24 ideas
| 19441 | All philosophies presuppose their historical moment, and arise from it [Feuerbach] |
| Full Idea: Every philosophy originates as a manifestation of its time; its origin presupposes its historical time. | |
| From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy [1839], p.59) | |
| A reaction: There seems to be widespread agreement among continental philosophers about this idea, whereas analytic philosophers largely ignore, and treat Plato as if he were a current professor in Chicago. |
| 19442 | I don't study Plato for his own sake; the primary aim is always understanding [Feuerbach] |
| Full Idea: Plato in writing is only a means for me; that which is primary and a priori, that which is the ground to which all is ultimately referred, is understanding. | |
| From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy [1839], p.63) | |
| A reaction: It always seems to that the main aim of philosophy is understanding - which is why its central activity is explanation. |
| 13734 | Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: On the now dominant Quinean view, metaphysics is about what there is (such as properties, meanings and numbers). I will argue for the revival of a more traditional Aristotelian view, on which metaphysics is about what grounds what. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], Intro) | |
| A reaction: I find that an enormously helpful distinction, and support the Aristotelian view. Schaffer's general line is that what exists is fairly uncontroversial and dull, but the interesting truths about the world emerge when we grasp its structure. |
| 13751 | If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: Traditional metaphysics is so tightly woven into the fabric of philosophy that it cannot be torn out without the whole tapestry unravelling. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.3) | |
| A reaction: I often wonder why the opponents of metaphysics still continue to do philosophy. I don't see how you address questions of ethics, or philosophy of mathematics (etc) without coming up against highly general and abstract over-questions. |
| 13743 | We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: Occam's Razor should only be understood to concern substances: do not multiply basic entities without necessity. There is no problem with the multiplication of derivative entities - they are an 'ontological free lunch'. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.1) | |
| A reaction: The phrase 'ontological free lunch' comes from Armstrong. This is probably what Occam meant. A few extra specks of dust, or even a few more numbers (thank you, Cantor!) don't seem to challenge the principle. |
| 19444 | Each proposition has an antithesis, and truth exists as its refutation [Feuerbach] |
| Full Idea: Every intellectual determination has its antithesis, its contradiction. Truth exists not in unity with, but in refutation of its opposite. | |
| From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy [1839], p.72) | |
| A reaction: This appears to be a rejection of the 'synthesis' in Hegel, in favour of what strikes me as a rather more sensible interpretation of the modern dialectic. Being exists in contrast to nothingness, and truth exists in contrast to its negation? |
| 19445 | A dialectician has to be his own opponent [Feuerbach] |
| Full Idea: A thinker is a dialectician only insofar as he is his own opponent. | |
| From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy [1839], p.72) | |
| A reaction: Quite an inspirational slogan for beginners in philosophy. How many non-philosophers are willing to be their own opponent. In law courts and the House of Commons we assign the roles to separate persons. Hence rhetoric replaces reason? |
| 19443 | Truth forges an impersonal unity between people [Feuerbach] |
| Full Idea: The urge to communicate is a fundamental urge - the urge for truth. ...That which is true belongs neither to me nor exclusively to you, but is common to all. The thought in which 'I' and 'You' are united is a true thought. | |
| From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy [1839], p.65) | |
| A reaction: Sceptics may doubt that there are such truths, but this is certainly how we experience agreement - that there is some truth shared between us which is no longer the possession of either of us. Nice idea. |
| 13741 | If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: We can automatically infer 'there are roses' from 'there are red roses' (with no shift in the meaning of 'roses'). Likewise one can automatically infer 'there are numbers' from 'there are prime numbers'. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.1) | |
| A reaction: He similarly observes that the atheist's 'God is a fictional character' implies 'there are fictional characters'. Schaffer is not committing to a strong platonism with his claim - merely that the existence of numbers is hardly worth disputing. |
| 13748 | Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: Grounding should be taken as primitive, as per the neo-Aristotelian approach. Grounding is an unanalyzable but needed notion - it is the primitive structuring conception of metaphysics. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: [he cites K.Fine 1991] I find that this simple claim clarifies the discussions of Kit Fine, where you are not always quite sure what the game is. I agree fully with it. It makes metaphysics interesting, where cataloguing entities is boring. |
| 13747 | Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: Supervenience is mere modal correlation. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.2) |
| 13744 | The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: My preferred view is that there is only one fundamental entity - the whole concrete cosmos - from which all else exists by abstraction. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.1) | |
| A reaction: This looks to me like weak anti-realism - that there are no natural 'joints' in nature - but I don't think Schaffer intends that. I take the joints to be fundamentals, which necessitates that the cosmos has parts. His 'abstraction' is clearly a process. |
| 19446 | To our consciousness it is language which looks unreal [Feuerbach] |
| Full Idea: To sensuous consciousness it is precisely language that is unreal, nothing. | |
| From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy [1839], p.77) | |
| A reaction: Offered as a corrective to the view that our ontological commitments entirely concern what we are willing to say. |
| 13739 | Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: Maybe the categories are determined by the different grounding relations, ..so that categories just are the ways things depend on substances. ...Categories are places in the dependence ordering. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 1.3) |
| 13742 | There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: I am happy to accept universal composition, on the grounds that there are heaps, piles etc with no integral unity, and that arbitrary composites are no less unified than heaps. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.1 n11) | |
| A reaction: The metaphysical focus is then placed on what constitutes 'integral unity', which is precisely the question which most interested Aristotle. Clearly if there is nothing more to an entity than its components, scattering them isn't destruction. |
| 13752 | The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: The notion of grounding my capture a crucial mereological distinction (missing from classical mereology) between an integrated whole with genuine unity, and a mere aggregate. x is an integrated whole if it grounds its proper parts. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: That gives a nice theoretical notion, but if you remove each of the proper parts, does x remain? Is it a bare particular? I take it that it will have to be an abstract principle, the one Aristotle was aiming at with his notion of 'form'. Schaffer agrees. |
| 13749 | Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: One motivation for dialetheism is the view that there are impossible worlds. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.3) |
| 13740 | 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: A 'Moorean certainty' is when something is more credible than any philosopher's argument to the contrary. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.1) | |
| A reaction: The reference is to G.E. Moore's famous claim that the existence of his hand is more certain than standard sceptical arguments. It sounds empiricist, but they might be parallel rational truths, of basic logic or arithmetic. |
| 19447 | The Absolute is the 'and' which unites 'spirit and nature' [Feuerbach] |
| Full Idea: The Absolute is spirit and nature. ...But what then is the Absolute? Nothing other than this 'and', that is, the unity of spirit and nature. | |
| From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy [1839], p.82) | |
| A reaction: This is Feuerbach's spin on Hegel. He has been outlining idealist philosophy and the philosophy of nature in Schelling. Is this Spinoza's one substance? |
| 24071 | Markets are transparent, with known prices and activity, and minimal profits [Davies,W] |
| Full Idea: Markets are characterised by transparency. Prices are public, and all relevant activity is visible to everyone. And because of competition, profits are minimal, little more than a 'wage' for the seller. | |
| From: William Davies (Review of 'The Price is Wrong' by B.Christophers [2024], 24-04-04) | |
| A reaction: This account, from Braudel, is to distinguish markets from capitalism. |
| 24073 | Capitalists use their exceptional power to impose their own rules, and make the state their ally [Davies,W] |
| Full Idea: Capitalists exploit their unrivalled control over time and space in order to impose their rules on everyone else. …It triumphed late, only becoming dominant in the 19th century, when it had conscripted the state as its ally. | |
| From: William Davies (Review of 'The Price is Wrong' by B.Christophers [2024], 24-04-04) | |
| A reaction: This so very much makes sense of the modern world. Nowadays capitalists are so wealthy that the state has largely become their pawn, rather than their ally. Populist leaders are their puppets (and are well rewarded). |
| 24070 | Economies have material, economic and capitalist layers [Davies,W] |
| Full Idea: Braudel's economic history has three layers. At the bottom is material life of consumption, production, reproduction. Next is economic life of markets, of equals in exchange and competition. Top is capitalism, of opacity, monopoly, power, high profits. | |
| From: William Davies (Review of 'The Price is Wrong' by B.Christophers [2024], 24-04-04) | |
| A reaction: The point Davies emphasises here is the sharp distinction between the market economy and capitalism. |
| 24074 | Capitalism must mainly rely either on the labour market, or on the financial markets [Davies,W] |
| Full Idea: According to Marxists, the one market capitalism cannot do without is the labour market, which creates saleable things. Others, influenced by Keynes, emphasise financial markets, where pieces of paper change hands on expectation of their value. | |
| From: William Davies (Review of 'The Price is Wrong' by B.Christophers [2024], 24-04-04) | |
| A reaction: Modern Britain fits the Keynesian account much better, given its low production, and very active (until recently) London financial market. |
| 24072 | Capitalism is the anti-market, with opacity, monopolies, powers, exceptional profits and wealth [Davies,W] |
| Full Idea: Braudel sees capitalism as the 'anti-market': a world of opacity, monopoly, concentration of power and wealth, and the exceptional profits that can be achieved only by escaping the norms of 'economic life'. | |
| From: William Davies (Review of 'The Price is Wrong' by B.Christophers [2024], 24-04-04) | |
| A reaction: Given all the talk about the wonders of the 'free market' from right-wingers, this passage came as a revelation to me. Capitalists all dream of a monopoly, which is precisely the destruction of a market. |