18 ideas
| 14082 | No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: Many decent candidates could the referent of this 'cup', differing over whether outlying particles are parts. No further sortal I could invoke will be selective enough to rule out all but one referent for it. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1 n8) | |
| A reaction: I never had much faith in sortals for establishing individual identity, so this point comes as no surprise. The implication is strongly realist - that the cup has an identity which is permanently beyond our capacity to specify it. |
| 14081 | Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: There can be determinately true identity claims despite indeterminate reference of the terms flanking the identity sign; these will be identity claims true under all admissible interpretations of the flanking terms. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: In informal contexts there might be problems with the notion of what is 'admissible'. Is 'my least favourite physical object' admissible? |
| 20657 | There are 23 core brain functions, with known circuit, transmitters, genes and behaviour [Watson] |
| Full Idea: In 2014 the National Institutes of Mental Health published a list of 23 core brain functions and their associated neural circuitry, neurotransmitters and genes, and the behaviour and emotions that go with them. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 16 'Physics') | |
| A reaction: They were interested in the functions behind mental health, but I am interested in the functions behind our belief systems, which might produce a different focus. Sub-functions, perhaps. |
| 1457 | Morality requires a minimum commitment to the self [Rashdall] |
| Full Idea: A bare minimum of metaphysical belief about the self is found to be absolutely presupposed in the very idea of morality. | |
| From: Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], II.III.I.4) | |
| A reaction: This may not be true of virtue theory, where we could have a whole creature which lacked any sense of personhood, but yet had clear virtues and vices in its social functioning. Even if choices are central to morality, that might not need a self. |
| 20656 | Traditional ideas of the mind were weakened in the 1950s by mind-influencing drugs [Watson] |
| Full Idea: One development in particular in the 1950s helped to discredit the traditional concept of the mind. This was medical drugs that influenced the workings of the brain. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 16 'Intro') | |
| A reaction: This explains Ryle's 1949 book, and the Australian physicalists emerging in the late 1950s. Philosophers don't grasp how their subject is responsive to other areas of human knowledge. Of course, opium had always done this. |
| 20655 | Humans have been hunter-gatherers for 99.5% of their existence [Watson] |
| Full Idea: Anthropology shows that the hunter-gathering lifestyle has occupied 99.5 per cent of the time humans have been on earth. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 13 'Emergence') | |
| A reaction: If you are trying to understand humanity, you ignore this fact at your peril. Even agriculture is only a tiny part of our history, and that only disappeared as a major human activity (in many nations) in the last hundred years. |
| 6674 | All moral judgements ultimately concern the value of ends [Rashdall] |
| Full Idea: All moral judgements are ultimately judgements as to the value of ends. | |
| From: Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], VII.I) | |
| A reaction: I am increasingly struck by this, especially when observing that it is the great gap in Kant's theory. For some odd reason, he gives being rational the highest possible value. Why? Nietzsche is good on this. 'Eudaimonia' seems a good start, to me. |
| 6673 | Ideal Utilitarianism is teleological but non-hedonistic; the aim is an ideal end, which includes pleasure [Rashdall] |
| Full Idea: My view, called Ideal Utilitarianism, combines the utilitarian principle that Ethics must be teleological with a non-hedonistic view of ethical ends; actions are right or wrong as they produce an ideal end, which includes, but is not limited to, pleasure. | |
| From: Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], VII.I) | |
| A reaction: I certainly think that if you are going to be a consequentialist, then it is ridiculous to limit the end to pleasure, as it is an 'open question' as to whether we judge pleasures or pains to be good or bad. I am fond of beauty, goodness and truth, myself. |
| 20650 | The Uncertainty Principle implies that cause and effect can't be measured [Watson] |
| Full Idea: The Uncertainty Principle implied that in the subatomic world cause and effect could never be measured. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 05 'Against') | |
| A reaction: The fact that it can't be measured does not, presumably, entail that it doesn't exist. Physicists seem to ignore causation, rather than denying it. Can causation be real if it only exists at the macro-level, as an emergent phenomenon? |
| 20649 | The interference of light through two slits confirmed that it is waves [Watson] |
| Full Idea: Thomas Young in 1803 confirmed the idea of Huyghens that light is waves, showing how light passing through two slits produces an interference pattern that resembles water waves sluicing through two slits. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 04 'Conception') | |
| A reaction: The great puzzle emerges when it also turns out to be quantised particles. |
| 20661 | Electrons rotate in hyrogen atoms 10^13 times per second [Watson] |
| Full Idea: In the hydrogen atom the electron rotates some 10,000 billion times per second. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 18 'Evolutionary') | |
| A reaction: That's an awful lot. Is it at the speed of light? |
| 20647 | Quantum theory explains why nature is made up of units, such as elements [Watson] |
| Full Idea: Planck's quantum idea explained so much, including the observation that the chemical world is made up of discrete units - the elements. Discrete elements implied fundamental units of matter that were themselves discrete (as Dalton had said). | |
| From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 4 'Intro') | |
| A reaction: The atomic theory was only finally confirmed by Einstein in 1905. This idea implies that the very lowest level of all must have distinct building blocks, but so far we have got down to 'fields', which seem to be a sort of 'foam'. |
| 20654 | Only four particles are needed for matter: up and down quark, electron, electron-neutrino [Watson] |
| Full Idea: We need twelve particles in the master equation of the standard model, but it is necessary to have only four to build a universe (up and down quarks, the electron and the electron neutrino (or lepton). The existence of the others is 'a bit of a mystery'. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 11 'First Three') |
| 20651 | The shape of molecules is important, as well as the atoms and their bonds [Watson] |
| Full Idea: Pauling showed that the architecture - the shape of molecules was relevant (as well as the bonds). This meant that molecules were just as important as atoms in the understanding of matter. Molecules were not just the sum of their parts. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 05 'Three') | |
| A reaction: If Aristotle struggled to understand matter, then so should modern philosophers. This involves thermodynamics and chemistry, as well as quantum theory. |
| 20652 | In 1828 the animal substance urea was manufactured from inorganic ingredients [Watson] |
| Full Idea: In 1828 Wöhler, in an iconic experiment, had manufactured an organic substance, urea, hitherto the product solely of animals, out of inorganic materials, and without any interventions of vital force. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 06 'Inorganic') | |
| A reaction: For reductionists like me, the gradual explanation of life in inorganic terms is the great role model of explanation. I take it for granted that the human mind will go the same way, despite partisan resistance from a lot of philosophers. |
| 20658 | Information is physical, and living can be seen as replicating and preserving information [Watson] |
| Full Idea: In passing information, physical changes take place, and information is thus physical. On this account, the act of living can be seen as replicating and preserving the information that a living body is comprised of. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 17 'Dreams') | |
| A reaction: [He emphasises 'the act' of living, rather than a life] |
| 1458 | Conduct is only reasonable or unreasonable if the world is governed by reason [Rashdall] |
| Full Idea: Absolutely reasonable or unreasonable conduct could not exist in a world which was not itself the product of reason or governed by its dictates. | |
| From: Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], II.III.I.4) |
| 1459 | Absolute moral ideals can't exist in human minds or material things, so their acceptance implies a greater Mind [Rashdall, by PG] |
| Full Idea: An absolute moral ideal cannot exist in material things, or in the minds of individual people, so belief in it requires belief in a Mind which contains the ideal and is its source. | |
| From: report of Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], II.III.I.4) by PG - Db (ideas) |