5 ideas
17813 | Löwenheim-Skolem says any theory with a true interpretation has a model in the natural numbers [White,NP] |
Full Idea: The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem tells us that any theory with a true interpretation has a model in the natural numbers. | |
From: Nicholas P. White (What Numbers Are [1974], V) |
17812 | Finite cardinalities don't need numbers as objects; numerical quantifiers will do [White,NP] |
Full Idea: Statements involving finite cardinalities can be made without treating numbers as objects at all, simply by using quantification and identity to define numerically definite quantifiers in the manner of Frege. | |
From: Nicholas P. White (What Numbers Are [1974], IV) | |
A reaction: [He adds Quine 1960:268 as a reference] |
14082 | No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Many decent candidates could the referent of this 'cup', differing over whether outlying particles are parts. No further sortal I could invoke will be selective enough to rule out all but one referent for it. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1 n8) | |
A reaction: I never had much faith in sortals for establishing individual identity, so this point comes as no surprise. The implication is strongly realist - that the cup has an identity which is permanently beyond our capacity to specify it. |
14081 | Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: There can be determinately true identity claims despite indeterminate reference of the terms flanking the identity sign; these will be identity claims true under all admissible interpretations of the flanking terms. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1) | |
A reaction: In informal contexts there might be problems with the notion of what is 'admissible'. Is 'my least favourite physical object' admissible? |
8638 | Thomae's idea of abstract from peculiarities gives a general concept, and leaves the peculiarities [Frege on Thomae] |
Full Idea: When Thomae says "abstract from the peculiarities of the individual members of a set of items", or "disregard those characteristics which serve to distinguish them", we get a general concept under which they fall. The things keep their characteristics. | |
From: comment on C.J. Thomae (works [1869], §34) by Gottlob Frege - Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) §34 | |
A reaction: Interesting. You don't have to leave out their distinctive fur in order to count cats. But you have to focus on some aspect of them, because they aren't 'three meats'. |