12 ideas
2546 | Philosophy is a magnificent failure in its attempt to overstep the limits of our knowledge [McGinn] |
Full Idea: Philosophy marks the limits of human theoretical intelligence. Philosophy is an attempt to overstep our cognitive bounds, a kind of magnificent failure. | |
From: Colin McGinn (The Mysterious Flame [1999], p.209) | |
A reaction: No one attempts to overstep boundaries once they are confirmed as such. The magnificent attempts persist because failure is impossible to demonstrate (except, perhaps, by Gödel's Theorem). |
2544 | Thoughts have a dual aspect: as they seem to introspection, and their underlying logical reality [McGinn] |
Full Idea: Our thoughts have a kind of duality, corresponding to their surface appearance to introspection and their underlying logical reality. | |
From: Colin McGinn (The Mysterious Flame [1999], p.147) |
9935 | Mathematical truth is always compromising between ordinary language and sensible epistemology [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: Most accounts of the concept of mathematical truth can be identified with serving one or another of either semantic theory (matching it to ordinary language), or with epistemology (meshing with a reasonable view) - always at the expense of the other. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (Mathematical Truth [1973], Intro) | |
A reaction: The gist is that language pulls you towards platonism, and epistemology pulls you towards empiricism. He argues that the semantics must give ground. He's right. |
17927 | Realists have semantics without epistemology, anti-realists epistemology but bad semantics [Benacerraf, by Colyvan] |
Full Idea: Benacerraf argues that realists about mathematical objects have a nice normal semantic but no epistemology, and anti-realists have a good epistemology but an unorthodox semantics. | |
From: report of Paul Benacerraf (Mathematical Truth [1973]) by Mark Colyvan - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics 1.2 |
9936 | The platonist view of mathematics doesn't fit our epistemology very well [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: The principle defect of the standard (platonist) account of mathematical truth is that it appears to violate the requirement that our account be susceptible to integration into our over-all account of knowledge. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (Mathematical Truth [1973], III) | |
A reaction: Unfortunately he goes on to defend a causal theory of justification (fashionable at that time, but implausible now). Nevertheless, his general point is well made. Your theory of what mathematics is had better make it knowable. |
18284 | Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper] |
Full Idea: Whereas particular reality statements are in principle completely verifiable or falsifiable, things are different for general reality statements: they can indeed be conclusively falsified, they can acquire a negative truth value, but not a positive one. | |
From: Karl Popper (Two Problems of Epistemology [1932], p.256), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 18 'Laws' | |
A reaction: This sounds like a logician's approach to science, but I prefer to look at coherence, where very little is actually conclusive, and one tinkers with the theory instead. |
2539 | Mental modules for language, social, action, theory, space, emotion [McGinn] |
Full Idea: The prevailing view in cognitive psychology is that the mind consists of separate faculties, each with a certain cognitive task: linguistic, social, practical, theoretical, abstract, spatial and emotional. | |
From: Colin McGinn (The Mysterious Flame [1999], p.40) | |
A reaction: 'Faculties' are not quite the same as 'modules', and this list mostly involves more higher-order activities than a modules list (e.g. Idea 2495). The idea that emotion is a 'faculty' sounds old-fashioned. |
2545 | Free will is mental causation in action [McGinn] |
Full Idea: Free will is mental causation in action. | |
From: Colin McGinn (The Mysterious Flame [1999], p.167) |
2543 | Brains aren't made of anything special, suggesting panpsychism [McGinn] |
Full Idea: All matter must contain the potential to underlie consciousness, since there is nothing special about the matter that composes brain tissue. | |
From: Colin McGinn (The Mysterious Flame [1999], p.100) | |
A reaction: This seems to me one of the most basic assumptions which we should all make about the mind. The mind is made of the brain, and the brain is made of food. However, there must be something 'special' about the brain. |
2540 | Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn] |
Full Idea: You can look into your mind until you burst and not discover neurons and synapses, and you can stare at someone's brain from dawn till dusk and not perceive the consciousness that is so apparent to the person whose brain it is. | |
From: Colin McGinn (The Mysterious Flame [1999], p.47) | |
A reaction: This is a striking symmetry of ignorance, though hardly enough to justify McGinn's pessimism about understanding the mind. 'When you are in the grass you can't see the whole of England; if you can see the whole of England, you won't see the grass'. |
2547 | There is information if there are symbols which refer, and which can combine into a truth or falsehood [McGinn] |
Full Idea: There is information in a system if there are symbols in it that refer to things and that together form strings that can be true or false. | |
From: Colin McGinn (The Mysterious Flame [1999], p.225) | |
A reaction: We can also directly apprehend information by perception. Are facts identical with correct information? Can a universal generalisation be information? |
2542 | Causation in the material world is energy-transfer, of motion, electricity or gravity [McGinn] |
Full Idea: Causation in the material world works by energy transfer of some sort: transfer of motion, of electrical energy, of gravitational force. | |
From: Colin McGinn (The Mysterious Flame [1999], p.92) |