Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Two Problems of Epistemology', 'fragments/reports' and 'Critical Common-Sensism'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought [Peirce]
     Full Idea: Logicians have too much neglected the study of vagueness, not suspecting the important part it plays in mathematical thought. It is the antithetical analogue of generality.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Critical Common-Sensism [1905], I)
All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction [Peirce]
     Full Idea: The 'vague' might be defined as that to which the principle of contradiction does not apply. For it is false neither that an animal (in a vague sense) is male, nor that an animal is female. No communication between persons can be entirely non-vague.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Critical Common-Sensism [1905], I)
     A reaction: Note that he makes vagueness largely a matter of the way we talk, which is David Lewis's approach, and looks right to me.
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper]
     Full Idea: Whereas particular reality statements are in principle completely verifiable or falsifiable, things are different for general reality statements: they can indeed be conclusively falsified, they can acquire a negative truth value, but not a positive one.
     From: Karl Popper (Two Problems of Epistemology [1932], p.256), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 18 'Laws'
     A reaction: This sounds like a logician's approach to science, but I prefer to look at coherence, where very little is actually conclusive, and one tinkers with the theory instead.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA]
     Full Idea: Critolaus reformulated Aristotelian theory by defining happiness as a 'fulfilment' (sumplêrôma) of psychic, physical, and external goods, where virtue vastly outweighs the rest.
     From: report of Critolaus (fragments/reports [c.170 BCE]) by Stephen A. White - Critolaus
     A reaction: The sounds more like an attempt at clarification than a real change of Peripatetic doctrine. Occasionally 'fulfilment' is offered as a translation for eudaimonia. Maybe we should just take up Critolaus' suggestion when we are discussing Aristotle.