6 ideas
| 3653 | My Meditations are the complete foundation of my physics [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: My six Meditations contain all the foundations of my physics, …and their principles destroy those of Aristotle. | |
| From: René Descartes (Letters to Mersenne [1640], 1641.01.28) |
| 4736 | Truth is such a transcendentally clear notion that it cannot be further defined [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Truth is such a transcendentally clear notion that it cannot be further defined. | |
| From: René Descartes (Letters to Mersenne [1640], 1642), quoted by Pascal Engel - Truth Intro | |
| A reaction: This is the view endorsed by Davidson. It is tempting to take basic concepts as axiomatic, but philosophers can't make that move every time they are in trouble. I have to say, though, that truth is a good candidate. |
| 21628 | To say reality itself is vague is not properly intelligible [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: The notion that things might actually be vague, as well as being vaguely described, is not properly intelligible. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Wang's Paradox [1970], p.260) | |
| A reaction: It seems hard to disagree with this. It seems crazy that a pile of grain, or the hair on someone's head, are vague, and even quantum indeterminacies are not very well described as 'vague'. Vagueness is a very human concept. |
| 14082 | No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: Many decent candidates could the referent of this 'cup', differing over whether outlying particles are parts. No further sortal I could invoke will be selective enough to rule out all but one referent for it. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1 n8) | |
| A reaction: I never had much faith in sortals for establishing individual identity, so this point comes as no surprise. The implication is strongly realist - that the cup has an identity which is permanently beyond our capacity to specify it. |
| 14081 | Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: There can be determinately true identity claims despite indeterminate reference of the terms flanking the identity sign; these will be identity claims true under all admissible interpretations of the flanking terms. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: In informal contexts there might be problems with the notion of what is 'admissible'. Is 'my least favourite physical object' admissible? |
| 3652 | I can't prove the soul is indestructible, only that it is separate from the mortal body [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: I don't know how to demonstrate that God cannot annihilate the soul, but only that it is entirely distinct from the body, and consequently that it is not naturally subject to die with it, which is all that is required to establish religion. | |
| From: René Descartes (Letters to Mersenne [1640], 1640.02.24) |