Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson', 'Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science' and 'fragments/reports'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


4 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Many decent candidates could the referent of this 'cup', differing over whether outlying particles are parts. No further sortal I could invoke will be selective enough to rule out all but one referent for it.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1 n8)
     A reaction: I never had much faith in sortals for establishing individual identity, so this point comes as no surprise. The implication is strongly realist - that the cup has an identity which is permanently beyond our capacity to specify it.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: There can be determinately true identity claims despite indeterminate reference of the terms flanking the identity sign; these will be identity claims true under all admissible interpretations of the flanking terms.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1)
     A reaction: In informal contexts there might be problems with the notion of what is 'admissible'. Is 'my least favourite physical object' admissible?
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Knowledge is mind and knowing 'cohabiting' [Lycophron, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Lycophron has it that knowledge is the 'cohabitation' (rather than participation or synthesis) of knowing and the soul.
     From: report of Lycophron (fragments/reports [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1045b
     A reaction: This sounds like a rather passive and inert relationship. Presumably knowing something implies the possibility of acting on it.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Science is the reduction of diverse forces and powers to a smaller number that explain them [Kant]
     Full Idea: All natural philosophy consists in the reduction of given forces apparently diverse to a smaller number of forces and powers sufficient for the explication of the actions of the former.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science [1786], 534)
     A reaction: I'm beginning to think science is just tracking of complex forces and powers back to fundamental forces and powers. In which case, that is the analysis Kant is talking of. The standard model of physics would thrill him to bits.