Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Two Problems of Epistemology', 'How to Russell a Frege-Church' and 'fragments/reports'

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6 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
For Russell, expressions dependent on contingent circumstances must be eliminated [Kaplan]
     Full Idea: It is a tenet of Russell's theory that all expressions, and especially definite descriptions, whose denotation is dependent upon contingent circumstances must be eliminated.
     From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], II)
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
'Haecceitism' says that sameness or difference of individuals is independent of appearances [Kaplan]
     Full Idea: The doctrine that we can ask whether this is the same individual in another possible world, and that a common 'thisness' may underlie extreme dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses may underlie great resemblance, I call 'Haecceitism'.
     From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], IV)
     A reaction: Penelope Mackie emphasises that this doctrine, that each thing is somehow individuated, is not the same as believing in actual haecceities, specific properties which achieve the individuating.
'Haecceitism' is common thisness under dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses under resemblance [Kaplan]
     Full Idea: That a common 'thisness' may underlie extreme dissimilarity or distinct thisnesses may underlie great resemblance I call 'haecceitism'. (I prefer the pronunciation Hex'-ee-i-tis-m).
     From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], IV)
     A reaction: [odd pronunciation, if 'haec' is pronounced haeek] The view seems to be very unpopular (e.g. with Lewis, Bird and Mumford). But there is an intuitive sense of whether or not two things are identical when they seem dissimilar.
If quantification into modal contexts is legitimate, that seems to imply some form of haecceitism [Kaplan]
     Full Idea: If one regards the usual form of quantification into modal and other intensional contexts - modality de re - as legitimate (without special explanations), then one seems committed to some form of haecceitism.
     From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], IV)
     A reaction: That is, modal reference requires fixed identities, irrespective of possible changes in properties. Why could one not refer to objects just as bundles of properties, with some sort of rules about when it ceased to be that particular bundle (keep 60%?)?
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper]
     Full Idea: Whereas particular reality statements are in principle completely verifiable or falsifiable, things are different for general reality statements: they can indeed be conclusively falsified, they can acquire a negative truth value, but not a positive one.
     From: Karl Popper (Two Problems of Epistemology [1932], p.256), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 18 'Laws'
     A reaction: This sounds like a logician's approach to science, but I prefer to look at coherence, where very little is actually conclusive, and one tinkers with the theory instead.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The cardinal virtues are theoretical (based on knowledge), and others are 'non-theoretical' [Hecato, by Dorandi]
     Full Idea: Hecato defined the cardinal virtues as 'theoretical', that is, based on knowledge, and to these he opposed those that are 'non-theoretical', for example, health, beauty, strength of spirit, and courage.
     From: report of Hecato (fragments/reports [c.70 BCE]) by Tiziano Dorandi - Hecato of Rhodes
     A reaction: Mostly these are Aristotle's external and non-external virtues, except that courage is here included among the former, implying, presumably, that it is more of a natural gift than an intellectual achievement.