Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn)', 'Self, Body and Coincidence' and 'Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy

2945	Most philosophers start with reality and then examine knowledge; Descartes put the study of knowledge first [Lehrer]
	Full Idea: Some philosophers (e.g Plato) begin with an account of reality, and then appended an account of how we can know it, ..but Descartes turned the tables, insisting that we must first decide what we can know.
	From: Keith Lehrer (Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn) [2000], I p.2)

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis

2946	You cannot demand an analysis of a concept without knowing the purpose of the analysis [Lehrer]
	Full Idea: An analysis is always relative to some objective. It makes no sense to simply demand an analysis of goodness, knowledge, beauty or truth, without some indication of the purpose of the analysis.
	From: Keith Lehrer (Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn) [2000], I p.7)
	A reaction: Your dismantling of a car will go better if you know what a car is for, but you can still take it apart in ignorance.

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties

14534	Shoemaker moved from properties as powers to properties bestowing powers [Shoemaker, by Mumford/Anjum]
	Full Idea: Shoemaker ventured the theory in 1980 that properties just are clusters of powers, but he has subsequently abandoned this, and now thinks properties bestow their bearers with causal powers.
	From: report of Sydney Shoemaker (Self, Body and Coincidence [1999], p.297) by S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum - Getting Causes from Powers 1.1
	A reaction: Like Mumford and Anjum, I prefer the earlier theory. I think taking powers as basic is the only story that really makes sense. A power is intrinsic and primitive, whereas properties are complex, messy, partly subjective, and higher level.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction

20653	Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
	Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
	From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro'
	A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture?