Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson', 'Notes on Logic' and 'Classes and Attributes'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / d. Negative facts
22312 Facts can be both positive and negative [Wittgenstein, by Potter]
     Full Idea: In 1913 Wittgenstein was explicit that there are both positive and negative facts.
     From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notes on Logic [1913], B7) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 47 'Mole'
     A reaction: This is a prelude to the Tractatus, in which negative facts are denied in T1.11 (and in a 1919 letter), but then affirmed in T2.06.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
9783 While no two classes coincide in membership, there are distinct but coextensive attributes [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: Attributes and classes are said to be distinguished by the fact that whereas no two classes coincide in membership, there are supposed to be distinct but coextensive attributes.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Classes and Attributes [1967], §2)
     A reaction: This spells out the standard problem of renates and cordates, that creatures with hearts and with kidneys are precisely coextensive, but that these properties are different. Cartwright then attacks the distinction.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14082 No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Many decent candidates could the referent of this 'cup', differing over whether outlying particles are parts. No further sortal I could invoke will be selective enough to rule out all but one referent for it.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1 n8)
     A reaction: I never had much faith in sortals for establishing individual identity, so this point comes as no surprise. The implication is strongly realist - that the cup has an identity which is permanently beyond our capacity to specify it.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14081 Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: There can be determinately true identity claims despite indeterminate reference of the terms flanking the identity sign; these will be identity claims true under all admissible interpretations of the flanking terms.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1)
     A reaction: In informal contexts there might be problems with the notion of what is 'admissible'. Is 'my least favourite physical object' admissible?