6 ideas
2945 | Most philosophers start with reality and then examine knowledge; Descartes put the study of knowledge first [Lehrer] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers (e.g Plato) begin with an account of reality, and then appended an account of how we can know it, ..but Descartes turned the tables, insisting that we must first decide what we can know. | |
From: Keith Lehrer (Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn) [2000], I p.2) |
2946 | You cannot demand an analysis of a concept without knowing the purpose of the analysis [Lehrer] |
Full Idea: An analysis is always relative to some objective. It makes no sense to simply demand an analysis of goodness, knowledge, beauty or truth, without some indication of the purpose of the analysis. | |
From: Keith Lehrer (Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn) [2000], I p.7) | |
A reaction: Your dismantling of a car will go better if you know what a car is for, but you can still take it apart in ignorance. |
15335 | Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce] |
Full Idea: Peirce's anti-realist theory of a truth is a verificationist theory. Truth is judged to be an epistemic notion. But the way things are is independent of the evidence we may be able to obtain for or against a judgement. | |
From: comment on Charles Sanders Peirce (Pragmatism in Retrospect [1906]) by Leon Horsten - The Tarskian Turn 02.1 | |
A reaction: This criticism doesn't quite capture the point that Peirce's theory is that truth is an ideal, not the set of opinions that miserable little humans eventually settle for when they get bored. Truth is an aspect of rationality, perhaps. |
14796 | Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce] |
Full Idea: I hold that truth's independence of individual opinions is due (so far as there is any 'truth') to its being the predestined result to which sufficient enquiry would ultimately lead. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Pragmatism in Retrospect [1906], p.288) |
16456 | For modality Lewis rejected boxes and diamonds, preferring worlds, and an index for the actual one [Lewis, by Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: Lewis was suspicious of boxes and diamonds as regimenting ordinary modal thought, …preferring a first-order extensional theory including possible worlds in its domain and an indexical singular term for the actual world. | |
From: report of David Lewis (Anselm and Actuality [1970]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 3.8 |
14795 | Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Pragmatism is no doctrine of metaphysics, no attempt to determine the truth of things. It is merely a method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Pragmatism in Retrospect [1906], p.271) | |
A reaction: Suddenly I recognise a prominent strand of modern philosophy of language (especially in America) for what it is. |