15 ideas
| 14519 | It is a great good to show reverence for a wise man [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: To show reverence for a wise man is itself a great good for him who reveres [the wise man]. | |
| From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 32) | |
| A reaction: It is characteristic of Epicurus to move up a level in his thinking, and not merely respect wisdom, but ask after the value of his own respect. Compare Idea 14517. Nice. |
| 7536 | If you hope to improve the world, all you can do is improve yourself [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: When Wittgenstein was once asked what one can do to improve the world, he replied: 'Improve yourself; that is the only thing you can do to improve the world'. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (talk [1935]), quoted by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Ghost of Madness Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: This is rather startlingly pessimistic about politics, and I don't really believe it. If anything has ever improved me, it has usually come from the world, and been created by other people. |
| 14518 | In the study of philosophy, pleasure and knowledge arrive simultaneously [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: In philosophy the pleasure accompanies the knowledge. For the enjoyment does not come after the learning but the learning and the enjoyment are simultaneous. | |
| From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 27) |
| 14524 | Bodies are combinations of shape, size, resistance and weight [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: Epicurus said that body was conceived as an aggregate of shape and size and resistance and weight. | |
| From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE]) | |
| A reaction: [Source Sextus 'Adversus Mathematicos' 10.257] Note that this is how we 'conceive' them. They might be intrinsically different, except that Epicurus is pretty much a phenomenalist. |
| 19727 | Reliabilist knowledge is evidence based belief, with high conditional probability [Comesaña] |
| Full Idea: The best definition of reliabilism seems to be: the agent has evidence, and bases the belief on the evidence, and the actual conditional reliability of the belief on the evidence is high enough. | |
| From: Juan Comesaña (Reliabilism [2011], 4.4) | |
| A reaction: This is Comesaña's own theory, derived from Alston 1998, and based on conditional probabilities. |
| 19725 | In a sceptical scenario belief formation is unreliable, so no beliefs at all are justified? [Comesaña] |
| Full Idea: If the processes of belief-formation are unreliable (perhaps in a sceptical scenario), then reliabilism has the consequence that those victims can never have justified beliefs (which Sosa calls the 'new evil demon problem'). | |
| From: Juan Comesaña (Reliabilism [2011], 4.1) | |
| A reaction: That may be the right outcome. Could you have mathematical knowledge in a sceptical scenario? But that would be different processes. If I might be a brain in a vat, then it's true that I have no perceptual knowledge. |
| 19726 | How do we decide which exact process is the one that needs to be reliable? [Comesaña] |
| Full Idea: The reliabilist has the problem of finding a principled way of selecting, for each token-process of belief formation, the type whose reliability ratio must be high enough for the belief to be justified. | |
| From: Juan Comesaña (Reliabilism [2011], 4.3) | |
| A reaction: The question is which exact process I am employing for some visual knowledge (and how the process should be described). Seeing, staring, squinting, glancing.... This seems to be called the 'generality problem'. |
| 14521 | If everything is by necessity, then even denials of necessity are by necessity [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: He who claims that everything occurs by necessity has no complaint against him who claims that everything does not occur by necessity. For he makes the very claim in question by necessity. | |
| From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 40) |
| 14522 | What happens to me if I obtain all my desires, and what if I fail? [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: One should bring this question to bear on all one's desires: what will happen to me if what is sought by desire is achieved, and what will happen if it is not? | |
| From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 71) | |
| A reaction: Yet another example of Epicurus moving up a level in his thinking about ethical issues, as in Idea 14517 and Idea 14519. The mark of a true philosopher. This seems to be a key idea for wisdom - to think further ahead than merely what you desire. |
| 3563 | Pleasure and virtue entail one another [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: It is not possible to live pleasantly without living intelligently and finely and justly, nor to live intelligently and finely and justly without living pleasantly. | |
| From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 5), quoted by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness Ch.16 | |
| A reaction: A person with all these virtues might still suffer from depression. And I don't see why having limited intelligence should stop someone from living pleasantly. Just be warm-hearted. |
| 3560 | Justice is merely a contract about not harming or being harmed [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: There is no such things as justice in itself; in people's relations with one another in any place and at any time it is a contract about not harming or being harmed. | |
| From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 33), quoted by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 13.2 |
| 14517 | We value our own character, whatever it is, and we should respect the characters of others [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: We value our characters as our own personal possessions, whether they are good and envied by men or not. We must regard our neighbours' characters thus too, if they are respectable. | |
| From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 15) | |
| A reaction: I like this because it introduces a metaethical dimension to the whole problem of virtue. We should value our own character - so should we try to improve it? Should we improve so much as to become unrecognisable? |
| 14513 | Justice is a pledge of mutual protection [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: The justice of nature is a pledge of reciprocal usefulness, neither to harm one another nor to be harmed. | |
| From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 31) | |
| A reaction: Notice that justice is not just reciprocal usefulness, but a 'pledge' to that effect. This implies a metaethical value of trust and honesty in keeping the pledge. Is it better to live by the pledge, or to be always spontaneously useful? |
| 14515 | A law is not just if it is not useful in mutual associations [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: If someone passes a law and it does not turn out to be in accord with what is useful in mutual associations, this no longer possesses the nature of justice. | |
| From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 37) |
| 14520 | It is small-minded to find many good reasons for suicide [Epicurus] |
| Full Idea: He is utterly small-minded for whom there are many plausible reasons for committing suicide. | |
| From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 38) | |
| A reaction: It is a pity that the insult of 'small-minded' has slipped out of philosophy. The Greeks use it all the time, and know exactly what it means. We all recognise small-mindedness, and it is a great (and subtle) vice. |