Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Two Problems of Epistemology', 'The Communists and Peace' and 'Without Immediate Justification'

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7 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma

8851	Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M]
	Full Idea: From the point of view of the coherentist, Agrippa's Dilemma fails because it presupposes a 'linear' conception of justifying inference.
	From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §2)
	A reaction: [He cites Bonjour 1985 for this view] Since a belief may have several justifications, and one belief could justify a host of others, there certainly isn't a simple line of justifications. I agree with the coherentist picture here.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism

8849	Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M]
	Full Idea: Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist. The justification-making factors for beliefs, basic and otherwise, are all open to view, and perhaps even actual objects of awareness. I am always in a position to know that I know.
	From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §1)
	A reaction: This is a helpful if one is trying to draw a map of the debate. An externalist foundationalism would have to terminate in the external fact which was the object of knowledge (via some reliable channel), but that is the truth, not the justification.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs

8853	Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M]
	Full Idea: Basic judgements threaten to buy their immunity from error at the cost of being drained of descriptive content altogether.
	From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §4)
	A reaction: This is probably the key objection to foundationalism. As you import sufficient content into basic experiences to enable them to actually justify a set of beliefs, you find you have imported all sorts of comparisons and classifications as well.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations

8855	Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M]
	Full Idea: The fact that experiential contents cannot be other than they are, as far as sensory awareness goes, does not imply that we cannot misdescribe them, as in misreporting the number of speckles on a speckled hen (Chisholm's example).
	From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §4)
	A reaction: [Chisholm 1942 is cited] Such experiences couldn't be basic beliefs if there was a conflict between their intrinsic nature and the description I used in discussing them.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification

8852	In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M]
	Full Idea: In the peculiar context of the skeptical challenge, it is easy to persuade oneself that externalism is not an option.
	From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §3)
	A reaction: This is because externalism sees justification as largely non-conscious, but when faced with scepticism, the justifications need to be spelled out, and therefore internalised. So are sceptical discussions basic, or freakish anomalies?

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification

18284	Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper]
	Full Idea: Whereas particular reality statements are in principle completely verifiable or falsifiable, things are different for general reality statements: they can indeed be conclusively falsified, they can acquire a negative truth value, but not a positive one.
	From: Karl Popper (Two Problems of Epistemology [1932], p.256), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 18 'Laws'
	A reaction: This sounds like a logician's approach to science, but I prefer to look at coherence, where very little is actually conclusive, and one tinkers with the theory instead.

24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism

21240	The truth about events always comes from the oppressed and disadvantaged [Sartre, by Bakewell]
	Full Idea: Work out who is most oppressed and disadvantaged in the situation, and then adopt their version of events as the right one. If something is not true in the eyes of the least favoured, then it is not true.
	From: report of Jean-Paul Sartre (The Communists and Peace [1953], final part) by Sarah Bakewell - At the Existentialist Café 12
	A reaction: A theory of social truth, rather than truth in general. A bit simplistic, but appealing. If you want to know the truth, ask the people involved. This is true of the Savoy Grill, as well as of homeless life. You must first care about the oppressed.