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All the ideas for 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson', 'The Apology' and 'Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82'

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15 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Seeing with other eyes is more egoism, but exploring other perspectives leads to objectivity [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Wanting to know things as they are - that alone is the good inclination: not seeing ..with other eyes; that would be merely a change of place of egoistic seeing. …Practise at seeing with other eyes, and without human relationships, hence objectively!
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 11[013])
     A reaction: That Nietzsche thinks we should try to see things objectively will come as a bit of a shock to those who have him catalogued among the relativists. It's clear from other writings that he thinks (rightly) that perfect objectivity is unattainable.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
I tell the truth, even if it is repulsive [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: As a man I tell the truth, even the repulsive ones.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 12[86])
     A reaction: I wonder if even Nietzsche had his limits. He is quite coy about sexual matters, for example, before Freud and various sexual revolutions. To ruthlessly tell difficult truths strikes me as a scientific approach to the world.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Many decent candidates could the referent of this 'cup', differing over whether outlying particles are parts. No further sortal I could invoke will be selective enough to rule out all but one referent for it.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1 n8)
     A reaction: I never had much faith in sortals for establishing individual identity, so this point comes as no surprise. The implication is strongly realist - that the cup has an identity which is permanently beyond our capacity to specify it.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Essences are fictions needed for beings who represent things [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The true essence of things is a fiction of representing being, without which being is unable to represent. 11[330] Thinking must assert substance and identity because a knowing of complete flux is impossible.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 11[329])
     A reaction: I have defended (in my PhD) the thesis that the concept of essence is required for explanation. Do animals need the concept of essence in order to represent? I think people and animals ascribe essential natures to most things.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: There can be determinately true identity claims despite indeterminate reference of the terms flanking the identity sign; these will be identity claims true under all admissible interpretations of the flanking terms.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1)
     A reaction: In informal contexts there might be problems with the notion of what is 'admissible'. Is 'my least favourite physical object' admissible?
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Our inclinations would not conflict if we were a unity; we imagine unity for our multiplicity [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: How is it that we satisfy our stronger inclinations at the expense of our weaker inclinations? - In itself, if we were a unity, this split could not exist. In fact we are a multiplicity that has imagined a unity for itself.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 12[35])
     A reaction: Plato had the same thought, but stopped at three parts, rather than a multiplicity. What Nietzsche fails to say, I think, is that this 'imagined' unity of the mind is not optional, and obviously has a real link to the one body and the one life.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
If goodness needs true opinion but not knowledge, you can skip the 'examined life' [Vlastos on Plato]
     Full Idea: If true opinion without knowledge does suffice to guide action aright, the great mass of men and women may be spared the pain and hazards of the "examined" life.
     From: comment on Plato (The Apology [c.383 BCE], 38a) by Gregory Vlastos - Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher p.125
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
People who miss beauty seek the sublime, where even the ugly shows its 'beauty' [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Whoever does not achieve the beautiful seeks the wildly sublime, because there even the ugly can show its 'beauty'. Likewise we seek the wildly sublime morality.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 11[049])
     A reaction: Is the 'we' here Nietzsche, or the herd? The former, I guess, since some the values he likes seem rather ugly to me. He is a fan of war, for example. I'm guessing that massive destruction is sublime but ugly.
The sublimity of nature which dwarfs us was a human creation [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: This beauty and sublimity of nature, before which every human being seems small, was first imposed on nature by us.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 12[38])
     A reaction: I was struck when I was 10 with how indifferent to a landscape I was, when my mother told me it was 'beautiful'. Five years later I saw it differently. I assume nature is not intrinsically sublime. Dwarfed by our own concept is a bit odd.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
We can aspire to greatness by creating new functions for ourselves [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: To see the new greatness not above oneself, not outside oneself, but to make a new function from it.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 13[19])
     A reaction: Thus we might combine the Aristotelian and the existentialist views! Do we discover our function or invent it? Anyone who acquires an expertise is creating a new function for themselves, presumably with a high value.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
For absolute morality a goal for mankind is needed [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: I deny absolute morality because I do not know an absolute goal of mankind.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 11[037])
     A reaction: Christianity dreams of union of souls with God (clustering around God like goldfish to food, according to Dante). That is an absolute goal, justifying an absolute morality. If Aristotelians could identify human nature, its flourishing might be absolute.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Humans are vividly aware of short-term effects, and almost ignorant of the long-term ones [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: How weakly human beings feel responsible for their indirect and distant effects! And how cruelly and exaggeratedly the closest effect that we exert pounces on us - the effect we see, for which our myopic vision is still just sharp enough!
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 15[11])
     A reaction: This strikes me as both accurate and important, because consequentialist ethics is largely committed to judging by a very distorted image of their own objective.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
The goal is to settle human beings, like other animals, but humans are still changeable [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Obviously the goal is to make human beings as steady and firm as most animal species; they have adapted to the conditions of the earth etc. and do not change essentially. The human being is still changeable - is still becoming.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 11[044])
     A reaction: I favour an Aristotelian view, based on the flourishing of human nature, but this thought obviously challenges such a view. Great changes to a culture can make some difference to the apparent nature of people.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
See our present lives as eternal! Religions see it as fleeting, and aim at some different life [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Let us press the image of eternity on our life! This thought contains more than all religions that despise this life as fleeting and taught us to look toward an unspecified different life.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 11[159])
     A reaction: This is the best statement of the idea of eternal recurrence I have so far found. His ideal is to design a life for ourselves which we would be happy to see endlessly repeated. A lot of thought would have to go into that!
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
Our growth is too subtle to perceive, and long events are too slow for us to grasp [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The slowness of the events in the history of human beings is not suited to the human sense of time - and the subtlety and smallness of all growth defies human vision.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 15[41])
     A reaction: The only way we can study history is by 'periods'. It is as if English history has its slate wiped clean in 1066, 1485, 1603 and 1689. All historians know that the reality of it all is totally beyond our grasp.