Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson', 'Of Liberty and Necessity' and 'The Foundations of Mathematics'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
18844 You would cripple mathematics if you denied Excluded Middle [Hilbert]
     Full Idea: Taking the principle of Excluded Middle away from the mathematician would be the same, say, as prohibiting the astronomer from using the telescope or the boxer from using his fists.
     From: David Hilbert (The Foundations of Mathematics [1927], p.476), quoted by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 9.4
     A reaction: [p.476 in Van Heijenoort]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14082 No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Many decent candidates could the referent of this 'cup', differing over whether outlying particles are parts. No further sortal I could invoke will be selective enough to rule out all but one referent for it.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1 n8)
     A reaction: I never had much faith in sortals for establishing individual identity, so this point comes as no surprise. The implication is strongly realist - that the cup has an identity which is permanently beyond our capacity to specify it.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14081 Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: There can be determinately true identity claims despite indeterminate reference of the terms flanking the identity sign; these will be identity claims true under all admissible interpretations of the flanking terms.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1)
     A reaction: In informal contexts there might be problems with the notion of what is 'admissible'. Is 'my least favourite physical object' admissible?
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
6215 'Contingent' means that the cause is unperceived, not that there is no cause [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: For contingent, men do not mean that which hath no cause, but that which hath not for cause any thing that we perceive, as when a traveller meets a shower, they both had sufficient causes, but they didn't cause one another, so we say it was contingent.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (Of Liberty and Necessity [1654], §95)
     A reaction: Contingent nowadays means 'might not have happened', or 'does not happen in all possible worlds'. Personally I share Hobbes' doubts about the concept of contingency, and this is quite a good account of the misunderstanding.