Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Supervenience', 'Infinitism not solution to regress problem' and 'Personal Identity and Memory'

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12 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience: No A-difference without a B-difference [Bennett,K]
     Full Idea: The slogan for supervenience might be 'there cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference'. …(qualifying as a 'perfect forgery' would be an example).
     From: Karen Bennett (Supervenience [2011], Intro)
     A reaction: The key point about supervenience is that it is one-way. Presumably 'tracking' would be a better single word for it than 'dependence', which implies some sort of causal power. Supervenience describes, but doesn't attempt to explain.
Supervenience is non-symmetric - sometimes it's symmetric, and sometimes it's one-way [Bennett,K]
     Full Idea: Supervenience is neither symmetric nor asymmetric; it is non-symmetric. Sometimes it holds symmetrically. …And sometimes it holds asymmetrically.
     From: Karen Bennett (Supervenience [2011], §3.2)
     A reaction: I think of supervenience as 'tracking'. Stalkers track victims; married couples track one another. Beauty tracks statues, but statues don't seem to track beauty. I take so-called mind-brain supervenience to be two-way, not one-way.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Weak supervenience is in one world, strong supervenience in all possible worlds [Bennett,K]
     Full Idea: Weak supervenience says there is no possible world that contains individuals that are B-indiscernible but A-discernible. Strong supervenience entails the same even if they are in different possible worlds.
     From: Karen Bennett (Supervenience [2011], §4.1)
     A reaction: In other words (I presume), in simple language, the weak version says they happen supervene, the strong version says they have to supervene.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Aesthetics, morality and mind supervene on the physical? Modal on non-modal? General on particular? [Bennett,K]
     Full Idea: It has been claimed that aesthetic, moral and mental properties supervene upon physical properties, …and that modal truths supervene on non-modal ones, and that general truths supervene on particular ones.
     From: Karen Bennett (Supervenience [2011], Intro)
     A reaction: I am attracted to the last bit. I am bewildered by people who try to derive particular truths from general ones, such as deriving physical behaviour from laws, or the nature of some creature simply from its species. Only some tigers are man-eaters.
Some entailments do not involve supervenience, as when brotherhood entails siblinghood [Bennett,K]
     Full Idea: Some entailments do not suffice for supervenience. Being a brother entails being a sibling, but being a sibling does not supervene on being a brother. Sarah has a sister and Jack in an only child. Sarah, unlike Jack, is a sibling; neither is a brother.
     From: Karen Bennett (Supervenience [2011], §3.2)
     A reaction: The whole point of supervenience, I take it, is to label a relation of tracking, while offering no explanation of the tracking. Entailment would be a rather powerful explanation, as would a dog's being tied to a cart.
Reduction requires supervenience, but does supervenience suffice for reduction? [Bennett,K]
     Full Idea: Everyone agrees that reduction requires supervenience, …but the more interesting issue is whether supervenience suffices for reduction.
     From: Karen Bennett (Supervenience [2011], §3.3)
     A reaction: I think we should assume that there is a reason for every genuine case of supervenience (i.e. there are no cases of eternal or ubiquitious coincidence). One-way causation seems to give supervenience without reduction.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Definitions of physicalism are compatible with a necessary God [Bennett,K]
     Full Idea: All definitions of physicalism are compatible with the existence of a necessarily existing God.
     From: Karen Bennett (Supervenience [2011], 5.4)
     A reaction: All the definitions seem to depend on all the facts covarying with the physical facts, so anything which is invariant (such as divine or platonic entities) will stand outside the definition. Physicalism is more like a credo about all facts whatever.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
The metaphysically and logically possible worlds are the same, so they are the same strength [Bennett,K]
     Full Idea: Metaphysical necessity is just as strong as logical necessity in that the space of metaphysical possibility is exactly the same as the space of logical possibility: the logically possible worlds = the metaphysically possible worlds.
     From: Karen Bennett (Supervenience [2011], §3.1)
     A reaction: I think this is wrong. To be the 'same strength' there would also have to be the same number of logical as metaphysical truths, and I presume that is not the case. There are far more logical than metaphysical possibilities.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Must all justification be inferential? [Ginet]
     Full Idea: The infinitist view of justification holds that every justification must be inferential: no other kind of justification is possible.
     From: Carl Ginet (Infinitism not solution to regress problem [2005], p.141)
     A reaction: This is the key question in discussing whether justification is foundational. I'm not sure whether 'inference' is the best word when something is evidence for something else. I am inclined to think that only propositions can be reasons.
Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion [Ginet]
     Full Idea: Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion. And so it cannot be that, if there actually occurs justification, it is all inferential.
     From: Carl Ginet (Infinitism not solution to regress problem [2005], p.148)
     A reaction: The idea that justification must have an 'origin' seems to beg the question. I take Klein's inifinitism to be a version of coherence, where the accumulation of good reasons adds up to justification. It is not purely inferential.
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
If memory is the sole criterion of identity, we ought to use it for other people too [Shoemaker]
     Full Idea: If memory were the sole criterion of personal identity it would have to be the sole criterion that we use in making identity statements about persons other than ourselves.
     From: Sydney Shoemaker (Personal Identity and Memory [1959], §4)
     A reaction: From Locke's point of view, he is much less certain about the continued identity of other people, because he allows the possibility of transference of minds. Even we might reject physical identity, if a person had suffered a severe trauma.
Bodily identity is one criterion and memory another, for personal identity [Shoemaker, by PG]
     Full Idea: Bodily identity must be one of the criteria for personal identity (to establish that a rememberer was present at a past event), but memory itself must also be accepted as one of the criteria.
     From: report of Sydney Shoemaker (Personal Identity and Memory [1959], §5) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: This concerns the epistemology of personal identity, not the ontology. Someone with total amnesia would probably accept a driving licence as a criterion. Is personal identity a mental state, or a precondition which makes mental states possible?