Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Two Problems of Epistemology', 'talk' and 'Persons, Character and Morality'

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5 ideas

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification

18284	Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper]
	Full Idea: Whereas particular reality statements are in principle completely verifiable or falsifiable, things are different for general reality statements: they can indeed be conclusively falsified, they can acquire a negative truth value, but not a positive one.
	From: Karl Popper (Two Problems of Epistemology [1932], p.256), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 18 'Laws'
	A reaction: This sounds like a logician's approach to science, but I prefer to look at coherence, where very little is actually conclusive, and one tinkers with the theory instead.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy

5210	We could know what a lion thinks by mapping both its brain patterns and its experiences [Douglas,A]
	Full Idea: In principle, it seems possible to monitor both the brain activity and the external experiences of a lion cub from birth, and by extensive mapping of one against the other to work out fairly accurately what a lion is thinking.
	From: Andy Douglas (talk [2003])
	A reaction: This has limitations (e.g. we could monitor the external events, but not the way the lion experiences them), but it seems to me to offer a real theoretical possibility of breaching the mental privacy of an inarticulate creature.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character

23279	It is important that a person can change their character, and not just be successive 'selves' [Williams,B]
	Full Idea: I want to emphasise the basic importance of the ordinary idea of a self or person which undergoes changes of character, as opposed to dissolving a changing person into a series of 'selves'.
	From: Bernard Williams (Persons, Character and Morality [1976], II)
	A reaction: [compressed] He mentions Derek Parfit for the rival view. Williams has the Aristotelian view, that a person has an essential nature, which endures through change, and explains that change. But that needs some non-essential character traits.

23280	Kantians have an poor account of individuals, and insist on impartiality, because they ignore character [Williams,B]
	Full Idea: The Kantians' omission of character is a condition of their ultimate insistence on the demands of impartial morality, just as it is a reason to find inadequate their account of the individual.
	From: Bernard Williams (Persons, Character and Morality [1976], II)
	A reaction: This is also why the Kantian account of virtue is inadequate, in comparison with the Aristotelian view.

23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism

23278	For utilitarians states of affairs are what have value, not matter who produced them [Williams,B]
	Full Idea: The basic bearer of value for Utilitarianism is the state of affairs, and hence, when the relevant causal differences have been allowed for, it cannot make any further difference who produces a given state of affairs.
	From: Bernard Williams (Persons, Character and Morality [1976], I)
	A reaction: Which is morally better, that I water your bed of flowers, or that it rains? Which is morally better, that I water them from love, or because you threaten me with a whip?