Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn)', 'On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma' and 'Actualism and Thisness'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

4 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
2945 Most philosophers start with reality and then examine knowledge; Descartes put the study of knowledge first [Lehrer]
     Full Idea: Some philosophers (e.g Plato) begin with an account of reality, and then appended an account of how we can know it, ..but Descartes turned the tables, insisting that we must first decide what we can know.
     From: Keith Lehrer (Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn) [2000], I p.2)
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
2946 You cannot demand an analysis of a concept without knowing the purpose of the analysis [Lehrer]
     Full Idea: An analysis is always relative to some objective. It makes no sense to simply demand an analysis of goodness, knowledge, beauty or truth, without some indication of the purpose of the analysis.
     From: Keith Lehrer (Theory of Knowledge (2nd edn) [2000], I p.7)
     A reaction: Your dismantling of a car will go better if you know what a car is for, but you can still take it apart in ignorance.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
16463 Adams says actual things have haecceities, but not things that only might exist [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: Adams favours haecceitism about actual things but no haecceities for things that might exist but don't.
     From: report of Robert Merrihew Adams (Actualism and Thisness [1981]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.2
     A reaction: This contrasts with Plantinga, who proposes necessary essences for everything, even for what might exist. Plantinga sounds crazy to me, Adams merely interesting but not too plausible.
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
19045 Translation is too flimsy a notion to support theories of cultural incommensurability [Quine]
     Full Idea: Translation is a flimsy notion, unfit to bear the weight of the theories of cultural incommensurability that Davidson effectively and justly criticises.
     From: Willard Quine (On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma [1981], p.42)
     A reaction: I presume he means that a claim to accurately translate something is false, because there is no clear idea of what a good translation looks like it. I just don't believe him. The practice of daily life belies Quine's theories on this.