20 ideas
10911 | Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
Full Idea: The most important (ontological) relations holding among truth-makers are the part and whole relations. | |
From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §6) | |
A reaction: Hence Peter Simons goes off and writes the best known book on mereology. Looks very promising to me. |
10906 | Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
Full Idea: A 'moment' is an existentially dependent or non-self-sufficient object, that is, an object which is of such a nature that it cannot exist alone, ....... and we suggest that moments could serve as truth-makers. | |
From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §2) | |
A reaction: [These three writers invented the term 'truth-maker'] |
10909 | Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
Full Idea: Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true, because sentences with more than one truth-maker would then be ambiguous, and 'a' and 'a exists' would have the same designatum. | |
From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §3) |
10907 | The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
Full Idea: A proposition may have a minimal truth-maker which is not unique, or a sentence may be made true by no single truth-maker but only by several jointly, or again only by several separately. | |
From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §3) |
10912 | Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
Full Idea: Because of negative propositions, investigators of truth-makers have said that they are special non-objectual entities with a logical complexity, but we think a theory is possible in which the truth relation is tied to ordinary and scientific experience. | |
From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §6) |
10908 | Correspondence has to invoke facts or states of affairs, just to serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
Full Idea: The correspondence theory of truth invokes a special category of non-objectual entities - facts, states of affairs, or whatever - simply to serve as truth-makers. | |
From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §3) |
10301 | The axiom of choice is controversial, but it could be replaced [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: The axiom of choice has a troubled history, but is now standard in mathematics. It could be replaced with a principle of comprehension for functions), or one could omit the variables ranging over functions. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Higher-Order Logic [2001], n 3) |
10588 | First-order logic is Complete, and Compact, with the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Early study of first-order logic revealed a number of important features. Gödel showed that there is a complete, sound and effective deductive system. It follows that it is Compact, and there are also the downward and upward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Higher-Order Logic [2001], 2.1) |
10298 | Some say that second-order logic is mathematics, not logic [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Some authors argue that second-order logic (with standard semantics) is not logic at all, but is a rather obscure form of mathematics. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Higher-Order Logic [2001], 2.4) |
10299 | If the aim of logic is to codify inferences, second-order logic is useless [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: If the goal of logical study is to present a canon of inference, a calculus which codifies correct inference patterns, then second-order logic is a non-starter. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Higher-Order Logic [2001], 2.4) | |
A reaction: This seems to be because it is not 'complete'. However, moves like plural quantification seem aimed at capturing ordinary language inferences, so the difficulty is only that there isn't a precise 'calculus'. |
10300 | Logical consequence can be defined in terms of the logical terminology [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Informally, logical consequence is sometimes defined in terms of the meanings of a certain collection of terms, the so-called 'logical terminology'. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Higher-Order Logic [2001], 2.4) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a compositional account, where we build a full account from an account of the atomic bits, perhaps presented as truth-tables. |
10290 | Second-order variables also range over properties, sets, relations or functions [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Second-order variables can range over properties, sets, or relations on the items in the domain-of-discourse, or over functions from the domain itself. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Higher-Order Logic [2001], 2.1) |
10292 | Downward Löwenheim-Skolem: if there's an infinite model, there is a countable model [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Downward Löwenheim-Skolem: a finite or denumerable set of first-order formulas that is satisfied by a model whose domain is infinite is satisfied in a model whose domain is the natural numbers | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Higher-Order Logic [2001], 2.1) |
10590 | Up Löwenheim-Skolem: if natural numbers satisfy wffs, then an infinite domain satisfies them [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Upward Löwenheim-Skolem: if a set of first-order formulas is satisfied by a domain of at least the natural numbers, then it is satisfied by a model of at least some infinite cardinal. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Higher-Order Logic [2001], 2.1) |
10296 | The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems fail for second-order languages with standard semantics [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Both of the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems fail for second-order languages with a standard semantics | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Higher-Order Logic [2001], 2.3.2) |
10297 | The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem seems to be a defect of first-order logic [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem is usually taken as a sort of defect (often thought to be inevitable) of the first-order logic. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Higher-Order Logic [2001], 2.4) | |
A reaction: [He is quoting Wang 1974 p.154] |
10294 | Second-order logic has the expressive power for mathematics, but an unworkable model theory [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Full second-order logic has all the expressive power needed to do mathematics, but has an unworkable model theory. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Higher-Order Logic [2001], 2.1) | |
A reaction: [he credits Cowles for this remark] Having an unworkable model theory sounds pretty serious to me, as I'm not inclined to be interested in languages which don't produce models of some sort. Surely models are the whole point? |
10591 | Logicians use 'property' and 'set' interchangeably, with little hanging on it [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: In studying second-order logic one can think of relations and functions as extensional or intensional, or one can leave it open. Little turns on this here, and so words like 'property', 'class', and 'set' are used interchangeably. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Higher-Order Logic [2001], 2.2.1) | |
A reaction: Important. Students of the metaphysics of properties, who arrive with limited experience of logic, are bewildered by this attitude. Note that the metaphysics is left wide open, so never let logicians hijack the metaphysical problem of properties. |
14082 | No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Many decent candidates could the referent of this 'cup', differing over whether outlying particles are parts. No further sortal I could invoke will be selective enough to rule out all but one referent for it. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1 n8) | |
A reaction: I never had much faith in sortals for establishing individual identity, so this point comes as no surprise. The implication is strongly realist - that the cup has an identity which is permanently beyond our capacity to specify it. |
14081 | Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: There can be determinately true identity claims despite indeterminate reference of the terms flanking the identity sign; these will be identity claims true under all admissible interpretations of the flanking terms. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1) | |
A reaction: In informal contexts there might be problems with the notion of what is 'admissible'. Is 'my least favourite physical object' admissible? |