5 ideas
21552 | Common speech is vague; its vocabulary and syntax must be modified, for precision [Russell] |
Full Idea: I am persuaded that common speech is full of vagueness and inaccuracy, and that any attempt to be precise and accurate requires modification of common speech both as regards vocabulary and as regards syntax. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Mr Strawson on Referring [1957], p.123) | |
A reaction: It is interesting that he cites the syntax of ordinary language, as well as the vocabulary. The implication is that vagueness can also be a feature of syntax (and hence his pursuit of logical form), which is not normally mentioned |
21551 | Empirical words need ostensive definition, which makes them egocentric [Russell] |
Full Idea: The meanings of all empirical words depend ultimately upon ostensive definitions, ostensive definitions depend upon experience, and that experience is egocentric. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Mr Strawson on Referring [1957], p.122) | |
A reaction: He seems to imply that this makes them partly subjective, but I don't see why an objective consensus can't be reached when making an ostensive definition. We just need to clearly agree what 'that' refers to. |
18284 | Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper] |
Full Idea: Whereas particular reality statements are in principle completely verifiable or falsifiable, things are different for general reality statements: they can indeed be conclusively falsified, they can acquire a negative truth value, but not a positive one. | |
From: Karl Popper (Two Problems of Epistemology [1932], p.256), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 18 'Laws' | |
A reaction: This sounds like a logician's approach to science, but I prefer to look at coherence, where very little is actually conclusive, and one tinkers with the theory instead. |
19387 | Hypotheses come from induction, which is comparison of experiences [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We construct a hypothesis on the basis of an induction, that is on the basis of a comparison of experiences. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Elements of Law and Justice [1669], p.2) | |
A reaction: This fits the traditional positivist picture of science (observe-hypothesise-predict-observe). I like the definition of induction as 'comparison of experiences', because it doesn't reduce it to sequences of objects, and points to coherence. |
21550 | Science reduces indexicals to a minimum, but they can never be eliminated from empirical matters [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is of the essence of a scientific account of the world to reduce to a minimum the egocentric element in assertion, but success in this attempt is a matter of degree, and is never complete where empirical matter is concerned. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Mr Strawson on Referring [1957], p.121) | |
A reaction: He cites ostensive definitions. The key issue is whether they can be wholly eliminated when we try to be objective. Russell here endorses Perry's claim that they never go away. Personally I just think that (if so) we should try harder. |