5 ideas
10670 | A 'singulariser' converts a plural like 'number of' to a syntactically neutral form [Cartwright,H, by Hossack] |
Full Idea: Helen Cartwright calls 'a number of' a 'singulariser', an expression whose linguistic function is to convert to a syntactically neutral form an expression whose semantic value remains plural. It is a great convenience grammatically. | |
From: report of Helen Cartwright (On Plural Reference and Set Theory [1993]) by Keith Hossack - Plurals and Complexes 2 | |
A reaction: Compare Hofweber's Idea 10004, suggesting it is a crucial psychological convenience for reasoning, as well as a 'grammatical' convenience. |
17809 | Gödel showed that the syntactic approach to the infinite is of limited value [Kreisel] |
Full Idea: Usually Gödel's incompleteness theorems are taken as showing a limitation on the syntactic approach to an understanding of the concept of infinity. | |
From: Georg Kreisel (Hilbert's Programme [1958], 05) |
17810 | The study of mathematical foundations needs new non-mathematical concepts [Kreisel] |
Full Idea: It is necessary to use non-mathematical concepts, i.e. concepts lacking the precision which permit mathematical manipulation, for a significant approach to foundations. We currently have no concepts of this kind which we can take seriously. | |
From: Georg Kreisel (Hilbert's Programme [1958], 06) | |
A reaction: Music to the ears of any philosopher of mathematics, because it means they are not yet out of a job. |
18284 | Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper] |
Full Idea: Whereas particular reality statements are in principle completely verifiable or falsifiable, things are different for general reality statements: they can indeed be conclusively falsified, they can acquire a negative truth value, but not a positive one. | |
From: Karl Popper (Two Problems of Epistemology [1932], p.256), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 18 'Laws' | |
A reaction: This sounds like a logician's approach to science, but I prefer to look at coherence, where very little is actually conclusive, and one tinkers with the theory instead. |
17811 | The natural conception of points ducks the problem of naming or constructing each point [Kreisel] |
Full Idea: In analysis, the most natural conception of a point ignores the matter of naming the point, i.e. how the real number is represented or by what constructions the point is reached from given points. | |
From: Georg Kreisel (Hilbert's Programme [1958], 13) | |
A reaction: This problem has bothered me. There are formal ways of constructing real numbers, but they don't seem to result in a name for each one. |