9 ideas
14082 | No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Many decent candidates could the referent of this 'cup', differing over whether outlying particles are parts. No further sortal I could invoke will be selective enough to rule out all but one referent for it. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1 n8) | |
A reaction: I never had much faith in sortals for establishing individual identity, so this point comes as no surprise. The implication is strongly realist - that the cup has an identity which is permanently beyond our capacity to specify it. |
14081 | Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: There can be determinately true identity claims despite indeterminate reference of the terms flanking the identity sign; these will be identity claims true under all admissible interpretations of the flanking terms. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1) | |
A reaction: In informal contexts there might be problems with the notion of what is 'admissible'. Is 'my least favourite physical object' admissible? |
1389 | If memory is the sole criterion of identity, we ought to use it for other people too [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: If memory were the sole criterion of personal identity it would have to be the sole criterion that we use in making identity statements about persons other than ourselves. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Personal Identity and Memory [1959], §4) | |
A reaction: From Locke's point of view, he is much less certain about the continued identity of other people, because he allows the possibility of transference of minds. Even we might reject physical identity, if a person had suffered a severe trauma. |
1390 | Bodily identity is one criterion and memory another, for personal identity [Shoemaker, by PG] |
Full Idea: Bodily identity must be one of the criteria for personal identity (to establish that a rememberer was present at a past event), but memory itself must also be accepted as one of the criteria. | |
From: report of Sydney Shoemaker (Personal Identity and Memory [1959], §5) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: This concerns the epistemology of personal identity, not the ontology. Someone with total amnesia would probably accept a driving licence as a criterion. Is personal identity a mental state, or a precondition which makes mental states possible? |
20180 | A happy and joyous life must largely be a quiet life [Russell] |
Full Idea: A happy life must to a great extent be a quiet life, for it is only in an atmosphere of quiet that true joy can live. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4) | |
A reaction: Most people's image of happiness is absorption in an interesting task, or relaxing in good company. The idea that happiness is wild excitement exists, but is a minority view. |
20177 | Boredom always involves not being fully occupied [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is one of the essentials of boredom that one's faculties must not be fully occupied. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4) | |
A reaction: He gives running for your life as an example of non-boredom. I suspect that this is only the sort of boredom that troubled Russell, and not the sort of profound boredom that led the actor George Sanders to suicide (according to his last note). |
20179 | Happiness involves enduring boredom, and the young should be taught this [Russell] |
Full Idea: A certain power of enduring boredom is essential to a happy life, and is one of the things that ought to be taught to the young. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4) | |
A reaction: As an example he suggests that Wordsworth would never have written 'The Prelude' is he had never been bored when young. Which suggests that Russell doesn't really get boredom, seeing it merely as a stimulus to work. |
20176 | Boredom is an increasingly strong motivating power [Russell] |
Full Idea: Boredom has been, I believe, one of the great motive powers throughout the historical epoch, and is so at the present day more than ever. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4) | |
A reaction: Most of his essay tells us how to avoid boredom, rather than how it motivates. |
20178 | Life is now more interesting, but boredom is more frightening [Russell] |
Full Idea: We are less bored than our ancestors were, but we are more afraid of boredom | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4) | |
A reaction: I get the impression that the invention of the powerful mobile phone has largely banished boredom from human life, except when you are obliged to switch it off. The fear of boredom may hence be even greater now. |