7 ideas
10464 | A trope is a bit of a property or relation (not an exemplification or a quality) [Bacon,John] |
Full Idea: A trope is an instance or bit (not an exemplification) of a property or a relation. Bill Clinton's eloquence is not his participating in the universal eloquence, or the peculiar quality of his eloquence, but his bit, and his alone, of eloquence. | |
From: John Bacon (Tropes [2008], Intro) | |
A reaction: If we have identified something as a 'bit' of something, we can ask whether that bit is atomic, or divisible into something else, and we can ask what are the qualities and properties and powers of this bit, we seems to defeat the object. |
10465 | Trope theory is ontologically parsimonious, with possibly only one-category [Bacon,John] |
Full Idea: A major attraction of tropism has been its promise of parsimony; some adherents (such as Campbell) go so far as to proclaim a one-category ontology. | |
From: John Bacon (Tropes [2008], §2) | |
A reaction: This seems to go against the folk idiom which suggests that it is things which have properties, rather than properties ruling to roost. Maybe if one identified tropes with processes, the theory could be brought more into line with modern physics? |
10467 | Individuals consist of 'compresent' tropes [Bacon,John] |
Full Idea: 'Qualitons' or 'relatons' (quality and relation tropes) are held to belong to the same individual if they are all 'compresent' with one another. | |
From: John Bacon (Tropes [2008], §4) | |
A reaction: There is a perennial problem with bundles - how to distinguish accidental compresence (like people in a lift) from united compresence (like people who make a family). |
14082 | No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Many decent candidates could the referent of this 'cup', differing over whether outlying particles are parts. No further sortal I could invoke will be selective enough to rule out all but one referent for it. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1 n8) | |
A reaction: I never had much faith in sortals for establishing individual identity, so this point comes as no surprise. The implication is strongly realist - that the cup has an identity which is permanently beyond our capacity to specify it. |
14081 | Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: There can be determinately true identity claims despite indeterminate reference of the terms flanking the identity sign; these will be identity claims true under all admissible interpretations of the flanking terms. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1) | |
A reaction: In informal contexts there might be problems with the notion of what is 'admissible'. Is 'my least favourite physical object' admissible? |
10466 | Maybe possible worlds are just sets of possible tropes [Bacon,John] |
Full Idea: Meinongian tropism has the advantage that possible worlds might be thought of as sets of 'qualitons' and 'relatons' (quality and relational tropes). | |
From: John Bacon (Tropes [2008], §3) | |
A reaction: You are still left with 'possible' to explain, and I'm not sure that anything is explain here. If the actual world is sets of tropes, then possible worlds would also have to be, I suppose. |
18202 | The concept of a field gradually replaced the substances in explaining relations between charges [Einstein/Infeld] |
Full Idea: In the beginning the field concept was no more than a means of facilitating the understanding of phenomena. ...In the new field language it is the field and not the charges themselves which is essential. The substance was overshadowed by the field. | |
From: Einstein,A/Infeld,L (The Evolution of Physics [1938], p.151), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics II.4 | |
A reaction: This is very important for philosophical metaphysicians, especially those like me who want to explain the universe by the nature of the stuff that composes it. The 'stuff' had better not be simplistic individual 'substances'. |