24 ideas
| 14179 | The finest branch of wisdom is justice and moderation in ordering states and families [Plato] |
| Full Idea: By far the greatest and fairest branch of wisdom is that which is concerned with the due ordering of states and families, whose name is moderation and justice. | |
| From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 209a) | |
| A reaction: ['Justice' is probably 'dikaiosune'] It is hard to disagree with this, and it relegates ivory tower philosophical contemplation to second place, unlike the late books of Aristotle's Ethics. |
| 10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: Our concern in giving a definition is not to say how things are by to say how we wish to speak | |
| From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.310) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like an acceptable piece of wisdom which arises out of analytical and linguistic philosophy. It puts a damper on the Socratic dream of using definition of reveal the nature of reality. |
| 10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: Neo-Fregeans have thought that Hume's Principle, and the like, might be definitive of number and therefore not subject to the usual epistemological worries over its truth. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.310) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the underlying dream of logicism - that arithmetic is actually brought into existence by definitions, rather than by truths derived from elsewhere. But we must be able to count physical objects, as well as just counting numbers. |
| 10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: The fundamental difficulty facing the neo-Fregean is to either adopt the predicative reading of Hume's Principle, defining numbers, but inadequate, or the impredicative reading, which is adequate, but not really a definition. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.312) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this, but the general drift is the difficulty of building a system which has been brought into existence just by definition. |
| 1607 | Diotima said the Forms are the objects of desire in philosophical discourse [Plato, by Roochnik] |
| Full Idea: According to Diotima, the Forms are the objects of desire operative in philosophical discourse. | |
| From: report of Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 210a4-) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.199 |
| 174 | True opinion without reason is midway between wisdom and ignorance [Plato] |
| Full Idea: There is a state of mind half-way between wisdom and ignorance - having true opinions without being able to give reasons for them. | |
| From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 202a) | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 2140, where Plato scorns this state of mind. What he describes could be split into two - purely lucky true beliefs, and 'externalist knowledge', with non-conscious justification. |
| 3568 | Surely ALL truths are externally justified, by the facts? [Cross,A] |
| Full Idea: Surely ALL truths are externally justified? | |
| From: Adam Cross (works [2001]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: A very nice warning to aspiring externalists. If you actually think the justification is somehow 'out there', then everything is going to be justified, by its own facts. We need to get the justification 'in here'. |
| 180 | We call a person the same throughout life, but all their attributes change [Plato] |
| Full Idea: During the period from boyhood to old age, man does not retain the same attributes, though he is called the same person. | |
| From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 207d) | |
| A reaction: This precisely identifies the basic problem of personal identity over time. If this is the problem, DNA looks more and more significant for the answer, though it would be an awful mistake to think a pattern of DNA was a person. |
| 181 | Only the gods stay unchanged; we replace our losses with similar acquisitions [Plato] |
| Full Idea: We retain identity not by staying the same (the preserve of gods) but by replacing losses with new similar acquisitions. | |
| From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 208b) | |
| A reaction: Any modern student of personal identity should be intrigued by this remark! It appears to take a rather physical view of the matter, and to be aware of human biology as a process. Are my continuing desires token-identical, or just 'similar'? |
| 10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: If an abstraction principle is going to be acceptable, then it should not 'inflate', i.e. it should not result in there being more abstracts than there are objects. By this mark Hume's Principle will be acceptable, but Frege's Law V will not. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.307) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be motivated by my own intuition that abstract concepts had better be rooted in the world, or they are not worth the paper they are written on. The underlying idea this sort of abstraction is that it is 'shared' between objects. |
| 172 | Love of ugliness is impossible [Plato] |
| Full Idea: There cannot be such a thing as love of ugliness. | |
| From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 201a) |
| 4026 | Beauty is harmony with what is divine, and ugliness is lack of such harmony [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Ugliness is out of harmony with everything that is godly; beauty, however, is in harmony with the divine. | |
| From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 206d) | |
| A reaction: This remark shows how the concept of 'harmony' is at the centre of Greek thought (and is a potential bridge of the is/ought gap). |
| 173 | Beauty and goodness are the same [Plato] |
| Full Idea: What is good is the same as what is beautiful. | |
| From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 201c) |
| 183 | Stage two is the realisation that beauty of soul is of more value than beauty of body [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The second stage of progress is to realise that beauty of soul is more valuable than beauty of body. | |
| From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 210b) |
| 184 | Progress goes from physical beauty, to moral beauty, to the beauty of knowledge, and reaches absolute beauty [Plato] |
| Full Idea: One should step up from physical beauty, to moral beauty, to the beauty of knowledge, until at last one knows what absolute beauty is. | |
| From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 211c) | |
| A reaction: Presumably this is why Socrates refused sexual favours to Alcibiades. The idea is inspiring, and yet it is a rejection of humanity. |
| 171 | Music is a knowledge of love in the realm of harmony and rhythm [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Music may be called a knowledge of the principles of love in the realm of harmony and rhythm. | |
| From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 187c) |
| 179 | Love is desire for perpetual possession of the good [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Love is desire for perpetual possession of the good. | |
| From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 206a) | |
| A reaction: Even the worst human beings often have lovers. 'Perpetual' is a nice observation. |
| 14177 | Love assists men in achieving merit and happiness [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Phaedrus: Love is not only the oldest and most honourable of the gods, but also the most powerful to assist men in the acquisition of merit and happiness, both here and hereafter. | |
| From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 180b) | |
| A reaction: Maybe we should talk less of love as a feeling, and more as a motivation, not just in human relationships, but in activities like gardening and database compilation. |
| 176 | Love follows beauty, wisdom is exceptionally beautiful, so love follows wisdom [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Wisdom is one of the most beautiful of things, and Love is love of beauty, so it follows that Love must be a love of wisdom. | |
| From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 204b) | |
| A reaction: Good, but wisdom isn't the only exceptionally beautiful thing. Music is beautiful partly because it is devoid of ideas. |
| 177 | If a person is good they will automatically become happy [Plato] |
| Full Idea: 'What will be gained by a man who is good?' 'That is easy - he will be happy'. | |
| From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 205a) | |
| A reaction: Suppose you tried to assassinate Hitler in 1944 (a good deed), but failed. Happiness presumably results from success, rather than mere good intentions. |
| 14178 | Happiness is secure enjoyment of what is good and beautiful [Plato] |
| Full Idea: By happy you mean in secure enjoyment of what is good and beautiful? - Certainly. | |
| From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 202c) | |
| A reaction: We seem to have lost track of the idea that beauty might be an essential ingredient of happiness. |
| 170 | The only slavery which is not dishonourable is slavery to excellence [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The only form of servitude which has no dishonour has for its object the acquisition of excellence. | |
| From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 184c) |
| 182 | The first step on the right path is the contemplation of physical beauty when young [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The man who would pursue the right way to his goal must begin, when he is young, by contemplating physical beauty. | |
| From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 210a) |
| 175 | Gods are not lovers of wisdom, because they are already wise [Plato] |
| Full Idea: No god is a lover of wisdom or desires to be wise, for he is wise already. | |
| From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 204a) |