Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn)', 'The Structure and Content of Truth' and 'Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
2945 Most philosophers start with reality and then examine knowledge; Descartes put the study of knowledge first [Lehrer]
     Full Idea: Some philosophers (e.g Plato) begin with an account of reality, and then appended an account of how we can know it, ..but Descartes turned the tables, insisting that we must first decide what we can know.
     From: Keith Lehrer (Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn) [2000], I p.2)
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
2946 You cannot demand an analysis of a concept without knowing the purpose of the analysis [Lehrer]
     Full Idea: An analysis is always relative to some objective. It makes no sense to simply demand an analysis of goodness, knowledge, beauty or truth, without some indication of the purpose of the analysis.
     From: Keith Lehrer (Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn) [2000], I p.7)
     A reaction: Your dismantling of a car will go better if you know what a car is for, but you can still take it apart in ignorance.
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
18902 Correspondence theories can't tell you what truths correspond to [Davidson]
     Full Idea: The real objection to correspondence theories is that such theories fail to provide entities to which truth vehicles (as statements, sentence, or utterances) can be said to correspond.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Structure and Content of Truth [1990], p.304), quoted by Fred Sommers - Intellectual Autobiography Notes 23
     A reaction: This is the remark which provoked Sommers to come out with Idea 18901, which strikes me as rather profound.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
19729 'Modal epistemology' demands a connection between the belief and facts in possible worlds [Black,T]
     Full Idea: In 'modal epistemologies' a belief counts as knowledge only if there is a modal connection - a connection not only to the actual world, but also to other non-actual possible worlds - between the belief and the facts of the matter.
     From: Tim Black (Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology [2011], 1)
     A reaction: [Pritchard 2005 seems to be a source for this] This sounds to me a bit like Nozick's tracking or sensitivity theory. Nozick is, I suppose, diachronic (time must pass, for the tracking), where this theory is synchronic.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
19728 Gettier and lottery cases seem to involve luck, meaning bad connection of beliefs to facts [Black,T]
     Full Idea: The protagonists in Gettier cases and in lottery cases fail to have knowledge because their beliefs are true simply as a matter of luck, where this means that their beliefs themselves are not appropriately connected to the facts.
     From: Tim Black (Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology [2011], 1)
     A reaction: The lottery problem is you correctly believe 'my ticket won't win the lottery' even though you don't seem to actually know it won't. Is the Gettier problem simply the problem of lucky knowledge? 'Luck' is a rather vague concept.