9 ideas
10845 | To be true a sentence must express a proposition, and not be ambiguous or vague or just expressive [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Sentences or assertions can be derivately called true, if they succeed in expressing determinate propositions. A sentence can be ambiguous or vague or paradoxical or ungrounded or not declarative or a mere expression of feeling. | |
From: David Lewis (Forget the 'correspondence theory of truth' [2001], p.276) | |
A reaction: Lewis has, of course, a peculiar notion of what a proposition is - it's a set of possible worlds. I, with my more psychological approach, take a proposition to be a particular sort of brain event. |
10847 | Truthmakers are about existential grounding, not about truth [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Instances of the truthmaker principle are equivalent to biconditionals not about truth but about the existential grounding of all manner of other things; the flying pigs, or what-have-you. | |
From: David Lewis (Forget the 'correspondence theory of truth' [2001]) | |
A reaction: The question then is what the difference is between 'existential grounding' and 'truth'. There wouldn't seem to be any difference at all if the proposition in question was a simple existential claim. |
10846 | Truthmaker is correspondence, but without the requirement to be one-to-one [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The truthmaker principle seems to be a version of the correspondence theory of truth, but differs mostly in denying that the correspondence of truths to facts must be one-to-one. | |
From: David Lewis (Forget the 'correspondence theory of truth' [2001], p.277) | |
A reaction: In other words, several different sentences might have exactly the same truthmaker. |
5451 | Popper felt that ancient essentialism was a bar to progress [Popper, by Mautner] |
Full Idea: Karl Popper vehemently rejected the essentialism which underpins Plato and Aristotle, taking it to be a major obstacle to political, moral and scientific progress. | |
From: report of Karl Popper (Open Society and Its Enemies:Hegel and Marx [1945]) by Thomas Mautner - Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy p.179 | |
A reaction: This makes Popper sound like an existentialist, which seems unlikely. Modern essentialism would say the opposite about science - that hunting for external imposed laws is a red herring, and we should try to understand essences. |
9757 | A person viewed as an agent makes no sense without its own future [Korsgaard] |
Full Idea: In forming a particular plan of life, you need to identify with your future in order to be what you are even now. When the person is viewed as an agent, no clear content can be given to the idea of a merely present self. | |
From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §2) | |
A reaction: I certainly like the notion that we should treat persons primarily as agents, since I take personhood to be more like a process than an existent entity. If a large brick is about to hit you, you actually have no future, though you think you have. |
9758 | To make sense of personal identity, focus on agency rather than experience [Korsgaard] |
Full Idea: A focus on agency makes more sense of personal identity than a focus on experience. | |
From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §2) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as eminently sensible advice for the beginning of any discussion of personal identity. Her personal bęte noir is Parfit, who focuses on what we are conscious of. |
9759 | Theory of action focuses on explanation and prediction; practical action on justification and choice [Korsgaard] |
Full Idea: When we look at our actions from the theoretical standpoint our concern is with their explanation and prediction. When we view them from the practical standpoint our concern is with their justification and choice. | |
From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §4) | |
A reaction: A nice distinction, which invites us to further subdivide action theory into two branches, with entirely different concerns. |
9760 | Self-concern may be a source of pain, or a lack of self-respect, or a failure of responsibility [Korsgaard] |
Full Idea: For utilitarians, self-concern causes needless pain; for Kantians, it evinces a lack of respect for one's own humanity; for the religious moralist, it is a failure of responsibility for what has been placed in one's special care. | |
From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §5) | |
A reaction: Worryingly, given my heathenish views, I find the third one the most congenial. If we don't take responsibility for our own selves (e.g. for having a great talent), then no one (even parents) will take responsibility for anything. |
9761 | Personal concern for one's own self widens out into concern for the impersonal [Korsgaard] |
Full Idea: The personal concern which begins with one's life in a particular body finds its place in ever-widening spheres of agency and enterprise, developing finally into a personal concern for the impersonal. | |
From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §5) | |
A reaction: I am very struck by this nice thought, which comes from a very committed Kantian. It seems to me to capture the modern orthodoxy in ethical thinking - that concern for one's self, rather than altruism, is central, but altruism should follow from it. |