7 ideas
14082 | No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Many decent candidates could the referent of this 'cup', differing over whether outlying particles are parts. No further sortal I could invoke will be selective enough to rule out all but one referent for it. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1 n8) | |
A reaction: I never had much faith in sortals for establishing individual identity, so this point comes as no surprise. The implication is strongly realist - that the cup has an identity which is permanently beyond our capacity to specify it. |
16650 | 'Unity' is a particularly difficult word, because things can have hidden unity [Duns Scotus] |
Full Idea: I believe that 'unity' is one of the more difficult words in philosophy, for there are in things many hidden (occultae) unities that are obscure to us. | |
From: John Duns Scotus (Lectura [1298], I.17.2.4), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 | |
A reaction: Some examples would be nice. Do the Earth and the Moon form a unity, because of gravity? How ponders whether whiteness and a white man are unified. |
16678 | Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan] |
Full Idea: If magnitude were removed from matter by divine power, it would still have parts distinct from one another, but they would not be positioned either outside one another or inside one another, because position would be removed. | |
From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.8 f. 11va), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.4 | |
A reaction: This shows why Quantity is such an important category for scholastic philosopher. |
16793 | A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan] |
Full Idea: Less properly, one thing is said to be numerically the same as another according to the continuity of distinct parts, one in succession after another. In this way the Seine is said to be the same river after a thousand years. | |
From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.10, f. 13vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 29.3 | |
A reaction: This is a rather good solution to the difficulty of the looser non-transitive notion of a thing being 'the same'. The Ship of Theseus endures (in the simple case) as long as you remember to replace each departing plank. Must some parts be originals? |
14081 | Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: There can be determinately true identity claims despite indeterminate reference of the terms flanking the identity sign; these will be identity claims true under all admissible interpretations of the flanking terms. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1) | |
A reaction: In informal contexts there might be problems with the notion of what is 'admissible'. Is 'my least favourite physical object' admissible? |
16577 | Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan] |
Full Idea: Inductions are not demonstrations, because they do not conclude on account of their form, since it is not possible to make an induction from all cases. | |
From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.15 f. 18vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 02.3 | |
A reaction: Thus showing that demonstration really is meant to be as conclusive as a mathematical proof, and that Aristotle seems to think such a thing is possible in physical science. |
16576 | Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan] |
Full Idea: Induction should be regarded as a principle of natural science. For otherwise you could not prove that every fire is hot, that all rhubarb is purgative of bile, that every magnet attracts iron. | |
From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.15 f. 18vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 02.3 | |
A reaction: He is basing this on Aristotle, and refers to 'Physics' 190a33-b11. |