Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Two Problems of Epistemology', 'How to Russell a Frege-Church' and 'Sententia on 'De Caelo''

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly

22101	Philosophy aims to know the truth about the way things are [Aquinas]
	Full Idea: The study of philosophy has as its purpose to know not what people have thought, but rather the truth about the way things are.
	From: Thomas Aquinas (Sententia on 'De Caelo' [1268], I.22.228), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 05
	A reaction: I agree with this deeply unfashionable opinion. Of course, modern investigations must be more sensitive to biases built into language, culture and conceptual schemes. But I am one of those sad old folks who still think truths can be stated.

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions

11989	For Russell, expressions dependent on contingent circumstances must be eliminated [Kaplan]
	Full Idea: It is a tenet of Russell's theory that all expressions, and especially definite descriptions, whose denotation is dependent upon contingent circumstances must be eliminated.
	From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], II)

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism

11990	'Haecceitism' says that sameness or difference of individuals is independent of appearances [Kaplan]
	Full Idea: The doctrine that we can ask whether this is the same individual in another possible world, and that a common 'thisness' may underlie extreme dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses may underlie great resemblance, I call 'Haecceitism'.
	From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], IV)
	A reaction: Penelope Mackie emphasises that this doctrine, that each thing is somehow individuated, is not the same as believing in actual haecceities, specific properties which achieve the individuating.

9668	'Haecceitism' is common thisness under dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses under resemblance [Kaplan]
	Full Idea: That a common 'thisness' may underlie extreme dissimilarity or distinct thisnesses may underlie great resemblance I call 'haecceitism'. (I prefer the pronunciation Hex'-ee-i-tis-m).
	From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], IV)
	A reaction: [odd pronunciation, if 'haec' is pronounced haeek] The view seems to be very unpopular (e.g. with Lewis, Bird and Mumford). But there is an intuitive sense of whether or not two things are identical when they seem dissimilar.

11991	If quantification into modal contexts is legitimate, that seems to imply some form of haecceitism [Kaplan]
	Full Idea: If one regards the usual form of quantification into modal and other intensional contexts - modality de re - as legitimate (without special explanations), then one seems committed to some form of haecceitism.
	From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], IV)
	A reaction: That is, modal reference requires fixed identities, irrespective of possible changes in properties. Why could one not refer to objects just as bundles of properties, with some sort of rules about when it ceased to be that particular bundle (keep 60%?)?

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification

18284	Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper]
	Full Idea: Whereas particular reality statements are in principle completely verifiable or falsifiable, things are different for general reality statements: they can indeed be conclusively falsified, they can acquire a negative truth value, but not a positive one.
	From: Karl Popper (Two Problems of Epistemology [1932], p.256), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 18 'Laws'
	A reaction: This sounds like a logician's approach to science, but I prefer to look at coherence, where very little is actually conclusive, and one tinkers with the theory instead.