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All the ideas for 'Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction'', 'A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori' and 'On the Source of Necessity'

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14 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
10528 Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Our concern in giving a definition is not to say how things are by to say how we wish to speak
     From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.310)
     A reaction: This sounds like an acceptable piece of wisdom which arises out of analytical and linguistic philosophy. It puts a damper on the Socratic dream of using definition of reveal the nature of reality.
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
15102 S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one) [Cameron]
     Full Idea: S4 says there must be some necessary truths, because the actual necessary truths must be necessary. (It says if there are some actual necessary truths then that is so - but the S4 axiom is an actual necessary truth, if true).
     From: Ross P. Cameron (On the Source of Necessity [2010], 2)
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
9358 There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI]
     Full Idea: The fact is that there are several logics, markedly different, each self-consistent in its own terms and such that whoever, using it, avoids false premises, will never reach a false conclusion.
     From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.366)
     A reaction: As the man who invented modal logic in five different versions, he speaks with some authority. Logicians now debate which version is the best, so how could that be decided? You could avoid false conclusions by never reasoning at all.
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
9357 Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI]
     Full Idea: The law of excluded middle formulates our decision that whatever is not designated by a certain term shall be designated by its negative. It declares our purpose to make a complete dichotomy of experience, ..which is only our penchant for simplicity.
     From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.365)
     A reaction: I find this view quite appealing. 'Look, it's either F or it isn't!' is a dogmatic attitude which irritates a lot of people, and appears to be dispensible. Intuitionists in mathematics dispense with the principle, and vagueness threatens it.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
9364 Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI]
     Full Idea: A name must represent some uniformity in experience or it names nothing.
     From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.368)
     A reaction: I like this because, in the quintessentially linguistic debate about the exact logical role of names, it reminds us that names arise because of the way reality is; they are not sui generis private games for logicians.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
10529 If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Neo-Fregeans have thought that Hume's Principle, and the like, might be definitive of number and therefore not subject to the usual epistemological worries over its truth.
     From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.310)
     A reaction: This seems to be the underlying dream of logicism - that arithmetic is actually brought into existence by definitions, rather than by truths derived from elsewhere. But we must be able to count physical objects, as well as just counting numbers.
10530 Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The fundamental difficulty facing the neo-Fregean is to either adopt the predicative reading of Hume's Principle, defining numbers, but inadequate, or the impredicative reading, which is adequate, but not really a definition.
     From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.312)
     A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this, but the general drift is the difficulty of building a system which has been brought into existence just by definition.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
9362 Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI]
     Full Idea: Those laws and those laws only have necessary truth which we are prepared to maintain, no matter what.
     From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.367)
     A reaction: This bold and simple claim has famously been torpedoed by a well-known counterexample - that virtually every human being will cling on to the proposition "dogs have at some time existed" no matter what, but it clearly isn't a necessary truth.
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
15103 Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron]
     Full Idea: I conclude that Blackburn has not shown that any grounding of the necessary in the contingent (the Contingency Horn of his dilemma) is doomed to failure.
     From: Ross P. Cameron (On the Source of Necessity [2010], 2)
     A reaction: [You must read the article for details of Cameron's argument!] He goes on to also reject the Necessity Horn (that there is a regress if necessities must rely on necessities).
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
9365 We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI]
     Full Idea: The a priori contains principles which can be maintained in the face of all experience, representing the initiative of the mind. But they are subject to alteration on pragmatic grounds, if expanding experience shows their intellectual infelicity.
     From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.373)
     A reaction: [compressed] This simply IS Quine's famous 'web of belief' picture, showing how firmly Quine is in the pragmatist tradition. Lewis treats a priori principles as a pragmatic toolkit, which can be refined to be more effective. Not implausible...
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
9361 We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI]
     Full Idea: Physical processes present us with phenomena in which the purely mathematical has to be separated out by abstraction.
     From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.367)
     A reaction: This is the father of modal logic endorsing traditional abstractionism, it seems. He is also, though, endorsing the view that a priori knowledge is created by us, with pragmatic ends in view.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
10527 An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: If an abstraction principle is going to be acceptable, then it should not 'inflate', i.e. it should not result in there being more abstracts than there are objects. By this mark Hume's Principle will be acceptable, but Frege's Law V will not.
     From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.307)
     A reaction: I take this to be motivated by my own intuition that abstract concepts had better be rooted in the world, or they are not worth the paper they are written on. The underlying idea this sort of abstraction is that it is 'shared' between objects.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
9363 Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI]
     Full Idea: The scientific search is for such classification as will make it possible to correlate appearance and behaviour, to discover law, to penetrate to the "essential nature" of things in order that behaviour may become predictable.
     From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.368)
     A reaction: Modern scientific essentialists no longer invoke scare quotes, and I think we should talk of the search for the 'mechanisms' which explain behaviour, but Lewis seems to have been sixty years ahead of his time.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
15104 The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically [Cameron]
     Full Idea: What seems so wrong about the 'moving spotlight' theory is that here one time is privileged, but all the times are on a par ontologically.
     From: Ross P. Cameron (On the Source of Necessity [2010], 4)
     A reaction: The whole thing is baffling, but this looks like a good point. All our intuitions make presentism (there's only the present) look like a better theory than the moving spotlight (that the present is just 'special').