76 ideas
15447 | We shouldn't always follow where the argument leads! [Lewis on Plato] |
Full Idea: There comes a time not to go on following where the argument leads! | |
From: comment on Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 667b) by David Lewis - Against Structural Universals 'Variant' | |
A reaction: Lewis is a fine one to talk, since he follows argument that take him past innumerable incredulous stares of onlookers. |
6891 | Quine's naturalistic and empirical view is based entirely on first-order logic and set theory [Quine, by Mautner] |
Full Idea: Quine has aimed at a naturalistic and empirical world-view, and claims that first-order logic and set theory provide a framework sufficient for the articulation of our knowledge of the world. | |
From: report of Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960]) by Thomas Mautner - Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy p.465 | |
A reaction: Consequently he is fairly eliminativist about meaning and mental states, and does without universals in his metaphysics. An impressively puritanical enterprise, taking Ockham's Razor to the limit, but I find it hard to swallow. |
6310 | Enquiry needs a conceptual scheme, so we should retain the best available [Quine] |
Full Idea: No enquiry is possible without some conceptual scheme, so we may as well retain and use the best one we know. | |
From: Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §01) | |
A reaction: This remark leads to Davidson's splendid paper 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme'. Quine's remark raises the question of how we know which conceptual scheme is 'best'. |
243 | It is foolish to quarrel with the mind's own reasoning processes [Plato] |
Full Idea: When the soul quarrels with knowledge or opinion or reason, its natural ruling principles, you have there what I call 'folly'. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 689b) |
241 | We ought to follow where the argument leads us [Plato] |
Full Idea: We ought to follow where the argument leads us. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 667a) |
21264 | Mortals are incapable of being fully rational [Plato] |
Full Idea: We mustn't assume that mortal eyes will ever be able to look upon reason and get to know it adequately. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 897d) | |
A reaction: This is in the context of the rational control of the whole Cosmos. I presume Plato would be flabbergasted by the findings of recent physics and cosmology. Did Kant believe that he was being completely rational about ethics? |
251 | Truth has the supreme value, for both gods and men [Plato] |
Full Idea: Truth heads the list of all things good, for gods and men alike. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 730c) |
12798 | Plurals can in principle be paraphrased away altogether [Quine] |
Full Idea: By certain standardizations of phrasing the contexts that call for plurals can in principle be paraphrased away altogether. | |
From: Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §19) | |
A reaction: Laycock, who quotes this, calls it 'unduly optimistic', but I presume that it was the standard view of plural reference until Boolos raised the subject. |
17905 | Any progression will do nicely for numbers; they can all then be used to measure multiplicity [Quine] |
Full Idea: The condition on an explication of number can be put succinctly: any progression will do nicely. Russell once held that one must also be able to measure multiplicity, but this was a mistake; any progression can be fitted to that further condition. | |
From: Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §54) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This is the strongest possible statement that the numbers are the ordinals, and the Peano Axioms will define them. The Fregean view that cardinality comes first is redundant. |
9556 | Nearly all of mathematics has to quantify over abstract objects [Quine] |
Full Idea: Mathematics, except for very trivial portions such as very elementary arithmetic, is irredeemably committed to quantification over abstract objects. | |
From: Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §55) | |
A reaction: Personally I would say that we are no more committed to such things than actors in 'The Tempest' are committed to the existence of Prospero and Caliban (which is quite a strong commitment, actually). |
16462 | The quest for ultimate categories is the quest for a simple clear pattern of notation [Quine] |
Full Idea: The quest of a simplest, clearest overall pattern of canonical notation is not to be distinguished from a quest of ultimate categories, a limning of the most general traits of reality. | |
From: Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §33) | |
A reaction: I won't disagree, as long as we recognise that reality calls the shots, not the notation, and that even animals must have some sort of system of categories, achieved without 'notation'. |
15723 | Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal' [Quine] |
Full Idea: The further a disposition is from those that can confidently be pinned on molecular structure or something comparably firm, the more our talk of it tends to depend on a vague factor of 'caeteris paribus' | |
From: Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §46) | |
A reaction: I approve of this. It is precisely the point of scientific essentialism, I take it. We are faced with innumerable uncertain dispositions, but once the underlying mechanisms are known, their role in nature becomes fairly precise. |
15490 | Explain unmanifested dispositions as structural similarities to objects which have manifested them [Quine, by Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: Quine claims that an unmanifested disposition is explicable in terms of an object having a structure similar to a structure of an object that has manifested the supposed disposition. | |
From: report of Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §46) by C.B. Martin - The Mind in Nature 07.4 | |
A reaction: This is probably the best account available for the firm empiricist who denies modal features in the actual world. In other words, a disposition is the result of an induction, not a conditional statement. |
8504 | Quine aims to deal with properties by the use of eternal open sentences, or classes [Quine, by Devitt] |
Full Idea: Quine is not an 'ostrich', because his strategy for dealing with property sentences is clear enough: all talk of attributes is to be dispensed with in favour of talk of eternal open sentences or talk of classes. | |
From: report of Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §43) by Michael Devitt - 'Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'? p.100 | |
A reaction: [See p.209 'Word and Object'] The proposal seems to be that a property like being-human (a category) would be dealt with by classes, and qualitative properties would be dealt with simply as predicates. I like the split, and the first half, not the second. |
8464 | Physical objects in space-time are just events or processes, no matter how disconnected [Quine] |
Full Idea: Physical objects, conceived four-dimensionally in space-time, are not to be distinguished from events or concrete processes. Each comprises simply the content, however heterogeneous, of a portion of space-time, however disconnected and gerrymandered. | |
From: Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §36) | |
A reaction: I very much like the suggestion that objects should be thought of as 'processes', but I dislike the idea that they can be gerrymandered. This is a refusal to cut nature at the joints (Idea 7953), which I find very counterintuitive. |
7924 | The notion of a physical object is by far the most useful one for science [Quine] |
Full Idea: In a contest of sheer systematic utility to science, the notion of physical object still leads the field. | |
From: Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §48) | |
A reaction: A delightful circumlocution from someone who seems terrified to assert that there just are objects. Not that I object to Quine's caution. It would be disturbing if his researches had revealed that we could manage without objects. But compare Idea 6124. |
14082 | No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Many decent candidates could the referent of this 'cup', differing over whether outlying particles are parts. No further sortal I could invoke will be selective enough to rule out all but one referent for it. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1 n8) | |
A reaction: I never had much faith in sortals for establishing individual identity, so this point comes as no surprise. The implication is strongly realist - that the cup has an identity which is permanently beyond our capacity to specify it. |
21259 | To grasp a thing we need its name, its definition, and what it really is [Plato] |
Full Idea: There are three elements in any given thing: the first is what the object actually is, the second is the definition of this, and the third is the name. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 895d) | |
A reaction: I take the importance of this to be its distinction between what it is, and the definition of what it is. Aristotle maintains this distinction, but some modern Aristotelians seem to get the confused. Plato worried a lot more about names than we do. |
8482 | Mathematicians must be rational but not two-legged, cyclists the opposite. So a mathematical cyclist? [Quine] |
Full Idea: Mathematicians are necessarily rational, and not necessarily two-legged; cyclists are the opposite. But what of an individual who counts among his eccentricities both mathematics and cycling? | |
From: Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §41) | |
A reaction: Quine's view is that the necessity (and essence) depends on how this eccentric is described. If he loses a leg, he must give up cycling; if he loses his rationality, he must give up the mathematics. Quine is wrong. |
12136 | Cyclist are not actually essentially two-legged [Brody on Quine] |
Full Idea: Cyclists are not essentially two-legged (a one-legged cyclist exists, but can't cycle any more), and mathematicians are not essentially rational (as they can lose rationality and continue to exist, though unable to do mathematics). | |
From: comment on Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §41.5) by Baruch Brody - Identity and Essence 5.1 | |
A reaction: Was Quine thinking of the nominal essence of this person - that 'cyclists' necessarily cylce, and 'mathematicians' necessarily do some maths? It is as bad to confuse 'necessary' with 'essential' as to confuse 'use' with 'mention'. |
17594 | We can paraphrase 'x=y' as a sequence of the form 'if Fx then Fy' [Quine] |
Full Idea: For general terms write 'if Fx then Fy' and vice versa, and 'if Fxz then Fyz'..... The conjunction of all these is coextensive with 'x=y' if any formula constructible from the vocabulary is; and we can adopt that conjunction as our version of identity. | |
From: Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §47) | |
A reaction: [first half compressed] The main rival views of equality are this and Wiggins (1980:199). Quine concedes that his account implies a modest version of the identity of indiscernibles. Wiggins says identity statements need a sortal. |
14081 | Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: There can be determinately true identity claims despite indeterminate reference of the terms flanking the identity sign; these will be identity claims true under all admissible interpretations of the flanking terms. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1) | |
A reaction: In informal contexts there might be problems with the notion of what is 'admissible'. Is 'my least favourite physical object' admissible? |
15725 | Normal conditionals have a truth-value gap when the antecedent is false. [Quine] |
Full Idea: In its unquantified form 'If p then q' the indicative conditional is perhaps best represented as suffering a truth-value gap whenever its antecedent is false. | |
From: Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §46) | |
A reaction: That is, the clear truth-functional reading of the conditional (favoured by Lewis, his pupil) is unacceptable. Quine favours the Edgington line, that we are only interested in situations where the antecedent might be true. |
15722 | Conditionals are pointless if the truth value of the antecedent is known [Quine] |
Full Idea: The ordinary conditional loses its point when the truth value of its antecedent is known. | |
From: Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §46) | |
A reaction: A beautifully simple point that reveals a lot about what conditionals are. |
15719 | We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is [Quine] |
Full Idea: The subjunctive conditional depends, like indirect quotation and more so, on a dramatic projection: we feign belief in the antececent and see how convincing we then find the consequent. | |
From: Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §46) | |
A reaction: This seems accurate. It means that we are only interested in when the antecedent is true, and when it is false is irrelevant. |
15721 | Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures [Quine] |
Full Idea: The subjunctive conditional is seen at its most respectable in the disposition terms. ...The reason is that they are conceived as built-in, enduring structural traits. | |
From: Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §46) | |
A reaction: Surprisingly, this is very sympathetic to a metaphysical view that seems a long way from Quine, since dispositions seem to invite commitment to modal features of reality. But the structural traits are not, of course, modal, in any way! |
15724 | Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science [Quine] |
Full Idea: The subjunctive conditional has no place in an austere canonical notation for science - but that ban is less restrictive than would at first appear. | |
From: Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §46) | |
A reaction: Idea 15723 shows what he has in mind - that what science aims for is accounts of dispositional mechanisms, which then leave talk of other possible worlds (in Lewis style) as unnecessary. I may be with Quine one this one. |
15720 | What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context [Quine] |
Full Idea: The traits to suppose preserved in a counterfactual depend on sympathy for the fabulist's purpose. Compare 'If Caesar were in command, he would use the atom bomb', and 'If Caesar were in command, he would use catapults'. | |
From: Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §46) | |
A reaction: This seems to be an important example for the Lewis approach, since you are asked to consider the 'nearest' possible world, but that will depend on context. |
4630 | Two theories can be internally consistent and match all the facts, yet be inconsistent with one another [Quine, by Baggini /Fosl] |
Full Idea: Duhem and Quine have maintained that it may be possible to develop two or more theories that are 1) internally consistent, 2) inconsistent with one another, and 3) perfectly consistent with all the data we can muster. | |
From: report of Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960]) by J Baggini / PS Fosl - The Philosopher's Toolkit §1.06 | |
A reaction: Obviously this may be a contingent truth about our theories, but why not presume that this is because we are unable to collect the crucial data (e.g. about prehistoric biology), rather than denigrate the whole concept of a theory, and undermine science? |
21260 | Soul is what is defined by 'self-generating motion' [Plato] |
Full Idea: The entity which we call 'soul' is precisely that which is defined by the expression 'self-generating motion'. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 896a) | |
A reaction: We may suspect that he defines soul in this way for a particular context, aimed at proving the existence of a First Mover. He must think there is more to soul than the generation of movement. |
276 | My individuality is my soul, which carries my body around [Plato] |
Full Idea: While I am alive I have nothing to thank for my individuality except my soul, whereas my body is just the likeness that I carry around with me. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 959a) |
3131 | Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism [Quine, by Rey] |
Full Idea: Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism. | |
From: report of Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind Int.3 |
3988 | Indeterminacy of translation also implies indeterminacy in interpreting people's mental states [Dennett on Quine] |
Full Idea: Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of radical translation carries all the way in, as the thesis of the indeterminacy of radical interpretation of mental states and processes. | |
From: comment on Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Daniel Dennett on himself p.239 | |
A reaction: Strong scepticism seems wrong here. Davidson's account of charity in interpretation, and the role of truth, seems closer. |
6311 | The firmer the links between sentences and stimuli, the less translations can diverge [Quine] |
Full Idea: The firmer the direct links of a sentence with non-verbal stimulation, the less drastically its translations can diverge from one another from manual to manual. | |
From: Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §07) | |
A reaction: This implies (plausibly) that talk about farming will have fairly determinate translations into foreign languages, but talk of philosophy will not. An interesting case is logic, where we might expect tight translation with little non-verbal stimulation. |
6312 | We can never precisely pin down how to translate the native word 'Gavagai' [Quine] |
Full Idea: There is no evident criterion whereby to strip extraneous effects away and leave just the meaning of 'Gavagai' properly so-called - whatever meaning properly so-called may be. | |
From: Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §09) | |
A reaction: Quine's famous assertion that translation is ultimately 'indeterminate'. Huge doubts about meaning and language and truth follow from his claim. Personally I think it is rubbish. People become fluent in very foreign languages, and don't have breakdowns. |
6313 | Stimulus synonymy of 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' does not even guarantee they are coextensive [Quine] |
Full Idea: Stimulus synonymy of the occasion sentences 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' does not even guarantee that 'gavagai' and 'rabbit' are coextensive terms, terms true of the same things. | |
From: Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §12) | |
A reaction: Since this scepticism eventually seems to result in the reader no longer knowing what they mean themselves by the word 'rabbit', I doubt Quine's claim. Problems after hearing one word of a foreign language disappear after years of residence. |
6317 | Dispositions to speech behaviour, and actual speech, are never enough to fix any one translation [Quine] |
Full Idea: Rival systems of analytical hypotheses can fit the totality of speech behaviour to perfection, and can fit the totality of dispositions to speech behaviour as well, and still specify mutually incompatible translations of countless sentences. | |
From: Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §15) | |
A reaction: This is Quine's final assertion of indeterminacy, having explored charity, bilingual speakers etc. It seems to me that he is a victim of his underlying anti-realism, which won't allow nature to dictate ways of cutting up the world. |
6315 | We should be suspicious of a translation which implies that a people have very strange beliefs [Quine] |
Full Idea: The more absurd or exotic the beliefs imputed to a people, the more suspicious we are entitled to be of the translations. | |
From: Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §15) | |
A reaction: Quine is famous for his relativist and indeterminate account of translation, but he gradually works his way towards the common sense which Davidson later brought out into the open. |
6314 | Weird translations are always possible, but they improve if we impose our own logic on them [Quine] |
Full Idea: Wanton translation can make natives sound as queer as one pleases; better translation imposes our logic upon them. | |
From: Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §13) | |
A reaction: This begins to point towards the principle of charity, on which Davidson is so keen, and even on doubts whether two different conceptual schemes are possible. Personally I think there is only one logic (deep down), and the natives will have it. |
249 | People who value beauty above virtue insult the soul by placing the body above it [Plato] |
Full Idea: When a man values beauty above virtue, the disrespect he shows his soul is total and fundamental, because he argues that the body is more to be honoured than the soul. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 727e) |
265 | An action is only just if it is performed by someone with a just character and outlook [Plato] |
Full Idea: The description 'just' is applicable only to the benefit conferred or injury inflicted by someone with a just character and outlook. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 862b) | |
A reaction: How should we describe the occasional administering of good justice by a generally wicked judge. Greeks focus on character, but moderns focus on actions. |
269 | Attempted murder is like real murder, but we should respect the luck which avoided total ruin [Plato] |
Full Idea: An attempted murder should be treated like a successful one, but with respect shown for the luck which saved him from total ruin. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 877a) | |
A reaction: The earliest reference to moral luck, I think. 'Repect' sounds vague, but it is asking judges to 'take it into consideration', which is quite practical. Attempted murderers are just as dangerous. |
240 | It would be strange if the gods rewarded those who experienced the most pleasure in life [Plato] |
Full Idea: It would be strange if the gods gave the greatest rewards in heaven to those who led the most pleasant life, rather than the most just. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 662c) | |
A reaction: All of philosophy is just footnotes to Plato.... See Idea 1454. |
264 | The conquest of pleasure is the noblest victory of all [Plato] |
Full Idea: The conquest of pleasure is the noblest victory of all. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 840c) | |
A reaction: Plato's puritanical streak. Even Aristotle doesn't agree with this. Self-control does not imply conquest of pleasure. Has a good professional wine taster conquered pleasure? |
4332 | Virtue is a concord of reason and emotion, with pleasure and pain trained to correct ends [Plato] |
Full Idea: Virtue is the general concord of reason and emotion, but there is one key element, which is the correct formation of our feelings of pleasure and pain, which makes us hate what we ought to hate, and love what we ought to love. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 653c) | |
A reaction: An important truth, taken up by Aristotle. To see another person humiliated gives some people pleasure and other people pain. |
248 | A serious desire for moral excellence is very rare indeed [Plato] |
Full Idea: People who are anxious to attain moral excellence with all possible speed are pretty thin on the ground. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 718e) |
253 | Every crime is the result of excessive self-love [Plato] |
Full Idea: The cause of each and every crime we commit is precisely this excessive love of ourselves. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 731e) |
263 | The only worthwhile life is one devoted to physical and moral perfection [Plato] |
Full Idea: A life devoted to every physical perfection and every moral virtue is the only life worth the name. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 807c) |
235 | Virtue is the aim of all laws [Plato] |
Full Idea: Virtue is the aim of the laws the legislator lays down. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 631a) |
277 | The Guardians must aim to discover the common element in the four cardinal virtues [Plato] |
Full Idea: The guardians of the state should aim to get an exact idea of the common element in all the four virtues. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 965d) |
254 | Excessive laughter and tears must be avoided [Plato] |
Full Idea: Excessive laughter and tears must be avoided. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 732c) |
266 | Injustice is the mastery of the soul by bad feelings, even if they do not lead to harm [Plato] |
Full Idea: My general description of injustice is this: the mastery of the soul by anger, fear, pleasure, pain, envy and desires, whether they lead to actual damage or not. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 863e) |
242 | The best people are produced where there is no excess of wealth or poverty [Plato] |
Full Idea: The community in which neither wealth nor poverty exists will produce the finest characters. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 679b) |
256 | Virtue and great wealth are incompatible [Plato] |
Full Idea: Virtue and great wealth are quite incompatible. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 742e) |
245 | Totalitarian states destroy friendships and community spirit [Plato] |
Full Idea: Excessively authoritarian government destroys all friendship and community of spirit in the state. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 697d) |
239 | Education in virtue produces citizens who are active but obedient [Plato] |
Full Idea: Education in virtue produces a keen desire to become a perfect citizen who knows how to rule and be ruled as justice demands. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 643e) |
1402 | Friendship is impossible between master and slave, even if they are made equal [Plato] |
Full Idea: Even if you proclaim that a master and a slave shall have equal status, friendship between them is inherently impossible. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 757a) |
262 | Men and women should qualify equally for honours on merit [Plato] |
Full Idea: Men and women who have shown conspicuous merit should qualify for all honours without distinction of sex. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 802a) |
236 | Sound laws achieve the happiness of those who observe them [Plato] |
Full Idea: Sound laws achieve the happiness of those who observe them. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 631b) |
259 | Justice is granting the equality which unequals deserve [Plato] |
Full Idea: Justice consists of granting the 'equality' which unequals deserve to get. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 757d) | |
A reaction: Beautifully simple, and hard to improve on. It shows the close link between equality and justice, but shows why they are not the same. The main debate about justice concerns the criteria for 'deserving'. |
238 | Children's games should channel their pleasures into adult activity [Plato] |
Full Idea: We should use children's games to channel their pleasures and desires towards activities in which they will have to engage when they are adult. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 643c) |
260 | Control of education is the key office of state, and should go to the best citizen [Plato] |
Full Idea: The Minister of Education is by far the most important of all the supreme offices of the state; the best all-round citizen in the state should be appointed. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 765e) |
257 | Mathematics has the widest application of any subject on the curriculum [Plato] |
Full Idea: For domestic and public purposes, and all professional skills, no branch of a child's education has as big a range of applications as mathematics. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 747a) |
4331 | Education is channelling a child's feelings into the right course before it understands why [Plato] |
Full Idea: I call 'education' the initial acquisition of virtue by the child, when the feelings of pleasure and affection, pain and hatred, are channelled in the right courses before he can understand the reason why. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 653b) | |
A reaction: A precursor of Aristotle's view (Ethics 1104b11). A profound, simple and important insight. |
250 | The best way to educate the young is not to rebuke them, but to set a good example [Plato] |
Full Idea: The best way to educate the younger generation (as well as yourself) is not to rebuke them but patently to practise all your life what you preach to others. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 729c) |
275 | Creation is not for you; you exist for the sake of creation [Plato] |
Full Idea: Creation is not for your benefit; you exist for the sake of the universe. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 903c) |
273 | Movement is transmitted through everything, and it must have started with self-generated motion [Plato] |
Full Idea: Motion is transmitted to innumerable things, and this must spring from some initial principle, which must be the change effected by self-generated motion. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 895a) |
8004 | In 'The Laws', to obey the law is to be obey god [Plato, by MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: The divine is important in 'The Laws' because it is identified with law; to be obedient before the law is to be obedient before god. | |
From: report of Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.6 | |
A reaction: Christian conservativism in a nutshell. Plato is rejecting his view in Euthyphro that piety (etc.) must precede the will of the gods. The obvious problem is bad laws, made by corrupt rulers. |
21261 | Self-moving soul has to be the oldest thing there is [Plato] |
Full Idea: Soul, being the source of motion, is the most ancient thing there is. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 896b) | |
A reaction: Plato seems to assume that the First Mover must still exist, which doesn't follow from anything in the argument. The First Pusher could be dead before the last domino falls. Why can't activity be the default state of everything? |
21257 | Self-generating motion is clearly superior to all other kinds of motion [Plato] |
Full Idea: We can't resist the conclusion that the motion which can generate itself is infinitely superior, and all the others are inferior to it. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 894d) | |
A reaction: Who said you can't get values from facts! Not that the argument depends on superiority. There could be an inferior First Mover, as a bus driver is subservient to the passengers, or (my favourite) a head teacher is inferior to the pupils. |
21258 | The only possible beginning for the endless motions of reality is something self-generated [Plato] |
Full Idea: When the motion in reality is transmitted to thousands of things one after another, the entire sequence of their movements must surely spring from some initial principle, which can hardly be anything except the change effected by self-generated motion. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 895a) | |
A reaction: This gives a domino picture of reality, with all of reality responding inertly to a first kick. Much better is to see self-generated motion in the active qualities of all matter, as seen in the sea of virtual subatomic particles at the smallest level. |
274 | Soul must be the cause of all the opposites, such as good and evil or beauty and ugliness [Plato] |
Full Idea: Soul must be cause of good and evil, beauty and ugliness, justice and injustice, and all the opposites. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 896d) |
21263 | If all the motions of nature reflect calculations of reason, then the best kind of soul must direct it [Plato] |
Full Idea: If the movement of the heavens and all that is in them reflects the motion and revolution and calculation of reason ...then clearly we have to admit that it is the best kind of soul that cares for the entire universe and directs it along the best path. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 897c) | |
A reaction: Most of this passage reflects the cosmological argument - that without some initiating source natural events could not occur - but this slides into the design argument. So who designed mud (which is too inferior to have a Form)? |
278 | If astronomical movements are seen as necessary instead of by divine will, this leads to atheism [Plato] |
Full Idea: If a man studying astronomy sees events apparently happening by necessity rather than being directed by the intention of a benevolent will, he will turn into an atheist. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 967a) |
21265 | The heavens must be full of gods, controlling nature either externally or from within [Plato] |
Full Idea: A soul or souls have been shown to be cause of all the phenomena, and whether it is by their living presence in matter that they direct all the heavens, or by some other means, we insist that these souls are gods. So 'everything is full of gods'. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 899b) | |
A reaction: This seems to have little to do with the pagan gods on Olympus. It is also notably not monotheistic. It is somewhere between animism and panpsychism. Does he think the rivers and woods contain gods? Probably not. Just the orderly heavens. |
21262 | There must be at least two souls controlling the cosmos, one doing good, the other the opposite [Plato] |
Full Idea: There must be more than one soul (not fewer than two) controlling movement and the heavens: that which does good, and that which has the opposite capacity. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 896e) | |
A reaction: [Wording compressed - as often with the dialogues] This idea of controlling opposites is found in Empedocles. Presumably this good soul defers to the Form of the Good, as implied by the Euthyphro Question. |