Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Two Problems of Epistemology', 'Prolegomena to Ethics' and 'Comment on Armstrong and Forrest'

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6 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory [Lewis]
     Full Idea: The leading rivals to a theory of universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory.
     From: David Lewis (Comment on Armstrong and Forrest [1986], p.110)
     A reaction: If that is the complete menu, I choose resemblance nominalism. All discussion of properties in terms of classes is wildly misguided (because properties come first). Why not 'natural' tropes?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis]
     Full Idea: We could not, without structures, uphold the principle that every truth has a truthmaker. If Fa is true, the truthmaker is not F, not a, nor both together; not their mereological sum; not a set-theoretic construction. These would exist just the same.
     From: David Lewis (Comment on Armstrong and Forrest [1986], p.109)
     A reaction: This point ought to trouble Lewis, as well as Armstrong and Forrest. If we assert 'Fa', we must (in any theory) have some idea of what unites them, as well as of their separate existence. It must a fact about 'a', not a fact about 'F'.
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper]
     Full Idea: Whereas particular reality statements are in principle completely verifiable or falsifiable, things are different for general reality statements: they can indeed be conclusively falsified, they can acquire a negative truth value, but not a positive one.
     From: Karl Popper (Two Problems of Epistemology [1932], p.256), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 18 'Laws'
     A reaction: This sounds like a logician's approach to science, but I prefer to look at coherence, where very little is actually conclusive, and one tinkers with the theory instead.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The good life aims at perfections, or absolute laws, or what is absolutely desirable [Green,TH]
     Full Idea: The differentia of the good life …is controlled by the consciousness of there being some perfection which has to be fulfilled, some law which has to be obeyed, something absolutely desirable whatever the individual may for the time desire.
     From: T.H. Green (Prolegomena to Ethics [1882], p.134), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II
     A reaction: The 'perfection' suggests Plato, and the 'law' suggests Kant. The idea that something is 'absolutely desirable' is, I suspect, aimed at the utilitarians, who don't care what is desired. I'm no idealist, but have some sympathy with this idea.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
People are improved by egalitarian institutions and habits [Green,TH]
     Full Idea: Man has bettered himself through institutions and habits which tend to make the welfare of all the welfare of each.
     From: T.H. Green (Prolegomena to Ethics [1882], p.180), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II
     A reaction: I like this a lot. We underestimate how the best social values are promoted by the existence of enlightened institutions, rather than by preaching and teaching. Schools, law courts and churche embody their values.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / e. Liberal community
All talk of the progress of a nation must reduce to the progress of its individual members [Green,TH]
     Full Idea: Our ultimate standard of worth is an ideal of personal worth. All other values are relative to personal values. To speak of any progress of a nation or society or mankind except as relative to some greater worth of persons is to use words without meaning.
     From: T.H. Green (Prolegomena to Ethics [1882], p.193), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II
     A reaction: Note that, pre-verificationism, a Victorian talks of plausible words actually being meaningless. This is a good statement of the core doctrine of liberalism.