Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Two Problems of Epistemology', 'The Nature of Existence vol.1' and 'A General Principle to Explain Laws of Nature'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Philosophy is sanctified, because it flows from God [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Philosophy is sanctified by having its streams flow from the fountain of God's attributes.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (A General Principle to Explain Laws of Nature [1687], p.69)
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Substance has to exist, with no intrinsic qualities or relations [McTaggart]
     Full Idea: Something must exist, then, and have qualities, without being itself either a quality or a relation. And this is Substance.
     From: J.M.E. McTaggart (The Nature of Existence vol.1 [1921], §67), quoted by R.D. Ingthorsson - A Powerful Particulars View of Causation 7.2
     A reaction: Ingthorsson quotes this as 'the most extreme analytic view', which is a long way from the Aristotelian view. This is the implausible bare substrate.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Inequality can be brought infinitely close to equality [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Equality may be considered as an infinitely small inequality, and we may make inequality approach equality as much as we wish.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (A General Principle to Explain Laws of Nature [1687], p.67)
     A reaction: An interesting response to David Lewis's brusque dismissal of the problem of identity, as all-or-nothing...end of story.
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper]
     Full Idea: Whereas particular reality statements are in principle completely verifiable or falsifiable, things are different for general reality statements: they can indeed be conclusively falsified, they can acquire a negative truth value, but not a positive one.
     From: Karl Popper (Two Problems of Epistemology [1932], p.256), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 18 'Laws'
     A reaction: This sounds like a logician's approach to science, but I prefer to look at coherence, where very little is actually conclusive, and one tinkers with the theory instead.