Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Two Problems of Epistemology', 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?' and 'The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge'

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4 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism

8824	No one has defended translational phenomenalism since Ayer in 1940 [Ayer, by Kim]
	Full Idea: I know of no serious defence of 'translational phenomenalism' since Ayer's in 1940.
	From: report of A.J. Ayer (The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge [1940]) by Jaegwon Kim - What is 'naturalized epistemology'? 303-4+n
	A reaction: We can think of Ayer as a hero who explored how far extreme empiricism would go. We still have anti-realists who are singing from a revised version of the song-sheet. Personally I am with Russell, that we must embrace the best explanation.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem

8886	Being a true justified belief is not a sufficient condition for knowledge [Gettier]
	Full Idea: The claim that someone knows a proposition if it is true, it is believed, and the person is justified in their belief is false, in that the conditions do not state a sufficient condition for the claim.
	From: Edmund L. Gettier (Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? [1963], p.145)
	A reaction: This is the beginning of the famous Gettier Problem, which has motivated most epistemology for the last forty years. Gettier implies that justification is necessary, even if it is not sufficient. He gives two counterexamples.

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification

18284	Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper]
	Full Idea: Whereas particular reality statements are in principle completely verifiable or falsifiable, things are different for general reality statements: they can indeed be conclusively falsified, they can acquire a negative truth value, but not a positive one.
	From: Karl Popper (Two Problems of Epistemology [1932], p.256), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 18 'Laws'
	A reaction: This sounds like a logician's approach to science, but I prefer to look at coherence, where very little is actually conclusive, and one tinkers with the theory instead.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity

15251	The attribution of necessity to causation is either primitive animism, or confusion with logical necessity [Ayer]
	Full Idea: How are we to explain the word 'must' [about causation]? The answer is, I think, that it is either a relic of animism, or else reveals an inclination to treat causal connexion as if it were a form of logical necessity.
	From: A.J. Ayer (The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge [1940], IV.18)
	A reaction: The animism proposal just about makes sense (as a primitive feature of minds), but why would anyone, if they had the time and understanding, dream of treating a regular connection as a 'logical' necessity?