Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Two Problems of Epistemology', 'later work' and 'Introduction to 'Personal Identity''

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 6. Deconstruction

6840	Derrida came to believe in the undeconstructability of justice, which cannot be relativised [Derrida, by Critchley]
	Full Idea: In Derrida's later work we find him moving explicitly towards a belief in the undeconstructability of justice, as he puts it, which is an overarching value that cannot be relativised.
	From: report of Jacques Derrida (later work [1980]) by Simon Critchley - Interview with Baggini and Stangroom p.191
	A reaction: A nice corrective to the standard Anglo-Saxon assumption that Derrida is an extreme (and stupid) relativist. The notion of 'undeconstructability' is nice, just as Descartes found an idea that resisted the blasts of scepticism.

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification

18284	Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper]
	Full Idea: Whereas particular reality statements are in principle completely verifiable or falsifiable, things are different for general reality statements: they can indeed be conclusively falsified, they can acquire a negative truth value, but not a positive one.
	From: Karl Popper (Two Problems of Epistemology [1932], p.256), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 18 'Laws'
	A reaction: This sounds like a logician's approach to science, but I prefer to look at coherence, where very little is actually conclusive, and one tinkers with the theory instead.

16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity

5504	Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi]
	Full Idea: Some recent philosophers have argued that we should replace the three-dimensional view of persons with a four-dimensional view according to which only time-slices, or 'stages', of persons exist at short intervals of time.
	From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.3)
	A reaction: At first glance this seems to neatly eliminate lots of traditional worries. But why would I want to retain my identity, if someone threatened to brainwash me. I also want to disown my inadequate earlier selves. Interesting, though. Lewis.

5503	Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi]
	Full Idea: A modern question is whether personal identity is primarily what matters in survival; that is, people might cease and be continued by others whose continuation the original people would value as much.
	From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.3)
	A reaction: When put like this, the proposal seems hard to grasp. It only makes sense if you don't really believe in a thing called 'personal identity'. I don't see how you can believe in it without also believing that for you it has central importance.

16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct

5502	Locke's intrinsic view of personal identity has been replaced by an externalist view [Martin/Barresi]
	Full Idea: In modern times the Lockean intrinsic relations view of personal identity has been superseded by an extrinsic relations view (also called the 'closest-continuer' or 'externalist' view).
	From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.1)
	A reaction: Sounds sweeping. My suspicion is that there is a raging fashion for externalist views of everything (justification, content etc.), but this will pass. I take Parfit to be the source of the modern views.

24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people

21936	A community must consist of singular persons, with nothing in common [Derrida, by Glendinning]
	Full Idea: In Derrida's modal reversal (where the only possible forgiveness is forgiving the unforgivable), the only possible community is the impossible community, which is a 'community of singularities' without anything in common.
	From: report of Jacques Derrida (later work [1980]) by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 7
	A reaction: Since this seems to go beyond multiculturalism, I can only see it as hyper-liberalism - that isolated individuals have an absolute status. Sounds like Nozick, but Derrida saw himself as a non-Marxist left-winger.

21937	Can there be democratic friendship without us all becoming identical? [Derrida, by Glendinning]
	Full Idea: The question is whether it is possible to think of a politics of democratic friendship that could free itself from the terrifying threat of homogenization.
	From: report of Jacques Derrida (later work [1980]) by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 7
	A reaction: Being terrified of people becoming all the same links Derrida to existentialist individualism. Is he just a linguistic existentialist, trying to free us from the tyranny of linguistic uniformity?

29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality

5505	For Aristotle the psyche perishes with the body (except possibly 'nous') [Martin/Barresi]
	Full Idea: In Aristotle's view, with the possible exception of 'nous' the psyche and all its parts come into being at the same time as its associated body; it is inseparable from the body, and perishes along with it.
	From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.8)
	A reaction: It is suggested that he thought there was only one 'nous', which all humans share (p.9). If he wants to claim that one part is immortal, he doesn't have much evidence. If psyche is the form of the body, it is bound to perish.