54 ideas
| 20744 | Phenomenologists say all experience is about something and is directed [Aho] |
| Full Idea: Phenomenologists agree that all experience has an intentional structure, that is, my experience is always about or of something; it is always directed towards an object. | |
| From: Kevin Aho (Existentialism: an introduction [2014], 2 'Phenomenology') | |
| A reaction: I am just beginning to grasp that the analytic debates about perception are a re-enactment of the Kantian debates about the thing-in-itself. This is the sort of idea you find in McDowell. Presumably the idea denies the Given, and raw sense-data. |
| 19917 | Without reason and human help, human life is misery [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Without mutual help and the cultivation of reason, human beings necessarily live in great misery. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.05) | |
| A reaction: A clarion call from a great voice of the Enlightenment. I agree, but in 2017 the rest of western civilization seems to have given up on this ideal. I blame Adorno and Horkheimer. |
| 20736 | Science has to abstract out the subjective attributes of things, focusing on what is objective [Aho] |
| Full Idea: Crucial to the scientific method is the ability to abstract out the subjective qualities that we give to things - such as beauty, meaning, purpose, and value - and focus only on the objective qualities of things, which can be measured and quantified. | |
| From: Kevin Aho (Existentialism: an introduction [2014], 1 'Emergence') | |
| A reaction: This seems to me exactly right. People who deny the primary/secondary distinction, like Hume, are usually correspondingly pessimistic about science. And Hume was wrong about that. |
| 19922 | People are only free if they are guided entirely by reason [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: The only genuinely free person is one who lives with his entire mind guided solely by reason. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.10) | |
| A reaction: It strikes me as blatantly impossible to be entirely guided by reason. His point is that it is a subservience to reason which is entirely chosen. Why is that different from choosing to be entirely subservient to another person? |
| 20734 | Anxiety, nausea, guilt and absurdity shake us up, revealing our freedom and limits [Aho] |
| Full Idea: Some moods, such as 'anxiety' (Heidegger), 'nausea' (Sartre), 'guilt' (Kierkegaard), and 'absurdity' (Camus) are important because they have the capacity to shake us out of complacency and self-deception, disclosing our freedom and finitude. | |
| From: Kevin Aho (Existentialism: an introduction [2014], Pref 'What?) | |
| A reaction: [bit compressed] Problem: if I fail to feel such things, and deliberately induce them in myself, am I being inauthentic? Making a huge and unnatural effort to be an existentialist seems all wrong. And who wants the permanent grip of such feelings? |
| 20733 | Our 'existence' is how we create ourselves, unconstrained by any prior 'essence' [Aho] |
| Full Idea: 'Existence precedes essence' means there is no pre-given 'essence' that determines who and what we are. We are self-making beings. | |
| From: Kevin Aho (Existentialism: an introduction [2014], Pref 'What?) | |
| A reaction: This not a yes/no dilemma. Personally I believe (with Aristotle, and Steven Pinker) that there is a fairly comprehensive 'human nature' which we all share, and is the basis of ethics. On top of that, though, a fair bit of 'self-making' can go on. |
| 20753 | The self is constituted by its choices made within a social context [Aho] |
| Full Idea: The [existential] self is constituted by the continuous, open-ended process of choosing and pulling together the social interpretations that we care about and that are made available by the situation we grow into. | |
| From: Kevin Aho (Existentialism: an introduction [2014], 4 'Self') | |
| A reaction: These kind of explanations always seem wrong. That the self is influenced and moulded strongly by the choices it makes sounds right. But that the choices 'constitute' the chooser sounds like a bit of a muddle. |
| 19935 | Peoples are created by individuals, not by nature, and only distinguished by language and law [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Nature certainly does not create peoples, individuals do, and individuals are only separated into nations by differences of language, law and morality. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.26) | |
| A reaction: Quite wrong, I think. How did languages evolve if there were not already distinct peoples? Do ants and bees only form into colonies by individual choice? All social contract theories seem to make Spinoza's assumption. |
| 19914 | In nature everything has an absolute right to do anything it is capable of doing [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Since the universal power of nature is only the power of all individual things together, it follows that each individual thing has the sovereign right to do everything it can do, or the right of each thing extends as far as its determined power extends. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.01) | |
| A reaction: A typically ruthless Spinoza idea, very different from the rather ill-founded claims of Locke and Rousseau about the state of nature. |
| 19915 | Natural rights are determined by desire and power, not by reason [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Each person's natural right is determined not by sound reason but by desire and power. For it is not the case that all men are naturally determined to behave according to the rules and laws of reason | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.03) | |
| A reaction: Locke would have been horrified by this. It looks like hopeless unfounded optimism to claim a natural right to anything. Doomed prey can struggle all it likes, but its right to do so seems irrelevant. Yet we see self-evident injustice all the time. |
| 7487 | Society exists to extend human awareness [Spinoza, by Watson] |
| Full Idea: For Spinoza the purpose of society was the extension of human awareness. | |
| From: report of Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670]) by Peter Watson - Ideas Ch.24 | |
| A reaction: I like that. Personally I think human understanding is the best aim our lives can have, but I am inclined to see this in rather individualistic terms (despairing of getting others interested in the project!). |
| 19943 | The state aims to allow personal development, so its main purpose is freedom [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: It is the purpose of the state ...to allow people's minds and bodies to develop in their own way in security and enjoy the free use of reason ...Therefore the true purpose of the state is in fact freedom. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 20.06) | |
| A reaction: The core of Spinoza's political thinking. This strikes me as being as close to communitarianism as to liberalism. |
| 19930 | Sovereignty must include the power to make people submit to it [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Either there is no sovereignty nor any right over subjects, or else sovereignty must necessarily extend to everything that might be effective in inducing men to submit to it. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.02) | |
| A reaction: In the seventeenth century this usually includes the death penalty. Refusal to submit may be fairly passive and harmless, so the issue must concern duties, rather than rights. Taxes, jury duty, calls to arms. |
| 20738 | Social contracts and markets have made society seem disconnected and artificial [Aho] |
| Full Idea: Modern society has come to be viewed as something artificial, an aggregate of disconnected individuals that is held together by instrumental social contracts and monetary exchanges. | |
| From: Kevin Aho (Existentialism: an introduction [2014], 1 'Emergence') | |
| A reaction: This is all long of you, Thomas Hobbes! Aho is explaining the rebellion of existentialists against this - though existentialism strikes me as another variant of liberal individualism. |
| 19936 | Kings tend to fight wars for glory, rather than for peace and liberty [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: As soon as the kings took control [of the Hebrews] the reason for going to war was no longer peace and liberty but rather glory, | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 18.05) | |
| A reaction: As Spinoza was writing, Louis XIV had just invaded Holland, solely in quest of military glory. As soon as a leader like Napoleon discovers they are good at war, I assume that the thrill of glory takes over for them too. |
| 19937 | Monarchs are always proud, and can't back down [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Monarchical minds are always proud, and cannot back down without feelings of humiliation. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 18.05) | |
| A reaction: This would seem to be a problem in all politicians. As I teacher I found that backing down was sometimes quite a smart move, but you can only do it occasionally. |
| 19940 | Deposing a monarch is dangerous, because the people are used to royal authority [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: It is dangerous to depose a monarch, even if it is clear by every criterion that he is a tyrant. A people accustomed to royal authority and held in check only by it, will despise any lesser authority and hold it in contempt. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 18.07) | |
| A reaction: He is obviously thinking of Charles I and Cromwell. I suspect that the respect for Cromwell in the 1650s was only as a great soldier. If the people miss royal authority, the correct response is probably 'get over it!' |
| 19931 | Every state is more frightened of its own citizens than of external enemies [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: People have never succeeded in devising a form of government that was not in greater danger from its own citizens than from foreign foes, and which was not more fearful of the former than of the latter. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.04) | |
| A reaction: The sort of lovely clear-headed and accurate observation for which we love Spinoza. Only very powerful despots can afford to ignore the threat from the people. Stalin was paranoid, but eventually murdered almost everyone who seemed a threat. |
| 19920 | Democracy is a legitimate gathering of people who do whatever they can do [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Democracy is properly defined as a united gathering of people which collectively has the sovereign right to do all that it has the power to do. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.08) | |
| A reaction: Representative democracy doesn't fit this definition. What 'unites' the people, and where do they get their sovereign right? If my neighbouring village votes to invade mine, I spurn their pathetic 'sovereign right'. |
| 19933 | If religion is law, then piety is justice, impiety is crime, and non-believers must leave [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: [In the first Hebrew state] religious dogmas were not doctrines but rather laws and decrees, piety being regarded as justice and impiety as crime. Anyone who defected from this religion ceased to be a citizen. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.08) | |
| A reaction: Presumably speeding offences count as impiety, and failing to pray is a crime. A critical question will be how far religious doubts must extend before one actually has to leave. Mere doctrinal differences, or full atheism? |
| 19938 | Allowing religious ministers any control of the state is bad for both parties [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: How pernicious it is both for religion and the state to allow ministers of things sacred to acquire the right to make decrees or handle the business of government. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 18.06 (1)) | |
| A reaction: Interesting that he holds it to be bad for the religion as well as the state. In Britain we have bishops in the House of Lords. |
| 19923 | Slavery is not just obedience, but acting only in the interests of the master [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: It is not acting on command in itself that makes someone a slave, but rather the reason for so acting. ...A slave is someone obliged to obey commands from a master which look only to the advantage of the master. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.10) | |
| A reaction: So if I forcibly enslaved you, and then only commanded things which were for your own good, that would not be slavery? If the master feeds the slave, is that not part of the slavery? Most jobs might count as slavery by this account? |
| 19939 | Government is oppressive if opinions can be crimes, because people can't give them up [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Government is bound to become extremely oppressive where dissident opinions which are within the domain of each individual, a right which no one can give up, are treated as a crime. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 18.06 (2)) | |
| A reaction: One might compare illicit desires, such as those of a paedophile, where it is a crime to act on them, but presumably they cannot be given up, so there is no point in legislating against the mere desires. |
| 19944 | Without liberty of thought there is no trust in the state, and corruption follows [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: If liberty of thought is suppressed ...this would undemine the trust which is the first essential of a state; detestable flattery and deceit would flourish, giving rise to intrigues and every sort of honest behaviour. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 20.11) | |
| A reaction: Spinoza specifically defends philosophy, as the epitome of freedom of thought. |
| 19942 | Treason may be committed as much by words as by deeds [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: We cannot altogether deny that treason may be committed as much by words as by deeds. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 20.05) | |
| A reaction: For example, betraying a major state secret. This is an important idea, for anyone who simplistically demands utter freedom of speech. There is also subversive speech, which is very hard to assess. Incitements can be crimes in Britain. |
| 19924 | The freest state is a rational one, where people can submit themselves to reason [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: The freest state is that whose laws are founded on sound reason; for there each man can be free whenever he wishes, that is, he can live under the guidance of reason with his whole mind. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.10) | |
| A reaction: I wonder if is not so much that the state is rational as that it is right. Freedom is submission to the truth. Rationality is only good because it arrives at truth. But is there a 'truth' about how a state should be run? Enlightenment optimism. |
| 7827 | Spinoza wanted democracy based on individual rights, and is thus the first modern political philosopher [Stewart,M on Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Spinoza's advocacy of democracy on the basis of individual rights was extraordinarily bold for its time, and it qualifies him as the first truly modern political philosopher. | |
| From: comment on Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670]) by Matthew Stewart - The Courtier and the Heretic Ch. 6 | |
| A reaction: Sounds right. Hobbes may have been the 'first modern man', but his politics was fairly medieval. John Lilburne and co. may have campaigned for rights and democracy, but they weren't really philosophers. |
| 19926 | The sovereignty has absolute power over citizens [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: No offence can be committed against subjects by sovereigns, since they are of right permitted to do all things., and therefore offences occur only between private persons obliged by law not to harm one another. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.14) | |
| A reaction: This slightly alarming remark is the consequence of Spinoza's denial of natural rights. Nowadays we have international law to appeal to. Locke thinks revolution could be justified, but this implies the Spinoza does not? |
| 19918 | Forming a society meant following reason, and giving up dangerous appetites and mutual harm [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: People had to make a firm decision to decide everything by the sole dictates of reason (which no one dares contradict openly). They had to curb their appetites if it would hurt someone else, and not do to others what they did not want done to themselves. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.05) | |
| A reaction: The last bit invokes the Golden Rule. Being in society does indeed meaning curbing appetites, such as envy and lust. |
| 19919 | People only give up their rights, and keep promises, if they hope for some greater good [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: No one will give up his right to all things, and absolutely no one will keep his promises, except from fear of a greater ill or hope of a greater good. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.06) | |
| A reaction: I think Locke and Rousseau would agree with this. It is hard to imagine doing anything other than in hope of a greater good. But what to do when your hopes are disappointed? |
| 19921 | Once you have given up your rights, there is no going back [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: If people had wanted to keep any right for themselves, they should have made this provision at the same time as they could have safely defended it. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.08) | |
| A reaction: Spinoza is wonderful for grasping nettles. The other fans of social contracts seem blithely cheerful about how it is going to work out. But forming a society is like marriage - a risky commitment which could go horribly wrong. |
| 19925 | In democracy we don't abandon our rights, but transfer them to the majority of us [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: In a democracy no one transfers their natural right to another in such a way that they are not thereafter consulted, but rather to the majority of the whole society of which they are part. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.11) | |
| A reaction: At this time democracy means Athenian direct democracy. In representative democracy you are only consulted once every few years, and in between the government can ignore the people (as Rousseau pointed out). |
| 19928 | No one, in giving up their power and right, ceases to be a human being [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: No one will ever be able to transfer his power and (consequently) his right to another person in such a way that he ceases to be a human being. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.01) | |
| A reaction: Spinoza disdains natural rights, but this is a modest (and pretty uncontroversial) concession. |
| 19929 | Everyone who gives up their rights must fear the recipients of them [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: People have never given up their right and transferred their power to another in such a way that they did not fear the very persons who received their right and power, and put the government at greater risk from its own citizens than from its enemies. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.01) | |
| A reaction: I take this idea to be Rousseau's key motivation for the idea of the general will, because you are there supposed to be alienating your natural rights to yourself (sort of). In a democracy you alienate them partly to yourself. |
| 19932 | The early Hebrews, following Moses, gave up their rights to God alone [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: The Hebrews being in this natural state, they resolved, on the advice of Moses in whom they all had the greatest trust, to transfer their right to no mortal man but rather to God alone. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.07) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Exodus 24:7] He calls this the first Hebrew state, which seems to have depended heavily on Moses. Priests and prophets become crucial in this situation, and they may be in conflict about God's commands. |
| 19916 | The order of nature does not prohibit anything, and allows whatever appetite produces [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: The order of nature, under which all human beings are born and for the most part live, prohibits nothing but what no one desires or no one can do; it does not prohibit strife or hatred or anger or anything at all that appetite foments. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.04) | |
| A reaction: This is as vigorous a rejection of natural law as I have met with. It is hard to see on what grounds anyone could disagree, other than hopeful sentiment. |
| 19927 | State and religious law can clash, so the state must make decisions about religion [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: No one would be obliged by law if he considered it against his faith, and everyone could claim licence to do anything. Since the law of the state would then be wholly violated, it follows that the right of deciding about religion belongs to the sovereign. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.21) | |
| A reaction: This is an era when British puritans emigrate to America, because the state is not sufficiently tolerant. The needs of sovereignty and of religion can be very far apart. You can see those with great religious devotion not liking this idea. |
| 20712 | God is 'eternal' either by being non-temporal, or by enduring forever [Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: Saying 'God is eternal' means either that God is non-temporal or timeless, or that God has no beginning and no end. The first ('classical') view is found in Anselm, Augustine, Boethius, Aquinas, Calvin and Descartes. | |
| From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 8 'Meaning') | |
| A reaction: A God who is outside of time but performs actions is a bit of a puzzle. It seems that Augustine started the idea of a timeless God. |
| 20701 | Can God be good, if he has not maximised goodness? [Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: We may wonder whether God can be good since he has not produced more moral goodness than he has. We may wonder whether God is guilty by neglect. | |
| From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 3 'Freedom') | |
| A reaction: The orthodox response is that we cannot possibly know what the maximum of moral goodness would look like, so we can't make this judgement. Atheists say that God fails by human standards, which are not particularly high. |
| 20702 | The goodness of God may be a higher form than the goodness of moral agents [Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: If we can know that God exists and if God's goodness is not moral goodness, then moral goodness is not the highest form of goodness we know. There is the goodness of God to be reckoned with. | |
| From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 3 'Goodness') | |
| A reaction: This idea is to counter the charge that God fails to meet human standards for an ideal moral agent. But it sounds hand-wavy, since we presumably cannot comprehend the sort of goodness that is postulated here. |
| 20703 | How could God have obligations? What law could possibly impose them? [Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: We have good reason for resisting the suggestion that God has any duties or obligations. …What can oblige God in relation to his creatures? Could there be a law saying God has such obligations? Where does such a law come from? | |
| From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 3 'Goodness') | |
| A reaction: Plato can answer this question. Greek gods are not so supreme that nothing could put them under an obligation, but 'God' has to be supreme in every respect. |
| 20694 | 'Natural theology' aims to prove God to anyone (not just believers) by reason or argument [Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: 'Natural theology' is the attempt to show that belief in God's existence can be defended with reference to reason or argument which ought to be acceptable to anyone, not simply to those who believe in God's existence. | |
| From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 1 'Other') | |
| A reaction: I assume by 'reason or argument' he primarily means evidence (plus the ontological argument). He cites Karl Barth as objecting to the assumption of natural theology (preferring revelation). Presumably Kierkegaard offers a rival view too. |
| 20706 | A distinct cause of the universe can't be material (which would be part of the universe) [Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: If the universe was caused to come into being, it presumably could not have been caused to do so by anything material. For a material object would be part of the universe, and we are now asking for a cause distinct from the universe. | |
| From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 5 'God') | |
| A reaction: We're out of our depth here. We only have two modes of existence to offer, material and spiritual, and 'spiritual' means little more than non-material. |
| 20707 | The universe exhibits design either in its sense of purpose, or in its regularity [Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: The design argument offers two lines: the first states that the universe displays design in the sense of purpose; the second that it displays design in the sense of regularity. | |
| From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 6 'Versions') | |
| A reaction: I would have thought that you would infer the purpose from the regularity. How could you see purpose in a totally chaotic universe? |
| 20708 | If God is an orderly being, he cannot be the explanation of order [Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: If God is an instance of something orderly, how can he serve to account for the order of orderly things? | |
| From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 6 'b Has') | |
| A reaction: You can at least explain the tidiness of a house by the tidiness of its owner, but obviously that won't explain the phenomenon of tidiness. |
| 20710 | Maybe an abnormal state of mind is needed to experience God? [Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: Might it not be possible that experience of God requires an unusual state or psychological abnormality, just as an aerial view of Paris requires that one be in the unusual state of being abnormally elevated? | |
| From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 7 'Are the') | |
| A reaction: That would make sense if it were analogous to great mathematical or musical ability, but it sounds more like ouija boards in darkened rooms. Talent has a wonderful output, but people in mystical states don't return with proofs. |
| 20711 | A believer can experience the world as infused with God [Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: Maybe someone who believes in God can be regarded as experiencing everything as something behind which God lies. Believers see the world as a world in which God is present. | |
| From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 7 'Experiencing') | |
| A reaction: [Attributed to John Hick] This would count as supporting evidence for God, perhaps, if seeing reality as infused with God produces a consistent and plausible picture. But seeing reality as infused with other things might pass the same test. |
| 20709 | The experiences of God are inconsistent, not universal, and untestable [Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: A proclaimed experience of God must be rejected because a) there is no agreed test that it is such an experience, b) some people experience God's absence, and c) there is no uniformity of testimony about the experience. | |
| From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 7 'Objections') | |
| A reaction: [compressed] I'm not sure that absence of an experience is experience of an absence. Compare it with experiencing the greatness of Beethoven's Ninth. |
| 19934 | Hebrews were very hostile to other states, who had not given up their rights to God [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Having transferred their right to God, the Hebrews believed their kingdom was the kingdom of God, that they alone were the children of God, and that other nations were enemies of God, whom for that reason they regarded with extreme hostility. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.23) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Psalm 139:21-2] So, according to Spinoza, they did not become the chosen people because they thought God had chosen then, but because they were the only state trying to align itself with God. |
| 20737 | Protestantism brought the modern emphasis on inner states of the soul [Aho] |
| Full Idea: An important development in the formation of the modern worldview was the emergence of Protestantism, that reconfigured the self by privileging the inner states of the soul. Salvation concerns inner feelings, thoughts and desires, which can be genuine. | |
| From: Kevin Aho (Existentialism: an introduction [2014], 1 'Emergence') | |
| A reaction: [bit compressed] He is preparing the historical background for the existentialist concept of authenticity. We can link this Protestant idea with Descartes's Cogito, which grounds knowledge in the inner self. |
| 4300 | The Bible has nothing in common with reasoning and philosophy [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: The Bible leaves reason absolutely free and has nothing in common with philosophy. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670]) | |
| A reaction: Hm. The Bible may not contain reasoning, but it contains the fruits of reasoning, and it is obviously possible for reasoning to contradict its message. |
| 20766 | Four Noble Truths: life is suffering, caused by attachment, it is avoidable, there is a path [Aho] |
| Full Idea: The teachings of the Buddha are summarised in 'four noble truths': 1) life means suffering, 2) the origin of suffering is attachment, 3) the end of suffering is attainable, and 4) the path to the end of suffering. | |
| From: Kevin Aho (Existentialism: an introduction [2014], 9 'dukkha') | |
| A reaction: 1) and 2) summarise everything I dislike about most eastern philosophy. In the modern world life does not have to be suffering. To break off attachments in order to avoid suffering is a hideous injunction. |
| 20697 | One does not need a full understanding of God in order to speak of God [Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: In order to speak meaningfully about God, it is not necessary that one should understand exactly the import of one's statements about him. | |
| From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 2 'Sayng') | |
| A reaction: Perfectly reasonable. To insist that all discussion of a thing requires exact understanding of the thing is ridiculous. Equally, though, to discuss God while denying all understanding of God is just as ridiculous. |
| 20699 | Paradise would not contain some virtues, such as courage [Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: There are virtues (such as courage) that would not be present in a paradise. | |
| From: Brian Davies (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion [1982], 3 'Evil') | |
| A reaction: Part of a suggestion that morality would be entirely inapplicable in paradise, and so we need dangers etc in the world. |