Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn)', 'Self, Body and Coincidence' and 'Wittgenstein'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy

2945	Most philosophers start with reality and then examine knowledge; Descartes put the study of knowledge first [Lehrer]
	Full Idea: Some philosophers (e.g Plato) begin with an account of reality, and then appended an account of how we can know it, ..but Descartes turned the tables, insisting that we must first decide what we can know.
	From: Keith Lehrer (Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn) [2000], I p.2)

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis

2946	You cannot demand an analysis of a concept without knowing the purpose of the analysis [Lehrer]
	Full Idea: An analysis is always relative to some objective. It makes no sense to simply demand an analysis of goodness, knowledge, beauty or truth, without some indication of the purpose of the analysis.
	From: Keith Lehrer (Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn) [2000], I p.7)
	A reaction: Your dismantling of a car will go better if you know what a car is for, but you can still take it apart in ignorance.

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties

14534	Shoemaker moved from properties as powers to properties bestowing powers [Shoemaker, by Mumford/Anjum]
	Full Idea: Shoemaker ventured the theory in 1980 that properties just are clusters of powers, but he has subsequently abandoned this, and now thinks properties bestow their bearers with causal powers.
	From: report of Sydney Shoemaker (Self, Body and Coincidence [1999], p.297) by S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum - Getting Causes from Powers 1.1
	A reaction: Like Mumford and Anjum, I prefer the earlier theory. I think taking powers as basic is the only story that really makes sense. A power is intrinsic and primitive, whereas properties are complex, messy, partly subjective, and higher level.

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy

7091	The argument from analogy is not a strong inference, since the other being might be an actor or a robot [Grayling]
	Full Idea: The argument from analogy is a weak one, because it does not logically guarantee the inference I draw to the other's inner states, for he might be dissimulating or acting, or may even be a cleverly contrived robot which feels nothing.
	From: A.C. Grayling (Wittgenstein [1988], Ch.3)
	A reaction: This gives the impression that for an argument to be strong it must logically guarantee its inference. It strikes me that analogy is a good reason for believing in other minds, but that is because I am looking for the best explanation, not logical proof.