Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction'', 'The Parts of Animals' and 'Intro to I: Classical Logic'

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6 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition

10528	Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Our concern in giving a definition is not to say how things are by to say how we wish to speak
	From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.310)
	A reaction: This sounds like an acceptable piece of wisdom which arises out of analytical and linguistic philosophy. It puts a damper on the Socratic dream of using definition of reveal the nature of reality.

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic

9463	Classical logic is bivalent, has excluded middle, and only quantifies over existent objects [Jacquette]
	Full Idea: Classical logic (of Whitehead, Russell, Gödel, Church) is a two-valued system of propositional and predicate logic, in which all propositions are exclusively true or false, and quantification and predication are over existent objects only.
	From: Dale Jacquette (Intro to I: Classical Logic [2002], p.9)
	A reaction: All of these get challenged at some point, though the existence requirement is the one I find dubious.

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle

10529	If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Neo-Fregeans have thought that Hume's Principle, and the like, might be definitive of number and therefore not subject to the usual epistemological worries over its truth.
	From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.310)
	A reaction: This seems to be the underlying dream of logicism - that arithmetic is actually brought into existence by definitions, rather than by truths derived from elsewhere. But we must be able to count physical objects, as well as just counting numbers.

10530	Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: The fundamental difficulty facing the neo-Fregean is to either adopt the predicative reading of Hume's Principle, defining numbers, but inadequate, or the impredicative reading, which is adequate, but not really a definition.
	From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.312)
	A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this, but the general drift is the difficulty of building a system which has been brought into existence just by definition.

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain

23218	The brain has no responsibility for sensations, which occur in the heart [Aristotle]
	Full Idea: And of course, the brain is not responsible for any of the sensations at all. The correct view is that the seat and source of sensation is the region of the heart.
	From: Aristotle (The Parts of Animals [c.345 BCE]), quoted by Matthew Cobb - The Idea of the Brain 1
	A reaction: [Need a reference] Hippocrates's assertion a century earlier made no impression on the great man. I wish he had been a little more circumspect with his own view.

18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence

10527	An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: If an abstraction principle is going to be acceptable, then it should not 'inflate', i.e. it should not result in there being more abstracts than there are objects. By this mark Hume's Principle will be acceptable, but Frege's Law V will not.
	From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.307)
	A reaction: I take this to be motivated by my own intuition that abstract concepts had better be rooted in the world, or they are not worth the paper they are written on. The underlying idea this sort of abstraction is that it is 'shared' between objects.