Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Two Problems of Epistemology', 'The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge' and 'Events'

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6 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes

8979	Slow and continuous events (like balding or tree-growth) are called 'processes', not 'events' [Simons]
	Full Idea: Some changes are slow and continuous and are called 'processes' rather than events; the growth of a tree or the greying of John's hair.
	From: Peter Simons (Events [2003], 3.2)
	A reaction: So making a loaf of bread is an event rather than a process, and World War I was a process rather than an event? If you slow down a dramatic event (on film), you see that it is really a process. I take 'process' to be a much more illuminating word.

8981	Maybe processes behave like stuff-nouns, and events like count-nouns [Simons]
	Full Idea: There is arguably a parallel between the mass-count distinction among meanings of nouns and the process-event distinction among meanings of verbs. Processes, like stuff, do not connote criteria for counting, whereas events, like things, do.
	From: Peter Simons (Events [2003], 6.2)
	A reaction: Hm. You can have several processes, and a process can come to an end - but then you can have several ingredients of a cake, and you can run out of one of them. This may be quite a helpful distinction.

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events

8973	Einstein's relativity brought events into ontology, as the terms of a simultaneity relationships [Simons]
	Full Idea: The ontology of events rose in philosophy with the rise of relativity theory in physics. Einstein postulated the relativity of simultaneity to an observer's state of motion. The terms of the relation of simultaneity must be events or their parts.
	From: Peter Simons (Events [2003], 1.1.2)
	A reaction: Intriguing. Philosophers no doubt think they are way ahead of physicists in such a metaphysical area. Personally I regard the parentage of the concept as good grounds for scepticism about it. See Idea 7621 for my reason.

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism

8824	No one has defended translational phenomenalism since Ayer in 1940 [Ayer, by Kim]
	Full Idea: I know of no serious defence of 'translational phenomenalism' since Ayer's in 1940.
	From: report of A.J. Ayer (The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge [1940]) by Jaegwon Kim - What is 'naturalized epistemology'? 303-4+n
	A reaction: We can think of Ayer as a hero who explored how far extreme empiricism would go. We still have anti-realists who are singing from a revised version of the song-sheet. Personally I am with Russell, that we must embrace the best explanation.

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification

18284	Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper]
	Full Idea: Whereas particular reality statements are in principle completely verifiable or falsifiable, things are different for general reality statements: they can indeed be conclusively falsified, they can acquire a negative truth value, but not a positive one.
	From: Karl Popper (Two Problems of Epistemology [1932], p.256), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 18 'Laws'
	A reaction: This sounds like a logician's approach to science, but I prefer to look at coherence, where very little is actually conclusive, and one tinkers with the theory instead.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity

15251	The attribution of necessity to causation is either primitive animism, or confusion with logical necessity [Ayer]
	Full Idea: How are we to explain the word 'must' [about causation]? The answer is, I think, that it is either a relic of animism, or else reveals an inclination to treat causal connexion as if it were a form of logical necessity.
	From: A.J. Ayer (The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge [1940], IV.18)
	A reaction: The animism proposal just about makes sense (as a primitive feature of minds), but why would anyone, if they had the time and understanding, dream of treating a regular connection as a 'logical' necessity?