the existence of numbers is hardly worth disputing. |
13748 | Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Grounding should be taken as primitive, as per the neo-Aristotelian approach. Grounding is an unanalyzable but needed notion - it is the primitive structuring conception of metaphysics. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.2) | |
A reaction: [he cites K.Fine 1991] I find that this simple claim clarifies the discussions of Kit Fine, where you are not always quite sure what the game is. I agree fully with it. It makes metaphysics interesting, where cataloguing entities is boring. |
13747 | Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Supervenience is mere modal correlation. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.2) |
13744 | The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: My preferred view is that there is only one fundamental entity - the whole concrete cosmos - from which all else exists by abstraction. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.1) | |
A reaction: This looks to me like weak anti-realism - that there are no natural 'joints' in nature - but I don't think Schaffer intends that. I take the joints to be fundamentals, which necessitates that the cosmos has parts. His 'abstraction' is clearly a process. |
13739 | Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Maybe the categories are determined by the different grounding relations, ..so that categories just are the ways things depend on substances. ...Categories are places in the dependence ordering. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 1.3) |
13742 | There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: I am happy to accept universal composition, on the grounds that there are heaps, piles etc with no integral unity, and that arbitrary composites are no less unified than heaps. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.1 n11) | |
A reaction: The metaphysical focus is then placed on what constitutes 'integral unity', which is precisely the question which most interested Aristotle. Clearly if there is nothing more to an entity than its components, scattering them isn't destruction. |
13752 | The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: The notion of grounding my capture a crucial mereological distinction (missing from classical mereology) between an integrated whole with genuine unity, and a mere aggregate. x is an integrated whole if it grounds its proper parts. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 3.1) | |
A reaction: That gives a nice theoretical notion, but if you remove each of the proper parts, does x remain? Is it a bare particular? I take it that it will have to be an abstract principle, the one Aristotle was aiming at with his notion of 'form'. Schaffer agrees. |
19434 | There may be a world where dogs smell their game at a thousand leagues [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There will perhaps be a world in which dogs will have sufficiently good noses to scent their game at a thousand leagues. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Coste [1707], 1707) | |
A reaction: Wonderful. This should immediately replace Lewis's much repeated example of a world containing a talking donkey. We should always honour the first person to suggest an idea. That is one of the motivations for this collection of ideas. |
13749 | Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: One motivation for dialetheism is the view that there are impossible worlds. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.3) |
13740 | 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: A 'Moorean certainty' is when something is more credible than any philosopher's argument to the contrary. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.1) | |
A reaction: The reference is to G.E. Moore's famous claim that the existence of his hand is more certain than standard sceptical arguments. It sounds empiricist, but they might be parallel rational truths, of basic logic or arithmetic. |
20757 | The powerful self behind your thoughts and feelings is your body [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Behind your thoughts and feelings stands a powerful commander, an unknown wise man - he is called a self. He lives in your body; he is your body. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], I.4), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 5 'Creature' | |
A reaction: I find Nietzsche's view of the self very congenial, though I tend to see the self as certain central functions of the brain. The brain is enmeshed in the body (as in the location of pains). |
18289 | Forget the word 'I'; 'I' is performed by the intelligence of your body [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: You say 'I' and you are proud of this word. But greater than this - although you will not believe in it - is your body and its great intelligence, which does not say 'I' but performs 'I'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.05) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure if I understand this, but I offer it as a candidate for the most profound idea ever articulated about personal identity. |
18299 | The will is constantly frustrated by the past [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Powerless against that which has been done, the will is an angry spectator of all things past. The will cannot will backwards; that it cannot break time and time's desire - that is the will's most lonely affliction. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 2.20) |
18297 | We created meanings, to maintain ourselves [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Man first implanted values into things to maintain himself - he first created the meaning of things, a human meaning! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.16) | |
A reaction: It is certainly hard to see anything resembling values or meaning in the cosmos, if you remove the human beings. We should expect an evolutionary grounding in their explanation. |
18293 | The noble man wants new virtues; the good man preserves what is old [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The noble man wants to create new things and a new virtue. The good man wants the old things and that the old things shall be preserved. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.09) | |
A reaction: There is a limit to how many plausible virtues the noble men can come up with. We may already have run out. Are we going to have to re-run the Iliad? |
18301 | We only really love children and work [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: One loves from the very heart only one's child and one's work. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 3.03) | |
A reaction: Very Nietzchean (and masculine?) to cite one's work. Rachmaninov said he was 85% musician and 15% human being, so I guess he loved music from the very heart. |
18307 | I want my work, not happiness! [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Do I aspire after happiness? I aspire after my work! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 4.20) | |
A reaction: I empathise with aspiring to do something, rather than be something. But what do we wish for our children? Happiness first, then achievement? |
18291 | Virtues can destroy one another, through jealousy [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Every virtue is jealous of the others, and jealousy is a terrible thing. Even virtues can be destroyed through jealousy. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.07) | |
A reaction: How much more subtle and plausible than the picture of accumulating virtues, like medals! Zarathustra says it is best to have just one virtue. |
18287 | People now find both wealth and poverty too much of a burden [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Nobody grows rich or poor any more: both are too much of a burden. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.01) | |
A reaction: True. Most people I know are just puzzled by people who actually seem to want to be extremely wealthy. |
18295 | If you want friends, you must be a fighter [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: If you want a friend, you must be willing to wage war for him: and to wage war, you must be capable of being an enemy. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.15) |
18286 | The greatest experience possible is contempt for your own happiness, reason and virtue [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: What is the greatest thing you can experience? It is the hour of the great contempt. The hour in which even your happiness grows loathsome to you, and your reason and your virtue also. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.01) | |
A reaction: This would be a transient state for Nietzsche, in which you realise the hollowness of those traditional ideas, and begin to seek something else. |
18296 | An enduring people needs its own individual values [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: No people could live without evaluating; but if it wishes to maintain itself it must not evaluate as its neighbour evaluates. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.16) | |
A reaction: Political philosophers say plenty about a 'people', but little about what unifies them, or about what keeps one people distinct from another. Most people's are proud of their local values. |
18294 | The state coldly claims that it is the people, but that is a lie [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The state is the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly it lies, too; and this lie creeps from its mouth: 'I, the state, am the people'. It is a lie! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.12) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as just as true even after everyone gets the vote. Rulers can't help gradually forgetting about the people. |
18304 | Saints want to live as they desire, or not to live at all [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: 'To live as I desire to live or not to live at all': that is what I want, that is what the most saintly man wants. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 4.09) | |
A reaction: [spoken by Zarathustra] |
18300 | Whenever we have seen suffering, we have wanted the revenge of punishment [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The spirit of revenge: my friends, that, up to now, has been mankind's chief concern; and where there was suffering, there was always supposed to be punishment. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 2.20) |
18302 | Man and woman are deeply strange to one another! [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Who has fully conceived how strange man and woman are to one another! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 3.10.2) |
18292 | I can only believe in a God who can dance [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I should believe only in a God who understood how to dance. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.08) |
18298 | There can't be gods, because that leaves us nothing to create! [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: If there were gods, how could I endure not to be a god! Therefore there are no gods. ...For what would there be to create if gods - existed! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 2.02) | |
A reaction: [Zarathustra says this, not Nietzsche!] |
18306 | We don't want heaven; now that we are men, we want the kingdom of earth [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We certainly do not want to enter into the kingdom of heaven: we have become men, so we want the kingdom of earth. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 4.18.2) |
18288 | Heaven was invented by the sick and the dying [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: It was the sick and dying who despised the body and the earth and invented the things of heaven and the redeeming drops of blood. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.04) |