Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson', 'The Modularity of Mind' and 'Concepts without Boundaries'

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8 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality

8983	If 'red' is vague, then membership of the set of red things is vague, so there is no set of red things [Sainsbury]
	Full Idea: Sets have sharp boundaries, or are sharp objects; an object either definitely belongs to a set, or it does not. But 'red' is vague; there objects which are neither definitely red nor definitely not red. Hence there is no set of red things.
	From: Mark Sainsbury (Concepts without Boundaries [1990], §2)
	A reaction: Presumably that will entail that there IS a set of things which can be described as 'definitely red'. If we describe something as 'definitely having a hint of red about it', will that put it in a set? In fact will the applicability of 'definitely' do?

7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation

8986	We should abandon classifying by pigeon-holes, and classify around paradigms [Sainsbury]
	Full Idea: We must reject the classical picture of classification by pigeon-holes, and think in other terms: classifying can be, and often is, clustering round paradigms.
	From: Mark Sainsbury (Concepts without Boundaries [1990], §8)
	A reaction: His conclusion to a discussion of the problem of vagueness, where it is identified with concepts which have no boundaries. Pigeon-holes are a nice exemplar of the Enlightenment desire to get everything right. I prefer Aristotle's categories, Idea 3311.

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind

14082	No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: Many decent candidates could the referent of this 'cup', differing over whether outlying particles are parts. No further sortal I could invoke will be selective enough to rule out all but one referent for it.
	From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1 n8)
	A reaction: I never had much faith in sortals for establishing individual identity, so this point comes as no surprise. The implication is strongly realist - that the cup has an identity which is permanently beyond our capacity to specify it.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

8982	Vague concepts are concepts without boundaries [Sainsbury]
	Full Idea: If a word is vague, there are or could be borderline cases, but non-vague expressions can also have borderline cases. The essence of vagueness is to be found in the idea vague concepts are concepts without boundaries.
	From: Mark Sainsbury (Concepts without Boundaries [1990], Intro)
	A reaction: He goes on to say that vague concepts are not embodied in clear cut sets, which is what gives us our notion of a boundary. So what is vague is 'membership'. You are either a member of a club or not, but when do you join the 'middle-aged'?

8984	If concepts are vague, people avoid boundaries, can't spot them, and don't want them [Sainsbury]
	Full Idea: Vague concepts are boundaryless, ...and the manifestations are an unwillingness to draw any such boundaries, the impossibility of identifying such boundaries, and needlessness and even disutility of such boundaries.
	From: Mark Sainsbury (Concepts without Boundaries [1990], §5)
	A reaction: People have a very fine-tuned notion of whether the sharp boundary of a concept is worth discussing. The interesting exception are legal people, who are often forced to find precision where everyone else hates it. Who deserves to inherit the big house?

8985	Boundaryless concepts tend to come in pairs, such as child/adult, hot/cold [Sainsbury]
	Full Idea: Boundaryless concepts tend to come in systems of contraries: opposed pairs like child/adult, hot/cold, weak/strong, true/false, and complex systems of colour terms. ..Only a contrast with 'adult' will show what 'child' excludes.
	From: Mark Sainsbury (Concepts without Boundaries [1990], §5)
	A reaction: This might be expected. It all comes down to the sorites problem, of when one thing turns into something else. If it won't merge into another category, then presumably the isolated concept stays applicable (until reality terminates it? End of sheep..).

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects

14081	Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: There can be determinately true identity claims despite indeterminate reference of the terms flanking the identity sign; these will be identity claims true under all admissible interpretations of the flanking terms.
	From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1)
	A reaction: In informal contexts there might be problems with the notion of what is 'admissible'. Is 'my least favourite physical object' admissible?

18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 3. Modularity of Mind

22186	Mental modules are specialised, automatic, and isolated [Fodor, by Okasha]
	Full Idea: Fodor argues that mental modules have three important featuresL 1) they are domain-specific, 2) their operation is mandatory, 3) they are informationally encapsulated.
	From: report of Jerry A. Fodor (The Modularity of Mind [1983]) by Samir Okasha - Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) 6
	A reaction: Mandatory is interesting. When I hear an English sentence I can't decide not to process it. Modules cannot be too isolated or they couldn't participate in the team. Each one needs a comms manager.