15 ideas
22246 | A train of reasoning must be treated as all happening simultaneously [Recanati] |
Full Idea: For logic purposes, a train of reasoning has to be construed as synchronic. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files in Flux [2016], 5.2) | |
A reaction: If we are looking for a gulf between logic and the real world this is a factor to be considered, along with Nietzsche's observation about necessary simplification. [ref to Kaplan 'Afterthoughts' 1989, 584-5] |
12149 | Indexicals are a problem for beliefs being just subject-proposition relations [Perry] |
Full Idea: The essential indexical is a problem for the view that belief is a relation between subjects and propositions conceived as bearers of truth and falsity. | |
From: John Perry (The Problem of the Essential Indexical [1979], 'Intro') | |
A reaction: My immediate reaction would be that it depends on how you conceive of 'propositions'. If they are objective, you have a problem. I take them to be subjective events in brains, and the indexical meaning to be evident within the proposition. |
18284 | Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper] |
Full Idea: Whereas particular reality statements are in principle completely verifiable or falsifiable, things are different for general reality statements: they can indeed be conclusively falsified, they can acquire a negative truth value, but not a positive one. | |
From: Karl Popper (Two Problems of Epistemology [1932], p.256), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 18 'Laws' | |
A reaction: This sounds like a logician's approach to science, but I prefer to look at coherence, where very little is actually conclusive, and one tinkers with the theory instead. |
22247 | Indexicality is not just a feature of language; examples show it also occurs in thought [Recanati] |
Full Idea: People once took indexicality to be exclusively a property of language, ....but a series of examples seemed to establish that the thought expressed by uttering an indexical sentence is itself indexical (and is thus 'essential'). | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files in Flux [2016], 6.1) | |
A reaction: Perry's example of not realising it is him leaking the sugar in a supermarket is the best known example. Was this a key moment for realising that philosophy of thought is (pace Dummett) more important than philosophy of language? |
22248 | How can we communicate indexical thoughts to people not in the right context? [Recanati] |
Full Idea: Indexical thoughts create an obvious problem with regard to communication. How can we manage to communicate such thoughts to those who are not in the right context? | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files in Flux [2016], 7.1) | |
A reaction: One answer is that you often cannot communicate them. If I write on a wall 'I am here now', that doesn't tell the next passer-by very much. But 'it's raining here' said in a telephone call works fine - if you know the location of the caller. |
22242 | Mental files are concepts, which are either collections or (better) containers [Recanati] |
Full Idea: Mental files are entries in the mental encyclopedia, that is, concepts. Some, following Grice, say they are information collections, but I think of them as containers. Collections are determined by their elements, but containers have independent identity. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files in Flux [2016], Pref) | |
A reaction: [compressed] [Grice reference is 'Vacuous Names' (1969)] I agree with Recanati. The point is that you can invoke a file by a label, even when you don't know what the content is. |
22243 | The Frege case of believing a thing is both F and not-F is explained by separate mental files [Recanati] |
Full Idea: Frege's Constraint says if a subject believes an object is both F and not-F (as in 'Frege cases'), then the subject thinks of that object under distinct modes of presentation. Having distinct mental files of the object is sufficient to generate this. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files in Flux [2016], Pref) | |
A reaction: [compressed] When you look at how many semantic puzzles (notably from Frege and Kripke) are solved by the existence of labelled mental files, the case for them is overwhelming. |
22245 | A linguistic expression refers to what its associated mental file refers to [Recanati] |
Full Idea: Mental files determine the reference of linguistic expressions: an expression refers to what the mental file associated with it refers to (at the time of tokening). | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files in Flux [2016], 5) | |
A reaction: Invites the question of how mental files manage to refer, prior to the arrival of a linguistic expression. A mental file is usually fully of descriptions, but it might be no more than a label. |
12151 | If we replace 'I' in sentences about me, they are different beliefs and explanations of behaviour [Perry] |
Full Idea: If I leave a trail of sugar, and realise 'that I am making a mess', ...when we replace the word 'I' with other designations of me, we no longer have an explanation of my behaviour, or an attribution of the same belief, so it is an 'essential indexical'. | |
From: John Perry (The Problem of the Essential Indexical [1979], 'Intro') | |
A reaction: [compressed] A famous observation of Perry's, which leads him to challenge traditional accounts of belief and of propositions. I don't think I see a problem, if we have a thoroughly non-linguistic account of essentially unambiguous propositions. |
18412 | Indexicals individuate certain belief states, helping in explanation and prediction [Perry] |
Full Idea: We use sentences with indexicals or relativized propositions to individuate belief states, for the purposes of classifying believers in ways useful for explanation and prediction. | |
From: John Perry (The Problem of the Essential Indexical [1979], 'Obvious') | |
A reaction: He goes on to apparently connect this with some sort of moral integrity involved in 'owning up' to the fact that the person in question is you (who has spilled the sugar etc.). |
22250 | There are speakers' thoughts and hearers' thoughts, but no further thought attached to the utterance [Recanati] |
Full Idea: There is the speaker's thought and the thought formed by the hearer. That is all there is. We don't need an additional entity, the thought expressed by the utterance. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files in Flux [2016], 7.2) | |
A reaction: This fits my view of propositions nicely. They are the two 'thoughts'. The notion of some further abstract 'proposition' with its own mode of independent existence strikes me as ontologically absurd. |
12150 | Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition [Perry] |
Full Idea: The problem of the essential indexical reveals that something is badly wrong with the traditional doctrine of propositions. | |
From: John Perry (The Problem of the Essential Indexical [1979], 'Prob') | |
A reaction: See the reaction to 12149. The traditional view of propositions, or at least Russell's view, seems to be that they are same as facts, which strikes me as daft. I take propositions to be brain events, probably expressed in mentalese. |
22249 | The Naive view of communication is that hearers acquire exactly the thoughts of the speaker [Recanati] |
Full Idea: The Naive Conception of Communication rests on the idea that communication is the replication of thoughts: the thought the hearer entertains when he understands what the speaker is saying is the very thought which the speaker expressed. | |
From: François Recanati (Mental Files in Flux [2016], 7.1) | |
A reaction: It is hard to believe that any modern thinker would believe such a view, given holistic views of language etc. |
15203 | Tense is essential for thought and action [Perry, by Le Poidevin] |
Full Idea: Tense plays a crucial role in thought and action. | |
From: report of John Perry (The Problem of the Essential Indexical [1979]) by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 3 a | |
A reaction: This is important, because much of our metaphysics is dominated by a detached 'scientific' description of reality, which is given a rather passive character. If processes take centre stage, which they should, then our own processes are part of it. |
15204 | Actual tensed sentences cannot be tenseless, because they can cite their own context [Perry, by Le Poidevin] |
Full Idea: In the new tenseless theory, no tensed token sentence can be equivalent to a tenseless token, because the former, unlike the latter, draws attention to the context in which it is tokened. | |
From: report of John Perry (The Problem of the Essential Indexical [1979]) by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 3 a | |
A reaction: So the problem about indexicals was worrying fans of the tenseless B-series view of time (and so it should). I'm inclined to translate sentences containing indexicals into their actual propositions, which tend to avoid them. 'Time/person of utterance'. |