13 ideas
15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
Full Idea: To define theoretical terms might be to show how to do without them, but it is better to say that it shows there is no good reason to want to do without them. | |
From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], Intro) |
16755 | The possible Aristotelian view that forms are real and active principles is clearly wrong [Fine,K, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Aristotle seems to have a possible basis for the belief [in individual forms], namely that forms are real and active principles in the world, which is denied by any right-minded modern. | |
From: report of Kit Fine (A Puzzle Concerning Matter and Form [1994], p.19) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.3 n8 | |
A reaction: Pasnau says this is the view of forms promoted by the scholastics, whereas Aristotle's own view should be understood as 'metaphysical'. |
15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
Full Idea: A logically determinate name is one which names the same thing in every possible world. | |
From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], III) | |
A reaction: This appears to be rigid designation, before Kripke introduced the new word. |
411 | If we succeed in speaking the truth, we cannot know we have done it [Xenophanes] |
Full Idea: No man has seen certain truth, and no man will ever know about the gods and other things I mentioned; for if he succeeds in saying what is fully true, he himself is unaware of it; opinion is fixed by fate on all things. | |
From: Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE], B34), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 7.49.4 |
412 | If God had not created honey, men would say figs are sweeter [Xenophanes] |
Full Idea: If God had not created yellow honey, men would say that figs were sweeter. | |
From: Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE], B38), quoted by Herodian - On Peculiar Speech 41.5 |
15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
Full Idea: If we specify a theory with all of its terms, and then replace all of those terms with variables, we can then say that some n-tuples of entities can satisfy this formula. This Ramsey sentence then says the theory is realised, without specifying by what. | |
From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], II) | |
A reaction: [I have compressed Lewis, and cut out the symbolism] |
15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
Full Idea: I contend that there is a general method for defining newly introduced terms in a scientific theory, one which uses only the old terms we understood beforehand. | |
From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], Intro) | |
A reaction: Lewis is game is to provide bridge laws for a reductive account of nature, without having to introduce something entirely new to achieve it. The idea of bridge laws in scientific theory is less in favour these days. |
15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
Full Idea: A uniquely realised theory is, other things being equal, certainly more satisfactory than a multiply realised theory. We should insist on unique realisation as a standard of correctness unless it is a standard too high to be met. | |
From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], III) | |
A reaction: The point is that rewriting a theory as Ramsey sentences just says there is at least one realisation, and so it doesn't meet the highest standards for scientific theories. The influence of set-theoretic model theory is obvious in this approach. |
15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation. | |
From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], V) |
1640 | The basic Eleatic belief was that all things are one [Xenophanes, by Plato] |
Full Idea: The Eleatic tribe, which had its beginnings from Xenophanes and still earlier, proceed on the grounds that all things so-called are one. | |
From: report of Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE]) by Plato - The Sophist 242d |
3055 | Xenophanes said the essence of God was spherical and utterly inhuman [Xenophanes, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Xenophanes taught that the essence of God was of a spherical form, in no respect resembling man. | |
From: report of Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.2.3 |
408 | Ethiopian gods have black hair, and Thracian gods have red hair [Xenophanes] |
Full Idea: Ethiopians have gods with snub noses and black hair, Thracians have gods with grey eyes and red hair. | |
From: Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE], B16), quoted by Clement - Miscellanies 7.22.1 |
407 | Mortals believe gods are born, and have voices and clothes just like mortals [Xenophanes] |
Full Idea: Mortals believe the gods to be created by birth, and to have raiment, voice and body like mortals'. | |
From: Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE], B14), quoted by Clement - Miscellanies 5.109.2 |