Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn)', 'Realism, Mathematics and Modality' and 'Holism: a Shopper's Guide'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy

2945	Most philosophers start with reality and then examine knowledge; Descartes put the study of knowledge first [Lehrer]
	Full Idea: Some philosophers (e.g Plato) begin with an account of reality, and then appended an account of how we can know it, ..but Descartes turned the tables, insisting that we must first decide what we can know.
	From: Keith Lehrer (Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn) [2000], I p.2)

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis

2946	You cannot demand an analysis of a concept without knowing the purpose of the analysis [Lehrer]
	Full Idea: An analysis is always relative to some objective. It makes no sense to simply demand an analysis of goodness, knowledge, beauty or truth, without some indication of the purpose of the analysis.
	From: Keith Lehrer (Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn) [2000], I p.7)
	A reaction: Your dismantling of a car will go better if you know what a car is for, but you can still take it apart in ignorance.

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics

8714	Fictionalists say 2+2=4 is true in the way that 'Oliver Twist lived in London' is true [Field,H]
	Full Idea: The fictionalist can say that the sense in which '2+2=4' is true is pretty much the same as the sense in which 'Oliver Twist lived in London' is true. They are true 'according to a well-known story', or 'according to standard mathematics'.
	From: Hartry Field (Realism, Mathematics and Modality [1989], 1.1.1), quoted by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 6.3
	A reaction: The roots of this idea are in Carnap. Fictionalism strikes me as brilliant, but poisonous in large doses. Novels can aspire to artistic truth, or to documentary truth. We invent a fiction, and nudge it slowly towards reality.

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism

9381	If some inferences are needed to fix meaning, but we don't know which, they are all relevant [Fodor/Lepore, by Boghossian]
	Full Idea: The Master Argument for linguistic holism is: Some of an expression's inferences are relevant to fixing its meaning; there is no way to distinguish the inferences that are constitutive (from Quine); so all inferences are relevant to fixing meaning.
	From: report of J Fodor / E Lepore (Holism: a Shopper's Guide [1993], §III) by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered
	A reaction: This would only be if you thought that the pattern of inferences is what fixes the meanings, but how can you derive inferences before you have meanings? The underlying language of thought generates the inferences? Meanings are involved!