Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson', 'Philosophy as a way of life' and 'Knowledge'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
9198 It is no longer possible to be a sage, but we can practice the exercise of wisdom [Hadot]
     Full Idea: Personally I firmly believe, perhaps naively, that it is possible for modern man to live, not as a sage (sophos) - most of the ancients did not hold this to be possible - but as a practitioner of the ever-fragile exercise of wisdom.
     From: Pierre Hadot (Philosophy as a way of life [1987], 7)
     A reaction: It seems to me quite plausible that the philosophical life might yet become a widespread ideal, even though philosophers seem to still be sheltering from storms two thousand years after Plato gave us that image.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
9197 The logos represents a demand for universal rationality [Hadot]
     Full Idea: The logos represents a demand for universal rationality.
     From: Pierre Hadot (Philosophy as a way of life [1987], 3.3)
     A reaction: That is at one end of the spectrum. At the other, in parts of 'Theaetetus', it is just a polite request to be given a few reasons, instead of a splattering of hopes and prejudices.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14082 No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Many decent candidates could the referent of this 'cup', differing over whether outlying particles are parts. No further sortal I could invoke will be selective enough to rule out all but one referent for it.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1 n8)
     A reaction: I never had much faith in sortals for establishing individual identity, so this point comes as no surprise. The implication is strongly realist - that the cup has an identity which is permanently beyond our capacity to specify it.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14081 Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: There can be determinately true identity claims despite indeterminate reference of the terms flanking the identity sign; these will be identity claims true under all admissible interpretations of the flanking terms.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1)
     A reaction: In informal contexts there might be problems with the notion of what is 'admissible'. Is 'my least favourite physical object' admissible?
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
19724 Belief is knowledge if it is true, certain, and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: I have always said that a belief was knowledge if it was (i) true, (ii) certain, (iii) obtained by a reliable process.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (Knowledge [1929]), quoted by Juan Comesaņa - Reliabilism 2
     A reaction: Remarkable to be addressing the Gettier problem at that date, but Russell had flirted with the problem. Ramsey says the production of the belief must be reliable, rather than the justification for the belief. Note that he wants certainty.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
9196 The pleasure of existing is the only genuine pleasure [Hadot]
     Full Idea: For epicureans, the only genuine pleasure there is is the pleasure of existing.
     From: Pierre Hadot (Philosophy as a way of life [1987], 3.1)
     A reaction: I don't know Hadot's source for this claim, but it is a nice idea, which I shall endeavour to incorporate into my own attitude to daily living. I'm not quite clear, though, why the pleasure of music is not a 'genuine' one.