Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn)', 'Attack Upon Christendom' and 'On the Principles of Indiscernibles'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
Most philosophers start with reality and then examine knowledge; Descartes put the study of knowledge first [Lehrer]
     Full Idea: Some philosophers (e.g Plato) begin with an account of reality, and then appended an account of how we can know it, ..but Descartes turned the tables, insisting that we must first decide what we can know.
     From: Keith Lehrer (Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn) [2000], I p.2)
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
You cannot demand an analysis of a concept without knowing the purpose of the analysis [Lehrer]
     Full Idea: An analysis is always relative to some objective. It makes no sense to simply demand an analysis of goodness, knowledge, beauty or truth, without some indication of the purpose of the analysis.
     From: Keith Lehrer (Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn) [2000], I p.7)
     A reaction: Your dismantling of a car will go better if you know what a car is for, but you can still take it apart in ignorance.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
When we seek our own 'freedom' we are just trying to avoid responsibility [Kierkegaard]
     Full Idea: In all our own 'freedom' we actually seek one thing: to be able to live without responsibility.
     From: Søren Kierkegaard (Attack Upon Christendom [1855], p.290)
     A reaction: That's the plan when I win the lottery. [SY]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
The concept of an existing thing must contain more than the concept of a non-existing thing [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: There must be more in the concept of a thing which exists than in that of one which does not exist.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Principles of Indiscernibles [1696], p.134)