Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson', 'Lectura' and 'Identity, Essence and Indiscernibility'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14082 No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Many decent candidates could the referent of this 'cup', differing over whether outlying particles are parts. No further sortal I could invoke will be selective enough to rule out all but one referent for it.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1 n8)
     A reaction: I never had much faith in sortals for establishing individual identity, so this point comes as no surprise. The implication is strongly realist - that the cup has an identity which is permanently beyond our capacity to specify it.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
16650 'Unity' is a particularly difficult word, because things can have hidden unity [Duns Scotus]
     Full Idea: I believe that 'unity' is one of the more difficult words in philosophy, for there are in things many hidden (occultae) unities that are obscure to us.
     From: John Duns Scotus (Lectura [1298], I.17.2.4), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671
     A reaction: Some examples would be nice. Do the Earth and the Moon form a unity, because of gravity? How ponders whether whiteness and a white man are unified.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
14381 A statue is essentially the statue, but its lump is not essentially a statue, so statue isn't lump [Yablo, by Rocca]
     Full Idea: Yablo proposes the argument that Statue A is essentially a statue, and Lump 1 is not essentially a statue, so Statue A is not identical with Lump 1.
     From: report of Stephen Yablo (Identity, Essence and Indiscernibility [1987]) by Michael della Rocca - Essentialists and Essentialism I
     A reaction: Della Rocca and Yablo unashamedly elide necessary properties with essential properties, so this argument doesn't bother me too much. It concerns the statue and the clay having different modal properties.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14081 Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: There can be determinately true identity claims despite indeterminate reference of the terms flanking the identity sign; these will be identity claims true under all admissible interpretations of the flanking terms.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1)
     A reaction: In informal contexts there might be problems with the notion of what is 'admissible'. Is 'my least favourite physical object' admissible?