Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn)', 'Intro to Oxford Hndbk of Metaphysics' and 'Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy

2945	Most philosophers start with reality and then examine knowledge; Descartes put the study of knowledge first [Lehrer]
	Full Idea: Some philosophers (e.g Plato) begin with an account of reality, and then appended an account of how we can know it, ..but Descartes turned the tables, insisting that we must first decide what we can know.
	From: Keith Lehrer (Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn) [2000], I p.2)

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual

9217	Modern empirical metaphysics focuses on ontological commitments of discourse, or on presuppositions [Loux/Zimmerman]
	Full Idea: The empiricist revival of metaphysics came with Quine, who focused on ontological commitments associated with accepting a body of discourse, and Strawson, asking about the presuppositions of our conceptual practices.
	From: M Loux / D Zimmerman (Intro to Oxford Hndbk of Metaphysics [2003])
	A reaction: I find myself preferring the British approach. I can discourse about things without ontological commitment, and utter truths about non-existent things. I really yearn, though, for the third way - actually reasoning towards knowing what's out there.

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis

2946	You cannot demand an analysis of a concept without knowing the purpose of the analysis [Lehrer]
	Full Idea: An analysis is always relative to some objective. It makes no sense to simply demand an analysis of goodness, knowledge, beauty or truth, without some indication of the purpose of the analysis.
	From: Keith Lehrer (Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn) [2000], I p.7)
	A reaction: Your dismantling of a car will go better if you know what a car is for, but you can still take it apart in ignorance.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined

19347	Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins]
	Full Idea: For individuation, substance needs three properties: independence, to separate it from other things; unity, to call it one thing, rather than an aggregate; and permanence or stability over time. Its other role is as subject for predicates.
	From: Franklin Perkins (Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed [2007], 3.1)
	A reaction: Perkins is describing the Aristotelian view, which is taken up by Leibniz. 'Substance' is not a controversial idea, if we see that it only means that the world is full of 'things'. It is an unusual philosopher wholly totally denies that.