Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson', 'Logic [1897]' and 'on Goodman's 'Ways of Worldmaking''

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4 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism

18438	Every worldly event, without exception, is a redistribution of microphysical states [Quine]
	Full Idea: Nothing happens in the world, not the flutter of an eyelid, not the flicker of a thought, without some redistribution of microphysical states.
	From: Willard Quine (on Goodman's 'Ways of Worldmaking' [1978], p.98)
	A reaction: Is this causation, identity, or baffling supervenience?

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind

14082	No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: Many decent candidates could the referent of this 'cup', differing over whether outlying particles are parts. No further sortal I could invoke will be selective enough to rule out all but one referent for it.
	From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1 n8)
	A reaction: I never had much faith in sortals for establishing individual identity, so this point comes as no surprise. The implication is strongly realist - that the cup has an identity which is permanently beyond our capacity to specify it.

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects

14081	Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: There can be determinately true identity claims despite indeterminate reference of the terms flanking the identity sign; these will be identity claims true under all admissible interpretations of the flanking terms.
	From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1)
	A reaction: In informal contexts there might be problems with the notion of what is 'admissible'. Is 'my least favourite physical object' admissible?

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification

11052	Psychological logic can't distinguish justification from causes of a belief [Frege]
	Full Idea: With the psychological conception of logic we lose the distinction between the grounds that justify a conviction and the causes that actually produce it.
	From: Gottlob Frege (Logic [1897] [1897])
	A reaction: Thus Frege kicked the causal theory of justification well into touch long before it had even been properly formulated. That is not to say that there is no psychological aspect to logic, because there is.