Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Two Problems of Epistemology', 'Replies to Critics' and 'Many, but almost one'

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6 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth

18702	Names, descriptions and predicates refer to things; without that, language and thought are baffling [Davidson]
	Full Idea: The simple thesis that names and descriptions often refer to things, and that predicates often have an extension in the world of things, is obvious, and essential to the most elementary appreciation of both language and the thoughts we express.
	From: Donald Davidson (Replies to Critics [1998], p.323)
	A reaction: In 1983 Davidson had been a rare modern champion of the coherence theory of truth, but this is his clearest later renunciation of that view (and quite right too).

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic

15538	Semantic indecision explains vagueness (if we have precisifications to be undecided about) [Lewis]
	Full Idea: Semantic indecision will suffice to explain the phenomenon of vagueness. [note] Provided that there exist the many precisifications for us to be undecided between. If you deny this, you will indeed have need of vague objects.
	From: David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'Two solutions')
	A reaction: [He mentions Van Inwagen 1990:213-83] There seem to be three solutions to vague objects: that they really are vague, that they are precise but we can't know precisely, or Lewis's view. I like Lewis's view. Do animals have any problem with vagueness?

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail

15537	If cats are vague, we deny that the many cats are one, or deny that the one cat is many [Lewis]
	Full Idea: To deny that there are many cats on the mat (because removal of a few hairs seems to produce a new one), we must either deny that the many are cats, or else deny that the cats are many. ...I think both alternatives lead to successful solutions.
	From: David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'The paradox')
	A reaction: He credits the problem to Geach (and Tibbles), and says it is the same as Unger's 'problem of the many' (Idea 15536).

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

15536	We have one cloud, but many possible boundaries and aggregates for it [Lewis]
	Full Idea: Many surfaces are equally good candidates to be boundaries of a cloud; therefore many aggregates of droplets are equally good candidates to be the cloud. How is it that we have just one cloud? And yet we do. This is Unger's (1980) 'problem of the many'.
	From: David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'The problem')
	A reaction: This is the problem of vague objects, as opposed to the problem of vague predicates, or the problem of vague truths, or the problem of vague prepositions (like 'towards').

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification

18284	Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper]
	Full Idea: Whereas particular reality statements are in principle completely verifiable or falsifiable, things are different for general reality statements: they can indeed be conclusively falsified, they can acquire a negative truth value, but not a positive one.
	From: Karl Popper (Two Problems of Epistemology [1932], p.256), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 18 'Laws'
	A reaction: This sounds like a logician's approach to science, but I prefer to look at coherence, where very little is actually conclusive, and one tinkers with the theory instead.

19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity

15539	Basic to pragmatics is taking a message in a way that makes sense of it [Lewis]
	Full Idea: The cardinal principle of pragmatics is that the right way to take what is said, if at all possible, is the way that makes sense of the message.
	From: David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'A better solution')
	A reaction: Thus when someone misuses a word, suggesting nonsense, we gloss over it, often without even mentioning it, because the underlying sense is obvious. A good argument for the existence of propositions. Lewis doesn't mention truth.